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ABSTRACT

ASSET OWNER GOVERNANCE AND FIDUCIARY EFFECTIVENESS:
THE CASE OF PUBLIC PENSION PLANS
By Christopher K. Merker, CFA
Marquette University, 2017
Purpose: The U.S. and many developed countries are currently facing a retirement
savings crisis. The governance of institutional funds, such as public pension plans, is coming
under greater scrutiny in light of systematic chronic underfunding, declining investment
returns and shifts into higher risk asset classes. A disconnect exists between an
organization’s process under the standards, and the outcome of this process, the overall
effectiveness of the organization and, in particular, its investment performance and funding
status.
Methodology: In 2012, there were approximately 6,300 public retirement systems
in the United States with over $3 trillion in assets. We collected financial, governance and
legal data for the study period 2008-2012. Using the data reduction technique, Principal
Components Analysis, we successfully constructed a Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient Index
(FEQ) and Legal Index, and applied these indexes to multivariate regression analyses to
understand impacts on investment returns, funding ratios and bond yield spreads.

Findings: The FEQ and legal variables demonstrated robust statistical relationships
to pension plan performance measures. Top quintile FEQ organizations outperform bottom
quintile FEQ organizations nearly 2 to 1 based on investment return performance. Higher
FEQ organizations have 27% lower interest cost on related municipal bonds. The FEQ and
the Legal Index together have a direct impact on the funding ratio of pension plans, which
explain 89% of the variation in the funding ratio, an important measure of pension plan
financial health. The FEQ, Legal Index and other factors were 93% accurate in
distinguishing effective from ineffective plans, defined as plans having a funding ratio above
or below 0.50.
Conclusion: While this topic has increasingly gathered attention over the last 20
years, many studies have overly relied on survey responses to discern conclusions around
best practices (Spence Johnson, State Street), a method without empirical basis. This study
reveals that the structure, process and engagement of boards are critical to sustaining
effective performance. Best practices are reviewed and recommended.
Recommendations: Cross-country extension of this empirical approach into the
examination of other asset owners including private pensions, foundations, endowments
and trusts is recommended to assist trustees and policy makers.
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PREFACE

x

Fran Chanwick and Laura Wendling in a 2006 article that appeared in Social Studies

Review praised interdisciplinary approaches in the social sciences: 1

Social studies is inherently interdisciplinary. Within the field, the various

disciplines that comprise social studies link and intertwine. It's difficult to imagine
studying historical content without examining the roles of persons (sociology), their
motivations (psychology), where they lived (geography), the influences of spiritual
beliefs (religion), rules that govern behavior (political science and anthropology), or
how people negotiate for their needs and wants (economics). Outside the field of social
studies, vital connections can also be made to language arts, mathematics, science and
the arts that yield a deeper understanding of concepts and ideas.
Confronting a topic such as governance in investment management, especially in the

area of retirement security, is one subject that requires a thorough knowledge crossing
multiple disciplines. Consider the approach taken in recent years by one high profile
organization: The Bipartisan Policy Center, recognizing the crisis facing millions of

American workers, formed a Commission on Retirement Security and Personal Savings in

2014 to address the challenges facing many current and future retirees. 2 The people on that
19-member commission came from many different backgrounds and disciplines including
government, economics, industry, unions and think tanks. A complex issue demands

intricate examination through multiple lenses.

Since Graham and Dodd, who wrote in the early 1930s, the field of finance has

primarily focused on understanding the valuation and movement of asset prices. Since the

1970s, this began to change with the work of psychologists like Daniel Kahneman and Amos
1 Chadwick, Fran and Wendling, Laura M., “Social Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach”, Social Studies Review, Vol.
45. No. 2, Spring 2006
2 “Securing Our Financial Future: Report of the Commission on Retirement Security and Personal Savings”, June 2016,
Bipartisan Policy Center

Tversky, who introduced the idea that perhaps humans are bounded in their own

xi

rationality, and that common behavioral biases can manifest themselves every day in

product and financial markets in ways that can be explained by alternative theories beyond
classical economics.

Such is the approach I have taken in this work. Drawing from economics, law,

psychology, finance and ethics, I have cast a wide net in trying to understand whether we
can assess and systematically understand the governance of asset owners, including

pension funds, foundations, endowment and trusts. For example, it is nearly impossible to
talk about a fiduciary without reference to the law, discuss investment objectives without
considering financial concepts, or examine a board decision without considering the
organizational behavior aspects underpinning a given board’s interaction.

The idea for this study came to me from two different – but connected – worlds:

from several years of working directly with asset owners and other investors; and teaching

the subject of investment ethics, corporate governance and socially responsible investing at
Marquette. I observed “on the ground” the challenges that organizations regularly face in

doing the best job they can with their investments, how organizations can go through up

and down periods, and I also saw the impact our work was having in helping organizations
to do better. And “in the sky”, I became a student of corporate governance in my own

classroom, including regularly bringing in outside experts in this area with real world

experience serving on boards. This includes people like John Shiely, chairman emeritus at
Briggs & Stratton, and a professional board member and student himself of corporate

governance having done fellowship work at Harvard on the topic (and also a grad of the

Marquette Law School). When I was an MBA student in the late 1990s, corporate

governance was in the early stages of becoming a classroom topic; and now it is an integral
part of finance and law school curricula.

I also feel quite fortunate to have fallen in with – and be influenced by – many

xii

wonderful, talented and thoughtful people at Baird, Marquette, the CFA Institute and the
CFA Society Milwaukee and Make-A-Difference-WI, many of whom have dedicated their

lives to making the world a better place, whether for investors or for students-in-training to

serve investors. And I’m glad I have had the opportunity to make this modest contribution
to the field. For this reason, I dedicate this work to the people who work every day to
confront the ills of financial illiteracy.

CHAPTER I

1

INTRODUCTION
The word 'risk' derives from the early Italian risicare, which means 'to dare'. In this
sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate. The actions we dare to take, which depend on
how free we are to make choices, are what the story of risk is all about. And that story
helps define what it means to be a human being.
― Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk
Human history could be summarized as a struggle to minimize risk to one’s

livelihood and live as comfortable a life as possible for as long as possible. In many respects
in today’s world we can declare victory on this goal. People are living more comfortable

lives longer, and this quality of life is not limited to the select few, but for many living well

above the poverty line. Happiness, or social well-being as an increasingly popular measure

of human welfare, is also widespread and continuing to grow. 3 And for those still living at or

below the poverty line, there is still hope as countries continue their forward progression of
growth and development.

And yet despite this progress, we are facing a looming crisis of epic proportion: a

risky and insecure retirement for millions of Americans. To see the many commercials on

television about retirement planning, one would come away with the impression that the

solution is already in place. The statistics tell a much different story. The average household
has virtually no retirement savings. 45% of working households do not have an IRA or a

401(k) account. The estimated collective savings gap for working households ages 25 to 64

is estimated to be between $6.8 and $14 trillion. Two-thirds of working households ages 55
3

See Michael Porter’s Social Progress Index (SPI) for example.

to 64 have not saved more than one year’s worth of salary, and 90% of all working

2

households fail tests of retirement and pension assets for meeting future retirement needs. 4
An under-saved population, and an underfunded “safety” net system – in the face of

rising longevity, increasing health care costs, and unfavorable demographic trends (i.e.,

more retirees and fewer workers due to lower fertility rates across the entire developed

world) – portend a future of financial, political and social instability. This poses a large-scale

problem that is certain to come to a head this century, and we are already seeing the cracks
in places like Chicago, where the local government is already in the throes of dealing with
its pension crisis. 5

Transition to the Welfare State

Making sure that aging workers have their basic needs met in retirement until death

has been a common social value and objective since the beginning of civilization.

Throughout human history most elders were adequately cared for under the extended
family model (Aboderin, 2004).

Yet, for most of human history provision for a long retirement was largely

unnecessary as most died earlier in life anyway. That condition has changed: life expectancy
since 1850 has nearly doubled, increasing by approximately 40 years. 6 Today a large

percentage of people may expect to live 25 or 30 years into retirement.

The extended family model started to break down during the course of the

Industrial Revolution, as humans migrated on a massive scale from rural to urban areas in

4

“The Retirement Crisis: Is it Worse than We Think?, by Nari Rhee, Ph.D., National Institute on Retirement Security, June
2013
5 The Pension Crisis in Chicago and Illinois website, Chicago Tribune
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/rtc/chi-pension-crisis-gallery-storygallery.html
6 University of Oregon, http://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/US/US39-01.html

search of work and a new life. Heretofore, there was no need for state- or firm-provided

3

retirement plans, as the extended family more or less provided for those needs.

In the 20th century, two trends emerged: the nuclear family as the primary

household unit, with no longer multiple generations living under one roof, and as

mentioned already, longer lives. In addition, divorce became more prevalent as women

gained more social and economic independence. With divorce impacting one out of two

families, the family unit has been further eroded, with few able or willing to care for the

grandparents and great-grandparents during their golden years (ibid).

The rise of the Welfare State is one significant shift that occurred over the course of

the 20th century to fill this gap. As labor movements arose in the late 19th century,

corporations began introducing health and retirement plans. Public plans at the state and

municipal levels were introduced as well. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, these

local level schemes were broadened to cover virtually every American with the introduction
of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid (Ferguson, 2008).
Capitalism

Both the private and public sectors have a multi-fold role in this system of

retirement security. This can in no way be characterized as an offshoot of a purely capitalist
model, but rather a hybrid state capitalist system that emerged to buttress the social
upheaval wrought by the 19th century Industrial Revolution (ibid).

First, workers and employers pay into health and retirement schemes, whether

through pre-tax contributions or through payroll tax. Secondly, particularly in public and
private pension schemes, the pooled contributions of employers and employees are

invested in the capital markets. Early on these investments were made in primarily

4

conservative fixed income investments, but over time especially through the spread of

Modern Portfolio Theory beginning in the 1950’s, they became diversified across equities
and alternative investments (e.g., investments in non-traditional asset classes including

commodities, real estate, private equity and hedge funds), and so the investable universe

expanded. The base of pooled savings and investment – and the industry around it – grew.
Provision to the generation of retirees at the time was a non-issue in the face of a rapidly

growing U.S. economy and high worker-to-retiree ratios to fund a mostly “pay-as-you go”

system, using Social Security as an example. 7

Pools of assets such as retirement funds are managed for the purpose of growing the

capital base, as well as to produce income. Both capital appreciation and investment income
are forms of investment return. The targeted rate of investment return is intended to: 1)

maintain purchasing power by keeping pace with inflation, and; 2) minimize and close the
gap on future funding requirements to meet benefit payments throughout the course of
beneficiary retirement.

Until the 1980s private sector retirement plans were primarily comprised of

Defined Benefit (DB) plans, which are plans that provide a guaranteed benefit to the future
retiree. Since that time, various schemes known as Defined Contribution (DC) programs,

primarily 401(k) and 403(b) plans, have predominantly shifted the future funding burden
from the employer to employee, and such has been the trend with the decline in DB

programs (Broadbent et al, 2006). Since 1985 the percentage share of DB versus DC plan

assets in the U.S. has flipped with the majority of assets in Defined Contribution plans today
(ibid).

7

Feldstein, Martin and Liebman, Jeffrey B., Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 4, Chapter 32, Social Security
pp.2248-2265, edited by A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V.

This shifting of the funding burden on employees has at the same time called on

5

them to be more directly involved in investment decisions. Employees must decide not only
how much to save for retirement, but then how to invest those savings in the capital

markets. This approach leaves employees up to their own devices with many ill-prepared to

make such decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). This leads to sub-optimal investment

returns in aggregate across society, and fails the utilitarian test for good public policy of
benefiting the most for the least cost, but it does transfer the risk of not meeting benefit

obligations from employer to employee.

Capitalism does play a significant role in providing the incentives for service

providers and investment products to help institutions and individuals invest for

retirement. The range – and quality – of service providers vary significantly, from

investment consultants to investment managers to financial advisors, in addition to the
army of custodians, trustees, retirement plan attorneys who specialize in ERISA, and

actuaries and third party administrators that provide plan services. 8

The investment products abound as well, from target date funds, which are dynamic

asset allocation mutual funds that automatically “risk adjust” as the mutual fund holder

approaches retirement, to annuities, which are insurance contracts that offer a guaranteed
income stream over a period of years in retirement. The overwhelming number of savings

and investment vehicles further burdens individuals in making both informed and effective
decisions. Sub-optimal outcomes are impacted by the inability of many individuals to

contend with numerous issues such as fees and expenses, investment performance and tax

implications to name but a few. It also leaves individuals vulnerable to sales people,

8

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1972 (ERISA)

6

especially purveyors of hybrid investment and insurance products, such as annuities, which
promise guaranteed income, but generally have high expenses and low investment returns.

One redeeming feature in the modern framework for retirement services is the role

of the fiduciary, the subject of this dissertation. A fiduciary relationship is governed by legal
principles handed down from common law since the Roman Empire. A fiduciary standard

on a federal level as applied to pension plans under ERISA has been in place since the early
1970s. Essentially this means that the people put in charge of a pool of retirement assets,

whether the pension committee of a corporate or state pension fund, have the obligation to

manage the assets on behalf of the beneficiaries, current and future retirees, as if the assets

were their own. This is also known as the Prudent Person rule, a legal maxim restricting the

discretion in a client's account to investments that a prudent person seeking reasonable
income and preservation of capital might buy for his or her own portfolio.

Most involved in this process of investment management, where some element of

discretion over the investments is exercised, are held to a fiduciary standard. Professional

service providers receive a fee for service. So, a simple transaction of fee for service is held
to a much higher standard than a typical transaction as it relates to most other

commodities. Typically the problems in such relationships stem from conflicts of interest
(i.e., self-dealing). The law governing these relationships is both intricate and complex.
Given the turbulent nature of the business cycle in the overall economy (e.g.,

recessions and depressions), many households struggle during periods when

unemployment rises and household income drops precipitously. A weakened family

structure combined with the cyclical nature of the overall economy, gives further impetus to
having institutions like pension plans – managed by fiduciaries – in place to safeguard the

retirement income of our elder citizens. This need is especially evident during and after the

more virulent cycles, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the 2008 Global

7

Financial Crisis (GFC).

Recent regulatory reform, partially mandated by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, and

pushed by the Obama Administration, has established a fiduciary standard for any financial

advisor providing retirement planning and investment services, which applies to most retail
investment advisors and financial planners, all 401(k) advisors and many investment

managers. 9 This campaign to expand the fiduciary standard came at a time with enhanced

scrutiny on fees. 10

So, while capitalism clearly has a role in our retirement system, to say this is a pure

form of capitalism would be misguided. One can imagine a system, with no government

involvement, where employers would offer the best retirement plans to attract the best

workers, or alternatively, individuals would treat retirement (i.e., longevity risk) like they
do any other type of risk or “insurance” product bought on the open market such as

insurance for life, property and casualty. In such a system the idea of a social safety net for

the most desperate elements in our society, such as the infirm or the mentally incompetent,
could still co-exist.

So, applying a pragmatic test, a system that is more efficient because of capitalism,

and a moral test to this system, a system that promotes freedom, it is difficult to say

capitalism fails these tests because capitalism’s role is both limited and distorted by the

government’s role within the Welfare State.

9

“Obama Backs New Rules for Brokers on Retirement Accounts: Proposal requires advisers to put clients’ interests first”
by Andrew Ackerman and Karen Damato, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2015
10 “Is Wall Street Eating Your 401(k) Nest Egg?” By Chris Arnold, NPR, October 19, 2015
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/19/445322138/is-wall-street-eating-your-401-k-nest-egg

Background on Pensions and Investments
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A brief primer on the basics of pensions and investments is necessary before we

continue. Appendix A – Definition of Key Terms includes a complete glossary of
investment-related terminology.

A portfolio of investments (bonds, stocks, and alternative investments including real

estate, private equity and other “real” assets, such as commodities) is managed to support
the specific objectives of an individual (e.g., saving for education or retirement) or

organization (e.g., providing funding for a college endowment). Investments have risk and,
therefore, must be managed in accordance within a number of constraints specifically
including liquidity needs, time horizon, tax considerations, legal and regulatory
requirements and unique situational circumstances.

Pensions are managed in light of these objectives, but have some additional

constraints specifically regarding demographic characteristics among current and future

retirees, which along with market conditions will impact funding requirements. They also

have significant regulatory oversight, particularly in the case of private pensions. These two

aspects alone drive a complex funding and management structure that requires additional

outside expertise and other service providers including actuaries, investment consultants,
investment managers, Third Party Administrators (TPAs), custodians, etc. Actuaries

evaluate mathematically the funding requirements to ensure benefits are paid to future

retirees. Consultants advise on the portfolio, and managers make investments. TPAs process
benefit payments on behalf of plans, and a custodian is a specialized financial institution

responsible for safeguarding financial assets.

The discount rate plays a key role in assessing whether the pension plan has enough

assets to meet its future pension obligations (also known as liabilities). The discount rate
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reflects what the plan's assets can reasonably be expected to earn over the long term. From
this are subtracted the cost of running the pension plan and provisions for major adverse
events, such as asset declines due to economic recessions. Plan sponsors make annual
required contributions to maintain the asset base in relation to the projected liability

obligation (PBO). The hope is that the investment returns will be enough (either to meet or
exceed the discount rate) to offset as much as possible the ongoing and future required
contributions.

The discount rate is approved annually by the plan's board members. This is one of

only many decisions that a board must make throughout the year, but it is an important one.
The process to set the discount rate must be robust enough to ensure this assumption is

reasonable and appropriate for the plan. The discount rate must be realistic to avoid

masking plan funding issues that could impact future generations of retirees and plan
members. For example, if the assumption is too high and investments earn less than

expected, a funding shortfall could result, requiring younger and future plan members to

contribute more to the pension plan, receive lower benefits, or both. If the assumption is too
low, current members could pay more than necessary for their pensions or benefits may be
reduced more than necessary.

Problems of the Current Retirement System

Many state and local retirement plans are on an unsustainable course, having failed to
set aside enough money to fund the promises they have made.
- The Pew Charitable Trusts 11

11

http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/public-sector-retirement-systems

The current system is failing under the American capitalist system, but to call it a

10

“market failure” and attribute this to capitalist precepts – as many current socialist thinkers

argue in discussing neoliberalism – is a misinterpretation of what capitalist thought, in

particular, classical liberalism espouses. 12 Essentially, the answer is more nuanced. This

claim also ignores the inertia of social systems and institutions that evolve over time around
a social problem (Ferguson, 2008). Our retirement system took a long time to develop and
the social, political and market forces that formed it did not spring from a pure Smithian
ideal and vision of the future, but – I would assert – rather a corruption of that ideal.

I would, in a number of ways, draw comparisons of the failure of our retirement

system to the failure of our health care system, which is another form of state

interventionist capitalist system with similar symptoms: over-capacity with a proliferation

of products and services, many of which are poor and ineffective; costly, inadequate

coverage for many Americans; heavily bureaucratic and regulatory infrastructure, and a
general lack of transparency and accountability among institutions. 13

First, let us identify the failures and then examine the root causes of each:

1. Most people are unprepared. Clearly, people are not saving enough for

retirement. 14 Is this because people have no regard for their future welfare, and are

acting irrationally? Or is it because corporations and governments are not making

sufficient provision for retirement savings, and are somehow leading people into a
false sense of security?

The problem is two-fold: 1) moral hazard; and 2) deficiencies that are

psychological/behavioral in nature. First, the perception of government and corporate12

Judt, T. (2010). Ill fares the land. New York: Penguin Press.
Hiltzik, Michael, “The U.S. healthcare system: worst in the developed world”, Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2014
14
The Retirement Crisis: Is it Worse than We Think?, by Nari Rhee, Ph.D., National Institute on Retirement Security, June
2013
13

sponsored programs, most notably Social Security and Medicare, well-funded in the past,
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likely telegraphs to future retirees that the system is adequate, and, therefore, any risk has

been effectively transferred to the providers of these programs. This is a clear example of

moral hazard, which is a concept taken from insurance and defined as a lack of incentive to
guard against risk where one is protected from its consequences.

However, this perception is changing. A recent T. Rowe Price survey showed that

Millennials are increasing their rates of participation in 401(k) plans. When asked why, the

most common answer was due to concerns about the future solvency and availability of
Social Security. 15 A recent survey by the International Foundation on Employee Benefit
Plans shows that 71% of Americans are concerned about the security of their future

retirement. However, concern does not necessarily translate into action around that
concern i.e., saving more. 16

Secondly, behavioral finance research has uncovered a number of heuristics and

biases impacting people’s ability to make effective retirement decisions (Benartzi and

Thaler, 2007). Inherent behavioral deficiencies likely can be neutralized with education, e.g.,

basic financial literacy, and reducing poor retirement decisions for most people. This
applies to those making decisions on their own investments, as well as those making

decisions on behalf of others, i.e., trustees of pension boards. Our system of education is

woefully inadequate in preparing people for making and managing financial decisions. 17

This has created generations of Americans who suffer from lacking an essential working
knowledge of planning and household budgeting, management of credit, saving and
investing.
15

“Think Millennials Are Neglecting 401(k)s? Think Again,” ThinkAdvisor, May 22, 2015
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/05/22/think-millennials-are-neglecting-401ks-think-again
16
2015 Annual Report, International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, p. 7
17
https://www.financialeducatorscouncil.org/financial-literacy-statistics/
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2. The current public pension system is underfunded, and may require deep cuts
in benefits in the future. This will further add to the financial insecurity of millions
of future retirees. If people cannot provide for themselves, what happens when
institutions also fail them?

The current public pension system is comprised of state and municipal pension

plans and Social Security. According to a report by Morningstar in 2012, over 40% of states
had a funding ratio of less than 70%, a level Morningstar considers fiscally unsound. 18

Furthermore, this condition has been masked by current accounting standards, and despite
the relative improvement from rising stock market valuations.

For example, a report by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

indicated the aggregate funded level for 126 large pension plans it sampled would decline
from 76% based on fiscal 2010 levels to a much lower level of 57%, when these changes

became in enacted in 2014-15. The same report cited a study by the actuarial firm, Milliman,
which found a $1.2 trillion gap for the largest 100 public pension plans. Here is but one

example of the actuarial and accounting financial shenanigans being played in the public

sector causing such disparities: the Pension Protection Act of 2006 requires a discount rate

as applied to corporate pension plans as determined by an appropriate market corporate

bond yield, typically in the 4.5% range; but the average public pension plan – not subject to

the same rules – uses a discount rate of 7.74%. 19 Such a gulf in discount rates means that

for public funds their liabilities may be severely understated relative to the more restrictive
corporate method, as much as $3 trillion depending on the method used.

18

Barkley, Rachel, “The State of State Pension Plans: A Deep Dive Into Shortfalls and Surpluses”, Morningstar,
November 26, 2012
19 Bui,Truong and Randazzo, Anthony, “Why Discount Rates Should Reflect Liabilities: Best Practices for Setting Public
Sector Pension Fund Discount Rates”, Reason Foundation Policy Brief No. 130 September 2015
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So dire is the pension funding in the state of Illinois that the legislature was cited by

the SEC in 2013 for misleading the investing public in its municipal bond offerings because
of improper disclosure of the state’s mismanaged and underfunded pension fund. The SEC
has taken similar action only one other time in history – at the state level (the municipal
level is not altogether uncommon) – with the state of New Jersey in 2007. 20

This crisis took a new turn in 2015 when the city of Chicago was blocked by the

Illinois Supreme Court from reforming its municipal pension system through benefit

reductions, citing constitutional guarantees that could not be modified ad hoc. Moody’s, a
bond rating agency, subsequently downgraded Chicago municipal bonds to “junk” status,

meaning that the bonds were no longer viewed by the ratings agencies as being of sufficient
credit quality to be defined as investment grade. This reflected the worsening fiscal outlook

for the city and the increasing probability of a future default on the city’s borrowings due to
its growing unfunded pension obligations. 21

The decline in public pension systems is one that is being driven in large part by

government intervention in the market that has almost no relation to a capitalist structure.

With little accountability by the people in government in the face of lower returns, and

greater cost increases in benefits, in many cases benefits guaranteed under state

constitution as in the case of Illinois, these issues combine to make this situation hard to
reform and virtually untenable to sustain (Ennis, 2007).

3. Most corporate plans no longer guarantee benefits, and have shifted the
funding and investment burden to workers. As already highlighted, since the

20

1980s, companies have been freezing or shutting down their Defined Benefit

“Illinois is Accused of Fraud by S.E.C.” by Mary Williams Walsh, The New York Times, March 11, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/business/sec-accuses-illinois-of-securities-fraud.html?_r=0
21 “Chicago credit rating plummets to junk status following pension ruling”, May 12, 2015, Chicago Tribune.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-credit-rating-junk-status-met-0513-20150512-story.html
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pension funds, and instead opting to provide Defined Contribution plans (Skinner,

2007). This represents a further erosion of the safeguards provided institutionally
by the private sector.

Continued reductions in benefits, both in terms of healthcare and retirement, reflect

the reality of an ongoing decline in worker benefits and wages overall. However, this is also
occurring at a time of rising healthcare costs, which is further exacerbating the situation.
One reason for the worsening position of U.S. workers has to do with competition from

abroad. The U.S. was abnormally favored in the post-World War II period as it capitalized on
the global destruction left in the War’s wake. However, U.S. hegemony in both business and

politics could not last forever.

In the modern era, it is likely that many of us, by assuming that the future will look

very similar to the past, suffer from a fallacy of extrapolation. Times have changed since

many benefit schemes were put in place. Many came at a time when U.S. corporations were
dominant globally, enormously profitable and labor unions were strong. The two groups
essentially came together and made promises to workers that seemed reasonable at the

time, but were completely unsustainable in a world of increased competition and slowing

economic growth.

Nowhere did we see this play out more succinctly than the near collapse of the U.S.

auto industry during the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Here we witnessed the

consequences of the promises made decades ago by auto industry management and labor

unions. As sales collapsed, it became clear that these companies could no longer fund their
obligations, especially the enormous ongoing payments required for retirees. As I heard

someone once quip, “General Motors is a pension fund that happens to produce cars in its
spare time”.

So, the choices are what they are for U.S. companies: offer plans that may be too

15

costly to maintain in the future, or limit financial risk and make contributions to retirement
savings accounts, but no longer guarantee the benefit payout. On this point, industry has

clearly voted. What about the companies that do not offer any plans? While most medium-

sized and larger sized enterprises offer some kind of retirement plan, only 14% of small

businesses, defined as companies with less than 100 employees, offer a plan. The primary
reason: too costly. 22 President Obama in his 2016 State of the Union address called for

reforms to directly address this issue such as changing the law to allow small business to
band together to offer multi-employer 401(k) plans across industries. Today they are

restricted to being offered only within a common industry. A reform package would include
subsidies and tax deductions to incent the funding of such plans.

For those who have access to a plan, which represent over 80% of full-time working

Americans, with proper saving and investing a secure retirement could be within reach. 23
For small business and part-time workers, the segments of the economy that fall within a

“retirement gap”, there are policy considerations to expand coverage, as in the way the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) extended health care to close this gap.

4. Longevity and demographic trends are a persistent headwind. People live much
longer lives today. 24 Longevity risk, as it is known in the retirement business, is a

reality and a costly matter. At the same time, population replacement, as fertility
rates have steadily declined over the past century, means that relative to the

growing number of retirees there are fewer workers contributing to the system to
22 “Why Small Businesses Don't Offer Retirement Plans: Small companies generally provide high-cost retirement benefits,
if they offer them at all.” By Emily Brandon, August 12, 2013, U.S. News
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2013/08/12/why-small-businesses-dont-offer-retirement-plans
23 “401(k) Fast Facts”, American Benefits Council, March 2014,
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents2013/401k_stats.pdf
24 University of Oregon, http://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/US/US39-01.html
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cover benefit payments. These two persistent conditions will no doubt ensure that
the system will continue to struggle into the future.

Currently, it is forecast that Social Security trust fund will run out of funding in 2034

due to this problem alone, unless the system is reformed. That reform is likely to come in
the form of deferred retirement ages when beneficiaries may begin collecting payments,
reductions in benefits or both. This problem is evident across the developed world, and

varies only to the extent of the severity of the problem. For instance, Germany’s population

is forecast to fall by 30% by 2150, which will likely impact not only retirement security, but
the overall standard of living of that country. 25

It is for this reason that the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index assigns

Germany an overall grade of C+, in particular scoring a D in the category of Sustainability.
Japan’s outlook is even worse, scoring an overall grade of D, with an E in the category of

Sustainability. The U.S., by the way, with moderately better fertility rates and immigration
policy, scores a C in its overall grade, with C’s across the board in every category. 26

The cost of health care further exacerbates the retirement security problem, as the

largest consumers of health care, of course, are retirees. The Social Security Trustees 2015
Report forecasts, in addition to Social Security costs rising from 4.5% of GDP to 6%, that
Medicare will also rise from 3.75% to 5.75% by 2030 and 2035, respectively. This is a

problem getting worse as more and more people retire each year, from the over 80 million
people that comprise the Baby Boom generation. 27
25

“Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Ageing and Population Decline”, Population Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Secretariat, New York, 16-18 October 2000
26 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, 2014 http://www.globalpensionindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2014-OverallGrades.jpg
27 A Summary of the 2015 Annual Reports, Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/

Unfortunately, no one particular conditional factor, i.e., demographic, educational,
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etc. – or institutional factor, i.e., public and corporate funds, Social Security – is alleviating

the problem of insufficient funding for millions of retirees. If anything, the problem is being
compounded by many of the same issues driving the failure of our health care system.

Many believe that the hybrid model of state capitalism represents a corruption of the promarket ideal, and has created a system of incentives that is self-defeating to the goals of
society, in particular the health and retirement security of our citizens. 28

In summary, future focus should be spent on reviewing the necessary reforms to our

current system. Education should be a part of that solution – especially as people are being
asked to do more – and help empower current and future generations to begin the process

of saving and investing for retirement early in working life. Additionally, there will be many

tough reform battles ahead that will likely be played out in and outside of the courts, as we
are already seeing in places like Chicago.

The good news is that most full-time working Americans have access to a Defined

Contribution plan. For those who are part-time or working for a small business that does
not offer a plan, this is one area that could be strengthened by public policy. One place
government could potentially have a much expanded role is in the area of providing

education to our citizens to promote financial literacy. This would potentially drive greater
participation and savings into our system of employer-offered retirement plans.

Finally, the system could also benefit from greater transparency, awareness and

oversight on the individuals administering retirement plans, and other dedicated funds

such as endowments and foundations, both in the public and private sectors. According to
the Pew Charitable Trusts,
28

Cavanna, H. et al, Challenges to the Welfare State: Internal and External Dynamics for Change,
Forum International des Sciences Humaines, Paris, France, 1998

Democracy is well-served when informed and engaged citizens are able to exercise
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their most important civic duties—especially voting. But the American people also need to
know that federal, state, and local leaders spend (and manage – author’s addition) taxpayer
dollars efficiently and wisely. 29
A system for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of fiduciaries is the subject

of this dissertation.

U.S. Public Pension System Characteristics

Our study sample set is derived from 163 public pension systems representing $1.4

trillion in assets, or 47% of the total assets of the overall system. These systems represent
most of the states and larger city and county municipalities. According to the U.S. Census
there were 6,299 retirement plan systems with total assets in 2012 of over $3 trillion. In
addition there are approximately 4,000 municipal bond issuers. As we will see in later

sections the role of the municipal bond market is particularly important when it comes to
today’s public pension system.

We apply the lens of corporate governance theory to understanding performance

differences of boards of asset owners given readily available data. That being said, when

working with public pension fund data there are some unique characteristics of the U.S.
public pension system – which are, of course, governmental bodies – that must first be
understood.

Figure 1 provides a conceptual overview of the U.S. public pension system as it

relates to governance and the many variables that influence financial strength and

performance. There are two primary sources of funding for public pensions: investment
29

http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/topics/governing

19

returns and contributions. Over the last five years 67% have come from investment returns,
23% from employer contributions and 10% from employee contributions. 30 Our focus is on

the fiduciary effectiveness of public pension boards that impact two-thirds of the funding.
However, the fiscal prudence and management of the plan sponsor (states and

municipalities) will also influence the other third. These two contributions combine to meet
the actuarially determined annual required contribution (ARC). The adequacy and

consistency of contributions, in addition to other dynamic factors that drive ongoing shifts
in plan valuation, will influence the funding status and overall financial health of the plan.
Endogenous factors, factors that are primarily under the control of the board and

plan sponsor organization include 1) governance practices; 2) fiscal management of the

municipality; 3) hiring and compensation practices as it relates to the plan beneficiaries

(i.e., employees); and 4) actuarial and accounting practices and norms. Exogenous factors,
factors that are either mostly or completely outside the control of the board and plan
sponsor include: 1) demographic factors, i.e., how young or old the plan beneficiary

population is; 2) financial and market conditions, which influence asset prices and interest

rates; 4) political processes; and 5) economic conditions, which can significantly impact tax
revenue.

As the health of the pension plan declines two things start to happen. As we note in

the later section, “Bond Vigilantes: When Governance Fails”, the imputed interest cost of a
sponsoring municipality’s bonds increases as the bond yield spread widens, reflecting
growing risk aversion among investors. As bonds come under selling pressure, prices

decline and yields increase. Secondly, and over much longer periods of time, often – but not
always marked by crisis – a legal wrangle begins to occur. Municipalities, to stem the
30

DeGroot, Peter, Narayan, Karthik, and Henriques, Drew, “U.S. Fixed Income Markets Weekly: US Pension Plan
Update: Underfunded plans to have a higher spread beta to an economic downturn necessitating increased due
diligence”, J.P. Morgan, June 10, 2016, p. 13

funding problem, will engage in “pension reform” by reducing benefits either through
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outright benefit reductions or increasing denial of benefits. This begins to manifest itself in
a growing number of court cases as beneficiaries seek legal remedies to the problem.

Increasing bond spreads and the growing frequency and magnitude of courts cases are all
indicators of a system in distress.

It is for these reasons we have focused in this study on both governance and legal

factors in assessing both pension plan performance and sustainability.
Figure 1 – U.S. Public Pension System Overview

U.S. Public Pension System Overview
Fiduciary
Effectiveness

Investment
Fund

State / Municipal
Budget

Returns - 67% of required contribution*

•
•
•
•
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Fiscal management
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accounting standards
and practices

Municipal bond
market
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Employees – 10% of required contribution*

Annual Required
Contribution (ARC)

Endogenous Factors

Fiscal
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Pension Health /
Solvency

Exogenous Factors
•
•
•
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•

Demographics
Market conditions
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Political process
Economic conditions

• Funding ratio
<70% - poor health**

Higher bond yields – 39
bps higher on average*
(Concurrent indicator)
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incident rates
(Lagging indicator)

Signs of System Distress
Source: JP Morgan (2016) – average percentage contribution of the last five years
**Morningstar (2013)

Legal system

Asset Owners and Governance Fiduciaries
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There are many different kinds of asset owners in the world. They range from very

large sovereign wealth funds to small private family foundations. Figure 2 shows asset

owners in the U.S. by size of assets and number of organizations. There is one characteristic
that all asset owners have in common: every single fund is overseen by a group of trustees

or governance fiduciaries.

Figure 2 – Asset Owners in the United States, 2012

According to the Foundation for Fiduciary Studies (Ober, 2005), a fiduciary is someone

who: 31
•

•
•

Manages property for the benefit of another;

Exercises discretionary authority or control over assets; and

Acts in a professional capacity of trust and renders comprehensive, continuous
investment advice.

31

“Fiduciary Responsibility: Liability and Consequences, Stuart Ober, AIFA, Journal of Financial Planning, 2005, p. 51

22

According to the CFA Institute’s Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct,

Standard III(A) – Loyalty, Prudence, and Care – “requires CFA members and candidates for

the CFA designation to exercise a duty of loyalty to their clients, act with reasonable care,
exercise prudent judgment, act for the benefits of clients and place their clients’ interests

before their own…(and a Fiduciary is someone) who exercises ― discretionary authority or

control with respect to management of the plan or management or disposition of its
assets.” 32

The financial fiduciary plays a significant role in our economy. In the simplest terms,

fiduciaries are charged with achieving the risk-return objectives for their clients. Ober

(2005) states that virtually every investment decision at the institutional fund level is made
by a fiduciary, representing control of over 80% of the investable financial assets in the
U.S. 33 So, our system of financial oversight and control means that, for most Americans,

investment decisions are in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals. There are an
estimated 5 million people who act in the capacity of financial fiduciaries, or about 1.6% of
the overall population. 34

The term Fiduciary encompasses “the more than five million people who have

the legal responsibility for managing someone else’s money, including members of
investment committees of retirement plans, foundations and endowments; trustees of
private trusts; and investment advisors.”
The causes of the 2008 Credit Crisis in the United States and ensuing Great

Recession were many, and have been studied and analyzed in great detail over the last few
years. The Wall Street Journal in a 2011 editorial boiled it down to a list of ten essential
32

“Proposed Rule: Definition of Fiduciary under ERISA”, CFA Institute Letter to the Department of Labor, February 2,
2011
33
ibid
34
“Fiduciary Responsibility: Liability and Consequences,” Stuart Ober, AIFA, Journal of Financial Planning, 2005, p. 51

factors that included a speculative and combined bubble in credit and housing, a
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proliferation of non-traditional mortgage products, failures in credit rating and

securitization, a herd mentality of large and mid-sized financial institutions, which through
the use of leverage amassed enormous positions in these securitized products. All of which
ultimately led to extensive counterparty risk, contagion, financial firm failures, shock and
panic across the financial markets, and a severe recession. 35

The impact this had on retirement savings and pensions was, of course, significant

and far-reaching. This is due not only to the decline in assets during the deep market

downturn, but more insidiously, and even after markets recovered, to the historically low
and protracted interest rate environment we have seen since 2008. Low interest rates

punish savers and individuals on a fixed income, typically retirees, and degrade the funding
position of pension funds, as well as their ability to earn a return on fixed income

investments. It is likely that the additional risk taking occurring in public pension funds is

also due to the extremely low interest rate environment as observed by recent research
conducted by the investment consulting firm, Callan. 36

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which was commissioned by Congress to

determine the exact causes of the crisis, completed its 662-page report in January 2011. 37

While the report notes among its list of summary conclusions of the “systemic breakdown in
accountability and ethics”, and points to several groups of culpable individuals ranging from
lenders to regulators, it does not once in the entire report make any mention of the word,
“fiduciary” or explain the role of those who have control over the vast majority of

35

“What Caused the Financial Crisis? Congress's inquiry commission is offering a simplistic narrative that could lead to
the wrong policy reforms” By Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey And Douglas Holtz, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 2011
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704698004576104500524998280
36 Martin, Timothy W., “Pension Funds Pile on Risk Just to Get a Reasonable Return
An investor used to get a 7.5% return by holding safe bonds: To earn that now, research finds, takes a more volatile mix”,
Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2016
37
“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report”, January 2011 http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf

investment decisions. Others have described where investment managers did have a role
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following the report, for example, Manconi et al (2012) describe how institutional investors
propagated the crisis in terms of a financial mechanism, but not from a fiduciary
standpoint. 38

And yet, following the crisis, one of the public policy measures under consideration

has been expanding application of the fiduciary standard to include not just investment
advisors, but virtually anyone who buys or sells a security on behalf of a client. 39 As

mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010,
Section 913 of the Act called for a study followed by new regulations of broker/dealers and
investment advisers (Trone and Harvey 2010). 40 The study is required to document

specific differences between the broker/dealer suitability standard and the investment

adviser fiduciary standard. Effective June 7, 2016 the Department of Labor (DOL) Fiduciary

Rule went into effect, but while it only applies to qualified retirement accounts (i.e. 401(k)
and IRA accounts), it will still impact the vast majority of investment professionals.

This information is presented as background regarding the current environment

concerning the Fiduciary Standard. While the Fiduciary Standard has evolved over the last

century, and is clearly going through another period of evolution, the purpose of this study
is to examine the link between fiduciaries and relative and absolute measures of fiduciary
effectiveness. A blunt measure of fiduciary effectiveness is the risk-return performance of
the financial assets the fiduciary manages. Board size, board turnover and use of an

investment consultant are just a sampling of the characteristics that are likely to impact
fiduciaries’ investment decisions and ultimately their effectiveness.
38

The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007-2008, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 104, No.
3, pp. 491-518, June 2012 Alberto Manconi Massimo Massa Ayako Yasuda
“The Need for a ‘Harmonized’ Fiduciary Standard”, Donald B. Trone, RF™ and Louis S. Harvey, RF™, FOUNDATION
FOR FIDUCIARY STUDIES, August 29, 2010
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This research compiles data on fiduciary characteristics of organizations, their
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attributes, processes and practices, as well as their investment performance. Through

econometric modeling, we analyze these processes to ascertain whether there is a link

between fiduciary practice and performance, and from that examination determine whether
practices, as defined by law and understood broadly across academia and industry, directly
result in certain performance outcomes. In other words, does better process drive better
outcomes, and can a rating, measure or index be used to quantify this effectiveness?
Additionally, the findings of the study allow us to contemplate how people and

organizations may be held accountable to such a rating in today’s system of asset owner
governance.

Statement of the Problem

Statutory fiduciary standards relative to management of institutional funds by

organizations offer little guidance from a process point of view. In today’s world, investors,

donors, taxpayers and beneficiaries are likely to be poorly equipped to objectively evaluate

an organization’s fiduciary effectiveness or distinguish the effectiveness of one organization
in managing its assets over another. A disconnect exists between an organization’s process
under the standards, and the outcome of this process, the overall effectiveness of the

organization and, in particular, its investment performance. This is a ubiquitous problem for
virtually all citizens, as stakeholders of such organizations charged with fiduciary

obligations include taxpayers, investors, beneficiaries, and donors. As Cackowski (2007)
observes:

Fiduciary standards governing the selection of investment managers and the

monitoring of investment decisions offer very little operational guidance. The guidance
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cautions little more than that the fiduciary exercise ordinary prudence, diversify and
adhere to Modern Portfolio Theory. No specific process or quantitative measures are
defined. One scholarly commentator found the standards so ill conditioned that he
dubbed them “Voodoo Investonomics”.

And yet the common wisdom could be that as long as a prudent process is followed

then the obligations of the fiduciary standard have been met. This view assumes that

outcomes under the standard are impossible to judge, and, therefore, the performance

outcome, in particular, is systematically ignored. At most, as noted here by Hatton (2005), a
successful process is believed, but by no means guaranteed, to result in good performance.
Any investment adviser – fiduciary or non-fiduciary – that implements the

process described in these Practices should feel confident that they are living up to the
responsibilities they owe their clients. It is, after all, process that determines
prudent fiduciary conduct, not portfolio performance, according to principles of
modern prudent investing. And although prudent conduct is not determined by
investment performance, one of the most powerful reasons to implement
the…Practices…is that in many cases performance can improve significantly as a
result.
The logic of this system implies that adherence to the fiduciary standard is an

“either-or” proposition: either the organization is effective in meeting the standard or it is

not. Crucially, this means that judging an organization as ineffective occurs usually in a postmortem, after something has gone terribly wrong with the organization, such as a

significant erosion in financial position, bankruptcy, fraud, litigation case or regulatory

violation. Public awareness of such a condition is likely not to be widespread until it

appears as a headline in the news.

27

There are a number of common problems that limit the effectiveness of boards and

committees. Ambachtsheer (1998) in a survey of 50 senior pension executives found an
overwhelming 98% cited poor process a major hurdle to achieving investment goals. In

addition, other factors cited as barriers included: inadequate resources (48%), lack of focus
/ mission (43%), conservatism (35%), and insufficient skills (35%).

When pensions underperform or fail, it can be at great cost to society at large. For

private plans it can mean significant cuts in benefits, for public plans cuts in benefits and an

additional burden on taxpayers. Today in the United States there are 23,000 private pension
plans helping to protect the retirement security of over 32 million workers. Additionally,

there are 10 million workers in 1,400 multi-employer plans. In 2013, 111 newly failed plans

were moved to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which exists to take over
corporate pension plans in the event of a bankruptcy. Currently, PBGC pays monthly

retirement benefits to approximately 900,000 retirees of 4,600 failed defined benefit

pension plans. Including those who have not yet retired and participants in multi-employer
plans receiving financial assistance, the PBGC is responsible for the current and future
pensions of about 1.5 million people.

While PBGC will soften the blow of a corporate bankruptcy to a pensioner, it only

pays a fraction of the benefit that would have been paid by the original corporate plan.

While the number of failures has fallen since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), by 2013 the

total number of failed plans at PBGC had grown over a three-year period by almost a third. 41

Currently, a single multi-employer plan (MEP), the Teamsters Central States Pension

Plan, with its over billion dollar-funding gap, is threatening to swamp the solvency of PBGC.

PBGC is already running a $42.4 billion deficit on its MEP program, more than five times the
41

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, https://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf#page=9

single-employer program. The U.S. Treasury is reviewing a proposal to reduce benefits
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under a new law enacted by Congress in 2015 allowing reductions of MEP benefits for plans
in dire straits. 42

The current historical low interest rates have only exacerbated the situation for

pensions, especially corporate pensions whose liabilities are more directly tied to market

interest rates. According to the Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index, which is based on the

100 largest defined pension plans sponsored by U.S. public companies, the funding ratio has
dropped in the last year alone from 82.7% to 75.7% (see Figure 3). 43 This has happened as

a result of the decline in the discount rate, which has fallen to an all-time low, from just over
4% to 3.45%. To illustrate this significant decline in dollar terms, in June 2016 alone the

funded status of the Milliman 100 fell by $46 billion, which is over 10% of the outstanding
funding deficit of $447 billion.

42

Horowitz, Carl, “Teamsters Central States Pension Fund Puts PBGC in Jeopardy”, National Legal and Policy Center,
October 19, 2015
43 Source: Robert W. Baird & Co.

Figure 3 - Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index
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Turning to state and municipal pension plans, the common problem for this

category of funds is chronic underfunding. As noted earlier, many states have low funding
levels. In June 2016, the average funding level for state public plans was 69.9%, below the

critical 70% level threshold (as noted earlier, anything below 70% Morningstar defines as

“fiscally unsound”). 44 Furthermore, new GASB standards that came into effect beginning in
2014 have brought the levels down further from prior years. GASB, or Government

Accounting Standards Board, is the organization that sets accounting standards for financial
accounting of governments (FASB, or Financial Accounting Standards Board, is its

44

Milliman, Public Pension Funding Study, 2016, http://www.milliman.com/ppfs/

counterpart for corporations). A combination of stricter liability calculations along with
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greater transparency is finding its way into bond ratings.

…The change in accounting standards is expected to lower the overall funded

levels. A recent report by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
indicated the aggregate funded level for 126 large pension plans it sampled would
decline from 76% based on fiscal 2010 levels to a low 57%.
As noted earlier, there is a large gap nationally for public pension funding, and the

SEC is exercising enforcement as much as it can through enforcement of municipal bond
disclosure. Despite their large influence in the securities markets, the SEC does not have

oversight on public pensions directly. As described in Chapter II, the states themselves have
direct authority over their own pension systems. In 2013 the agency went after the state of
Illinois, with the worst funding problem in the nation. 45

Since that time the pension crisis has only worsened in the city of Chicago. As was

mentioned earlier, in 2015 Moody’s downgraded Chicago’s municipal bonds to junk due to

the underfunded condition of its pension system. This event alone has had a notable impact
on the municipal bond market nationally. Recent research indicates that when breaking

municipalities into two categories, those with well-funded pensions and those with poorly

funded pensions; the difference in yield spread or interest cost is 1.2%. 46 The implication is

that due to growing vigilance in the bond market, taxpayers pay 1.2% more to borrow funds
in such underfunded municipalities. Of course, this additional cost does not go to reducing
45

“Illinois is Accused of Fraud by S.E.C.” by Mary Williams Walsh, The New York Times, March 11, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/business/sec-accuses-illinois-of-securities-fraud.html?_r=0. The SEC, as an agency
of the federal government, is charged with investor protection and regulates the securities markets. One primary tool of
the agency is ensuring that proper disclosure of the risks of investments is disclosed through the prospectus. Pension risk
is a risk that can impact the performance of such bonds, and is therefore an item that the SEC will look to enforce when
reviewing the disclosure around such investments.
46 Source: Robert W. Baird & Co.

31

the pension liability; it is in effect “lost money”, going to bondholders simply to compensate
them for the additional risk.

Similarly, the societal costs of non-profits, endowment and foundations can be high

when organizations encounter fiduciary problems. All too common among non-profits is
fraud and embezzlement. In 2013, there were over 1,000 organizations in the U.S. that

suffered an unauthorized diversion of funds. Over half a billion dollars was lost in the top 10
cases alone. According to a study by Marquet International, an independent investigative,

litigation support and security consulting firm, one sixth of all major embezzlements occur
in non-profits and religious organizations, second only to the financial services industry. 47
The disconnect between fiduciary standards and effectiveness shows the perverse

impact across these three major categories of institutional funds: a growing number of

failed private pension plans, chronically underfunded state and municipal pension plans,

and non-profit organizations with such poor oversight that they are regularly vulnerable to
white collar crime. These widespread problems in our nation’s private and public pension

system and non-profit sector illustrate a system of financial management operating at a
level that gives cause for real concern.

Purpose

Therefore, the proposed research will undertake identification and measurement of

the key factors that drive fiduciary effectiveness. To that end, we will examine U.S. public

pension plans because of the more readily available information that these organizations

tend to disclose to the general public. Such disclosure comes in the form of meeting minutes,
47

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/10/27/Analysis-Nonprofits-lost-millions-in-assets-to-fraud-embezzlement/UPI43851382886790/
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agenda, financial statements and other information, and are often posted on their websites

directly or available through public databases such as the Boston College Public Retirement
Plans database.

With the data we collect on the factors we identify, we test whether our model

demonstrates some explanatory power on whether an organization is at risk of significant
underfunding, or other fiduciary problem such as a bankruptcy, civil litigation, regulatory

violation or crime. Moreover, our composite rating of fiduciary effectiveness will allow the

construction of an index of relative measures, making organizations comparable side-byside.

This composite rating system, a measure of overall effectiveness, I refer to as the

fiduciary effectiveness quotient or FEQ. A higher score is indicative of stronger governance
forms of - and structures within the organization, and overall greater fiduciary

effectiveness. Similar to the corporate governance ratings in place today whose purpose is
to inform investors about the effectiveness of companies in addressing the fiduciary

responsibility of all corporate assets, this rating system would inform investors, donors and
taxpayers about the potential effectiveness of the organization in managing investment
pools, whether they be dedicated funds, pension plans, endowments or foundations. 48
Research Questions

The key goals for the research are:
•

To investigate whether there is a relationship between an organization’s

FEQ and the investment returns of the organization’s respective investment
48

https://www.issgovernance.com/
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pool to understand whether there is a link between organizational structure
•

and behavior with performance outcomes.

To investigate the explanatory power of the measure in identifying fiduciary

problems. This will be shown by empirically back-testing an econometric

model on organizations that have encountered significant fiduciary issues in
the past. In the case of public pensions, significant underfunding would
constitute such a fiduciary issue.

Essentially, through this research, we are taking the prudence is process concept to

the next level, by evaluating and measuring a prudent process and tying it to direct,

measurable and comparable outcomes. Courts give wide latitude to the acts of a board

under the business judgment rule, a legal maxim that so long as a board can demonstrate

that an informed process was followed, then the board acted prudently under that process
even if the outcome was below expectations or even disastrous. 49
These are the research questions:

1. What are the attributes of an effective board, and what particular
attributes drive effectiveness (as defined by a variety of financial

performance measures including investment returns, funding ratios and
bond yield spreads), and are these attributes measurable?

2. If so, can an organization be usefully rated on a composite, index basis for
effectiveness using these measures?

49Robins

& Cole, LLP, “The Business Judgment Rule and the Entire Fairness Doctrine”,
http://www.rc.com/documents/Primer%20on%20Business%20Judgment%20Rule.pdf

3. Can these measures be explanatory of conditional outcomes (such as
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fiduciary problems i.e., underfunding, litigation, etc.) and directly linked to
improved investment performance?

These are the two hypotheses we will test:

Hypothesis I – Relative Effectiveness: The Effectiveness to Performance Link
H0: An organization’s FEQ has no relationship to the organization’s investment

return defined as a one-year forward investment returns.

H1: An organization’s FEQ demonstrates a clear, positive relationship to the

organization’s investment return defined as a one-year forward investment return.
Hypothesis II – Absolute Effectiveness: The Probability of Being an Effective
Organization
H0: An organization’s FEQ has no explanatory power over whether an organization

may be designated Fiduciary Effective (absent the following conditions: significant
underfunded condition, bankruptcy, civil litigation, regulatory violation, crime or

other fiduciary problem).

H1: An organization’s FEQ is explanatory.
Significance and Relevance

What I propose through this study is a shift in paradigm in the way we, as a society,

think about and address the role of the governance fiduciary, which has significant public
policy implications. If such a scoring system or index became accessible to the general

public, organizations would have an incentive to adopt and promulgate a positive rating
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through investor, donor or beneficiary communications such as annual reports; and avoid a

negative rating, such as in the media, to attract future contributions from donors, tax payers
and investors in a highly competitive marketplace. Donors and investors would have an

incentive to know in advance of making a contribution to an organization, how effectively
that contribution will be managed. Taxpayers would equally benefit from a system of
accountability for funds being managed by the public sector.

The statistical robustness of the research through this program could lead to the

creation of a system that would “raise all boats” through providing institutions, their donors
and investors, the tools by which they can measure, improve and communicate the
effectiveness of their own fund management.

Organization of the Study

This dissertation is composed of seven chapters.

This was an introductory chapter to the topic. Chapter II contains background on

the history and complexity of the legal environment of the fiduciary standard as it applies to
asset owners. Chapter III reviews governance theory, organizational challenges including

behavioral finance problems, and the characteristics of effective organizations. Chapter IV
reviews the literature specific to governance and fiduciary effectiveness measures. In
Chapter V the research methodology and rationale for its selection are detailed. The

research design, including population and sample, are explained. The research instruments

are identified, and their validity and reliability are discussed. Data collection and analysis
procedures are outlined. A timeline for the study and its limitations are reported.

In Chapter VI, the data are reported and analyzed. Key governance factors are
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examined, the FEQ or governance index is constructed and its explanatory power assessed.

Findings are compared to arguments and patterns found in the literature review. Chapter
VII completes the study with a summary of the findings, implications for best practices,

conclusions and recommendations for future studies.

CHAPTER II
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LEGAL BACKGROUND
Introduction

Recently reforms to the Chicago Public Retirement System have been reviewed

twice by the Illinois State Supreme Court and rejected both times. 50 In 2015, Congress

legalized benefit reductions to multi-employer plans, and the Secretary of the Treasury is

currently rejecting the proposal to reduce benefits to the Teamster’s plan to keep it solvent

and from becoming a ward of the PBGC, which currently threatens to fully deplete PBGC. 51 A

2012 case, Pundt v. Verizon Communications Inc., is now under review with the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding the pension risk transference practice of corporations offloading pension
obligations to insurance companies. 52

What do these three unrelated cases have in common? They represent the current

battleground of resolving our failing pension and retirement system, and in the absence of
market-driven changes or government reforms, the court is becoming the “arbiter of last
resort” in determining how this failure will be shared across society. Understanding the

legal background of asset owner fiduciaries is critically important to making sense of the

current and future states of this problem. It is also necessary for the development of legal
measures that tie in both related governance and performance outcomes, as will be
explained in detail in Chapter VI.
50

Editorial Board, Pension ruling another blow to Chicago taxpayers — and Emanuel, Chicago Tribune, March 24, 2016
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-chicago-pension-ruling-unconstitutional-rahm-emanuel-edit20160324-story.html
51 Segal, Julie, “Can the U.S. Supreme Court Save the American Dream”, Institutional Investor, May 12, 2016
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3553866/investors-pensions/can-the-us-supreme-court-save-the-americandream.html#/.Vzr-navhrBY
52 Editorial Board, “Treasury’s Teamsters Bailout Ploy: By rejecting a pension rescue plan, Obama sets taxpayers up for a
hit”, Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2016

Contemporary Legal Framework of the Fiduciary Standard
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Despite the long heritage of the law of fiduciary duty, according to the legal scholar,

Rafael Chodos, the modern day justice system is lacking a systematic approach:

The law of fiduciary duty draws heavily from both the law of contract and the law of

tort, and it is in many ways intermediate between those two branches of the civil law. It
might even be seen as a third, co-equal branch along with them. But while there is a welldeveloped and comprehensive theory of contract and of tort, there is presently no welldeveloped and comprehensive theory of fiduciary duties. As a result although there are
many cases dealing with fiduciary duties…and although many principles are wellestablished, the decisions do not seem to share any systematic overview of this area of the
law at all. 53
The legal framework is complicated for several reasons:

1) Federalism: The standards may be governed by state law, federal law or both, and
there may be instances where one set of laws is pre-empted by another.

2) Regulatory Agencies: There may be multiple agencies involved in the rulemaking and
enforcement of these laws.

3) Legal differences: There are key differences in how the laws are used in defining and
determining the standard.

According to the CFA Standards, Standard 1-A, investment professionals must have

knowledge of the law to carry out their duties, so understanding the laws that govern the
fiduciary standard is critical in exercising that duty:
53

The Law of Fiduciary Duty, by Rafeal Chodos, Blackthorne Legal Press, 2000, p. XIIX

Members and Candidates must understand and comply with all applicable
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laws, rules, and regulations (including the CFA Institute Code of Ethics and Standards
of Professional Conduct) of any government, regulatory organization, licensing
agency, or professional association governing their professional activities. In the event
of conflict, Members and Candidates must not knowingly participate or assist in and
must disassociate from any violation of such laws, rules, or regulations. 54
This dissertation is focused on public pension funds (state and municipal), but also

touches on other types of institutional funds including: corporate pension plans; and non-

profit funds, such as foundations or endowments; and it will examine the legal framework
of the fiduciary standard for each. This species of asset owners are institutional investors,
also known as asset owners, and referred to in the literature as the governance fiduciary

(Ambachtsheer, 1998).

This study does not focus on secondary institutional investors or financial

intermediaries, also referred to as the operating fiduciary, which include insurance

companies, banks, hedge funds, and mutual funds. These institutional investors have their
own set of legal and regulatory frameworks further complicating the U.S. legal system
governing and regulating fiduciary investment management. It also does not focus on

tertiary fiduciaries, which may include Third Party Administrators (TPAs), attorneys, CPAs
and other service providers, which, depending on the nature of the asset owner, will be
covered by the same laws. Finally, it does not focus on private trusts. Many of the same

principals and laws discussed below apply, and so private and corporate trusts have been
left out to avoid repetitiveness.

54

CFA Standards of Practice Handbook, Tenth Edition (effective 1 July 2010)

The concept of Fiduciary Duty finds its sources in Roman law. In fact, the word
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“fiduciary” comes from the Latin fiducia, which refers to the transfer of a right to a person
who received it subject to an obligation to transfer it again at a future time or upon the

fulfillment of a condition. This evokes the modern day idea of a trust or of an asset held in
escrow (Chodos, 2000).

Fiduciary duty represents a “cluster of obligations” owed by one person, the

“trustee” or “fiduciary” toward another, the “cestui” or “beneficiary”, regarding an identified
subject matter, which is referred to as the “res” or “subject of the trust” (ibid).

The conditions for a relationship that gives rise to a Fiduciary Duty is characterized by

the following:
•

The duty has an ambit, meaning that it is owed toward a certain person or persons

•

and not others (ibid).

•

(ibid).

•

certain obligations may persist long after the termination date (ibid).

The duty has a scope, which means it entails certain obligations and not others
A duty may terminate, which means the engagement of the duty may end, but
A duty is either discharged or breached. In the case of a breach the law will
impose a remedy (ibid).

The duty can be either asymmetrical or symmetrical depending on the situation. A

trustee of a pension plan owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the plan, and the beneficiaries
owe her nothing. A husband and wife are fiduciaries for one another.

The “Grammar” of Fiduciary Duty is essentially comprised of these four primary duties:
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1. Duty of Management or “Duty of Care” It is most similar to a contracting duty; and
it is the duty to do what has been undertaken to be done (ibid).

2. Duty of Preference or “Duty of Trust” This is the duty that is most similar to the
original Roman concept, and it comes in two parts: 1) Duty of Preference is to set

the interests of the cestui before one’s own; 2) Duty of Loyalty is to set the interests
of the cestui before all others (third parties) (ibid).

3. Duty to Account The fiduciary must maintain records of all transactions affecting

the res and provide a report of these transactions either on request or on a schedule.
It means the fiduciary must not only be honest, but maintain the records proving he
is honest (ibid).

4. Duty of Disclosure The final duty relates to the duty to account, but takes it one

step further. This duty requires the trustee to keep the cestui fully informed as to all
facts, which are or might be pertinent to the cestui’s interest in the trust. While the
duty to account refers to transactions that have already taken place, the duty of
disclosure refers to transactions that may take place in the future. These duties
carry no direct benefit themselves other than to ensure the cestui is privy to all
information, thereby enabling her to protect her rights (ibid).

The Fiduciary Standard for Corporate Pension Funds under ERISA

Today in the United States there are 23,000 private pension plans helping to protect

the retirement security of over 32 million workers. Additionally, there are 10 million

workers in 1,400 multi-employer plans. In 2013, 111 newly failed plans were moved to the

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which exists to take over corporate pension
plans in the event of a bankruptcy.

For private sector pension plans, which include defined benefit, defined
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contribution, also known as 401(k) or 403(b) plans, profit sharing plans, IRAs, Taft-Hartley
plans, and other qualified plans, the Fiduciary Standard as defined and governed by the

Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is the most comprehensive
and tested area of the law concerning it.

The essential elements of any plan include:

1. A written plan that describes the benefit structure and guides day-to-day
operations;

2. A trust fund to hold the plan's assets;

3. A recordkeeping system to track the flow of monies going to and from the
retirement plan; and

4. Documents to provide plan information to employees participating in the plan and
to the government.

The Department of Labor (DOL) is the federal executive branch agency responsible

for rule-making and bringing enforcement actions. Additionally, the Treasury Department's
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for the rules that allow tax benefits for both
employees and employers related to retirement plans, including vesting and distribution

requirements. While pension funds can be large participants in the financial markets, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has no oversight or enforcement powers. 55

55

Department of Labor and SEC web sites
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html
http://www.sec.gov/answers/401(k).htm

Exclusive Purpose Rule (i.e., Duty of Loyalty) All activities and transactions
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performed on behalf of a plan must be for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and defraying reasonable expenses of plan administration.

Questions of breach of the duty of loyalty may arise where the fiduciary is deemed to

fail to pursue the interest of the participants vigorously enough or where the interests of

third parties are preferred to the interest of the participant.

In addition, question of breach may arise if a fiduciary is deemed to lie to or

affirmatively mislead a participant or beneficiary as to plan terms or important aspects of
the plan's status. The Supreme Court held that when a fiduciary speaks in his or her

fiduciary capacity, the duty of loyalty requires that he or she do so truthfully (see Varity

Corp. v. Howe, 1996). 56

Prudence Fiduciaries must exercise the same care, skill, prudence and diligence that

a prudent person familiar with the applicable matter would exercise in managing similar
affairs (the Prudent Man Rule). Courts generally focus on the procedural prudence of a

fiduciary decision, i.e., whether the steps taken in determining a particular action or making
a particular decision were prudent.

This duty is generally the most significant. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of a

given fiduciary decision or action, a court generally will not find a violation where the

fiduciary is able to demonstrate "procedural prudence." Thus, the effectiveness, or direct

outcomes related to fiduciary action (i.e. investment decisions) is not a focus of the law or
the courts. To prove procedural prudence, fiduciaries should retain written records that

demonstrate (1) careful weighing of options, (2) sufficient information to make a careful

decision; and (3) how the decision is reached. Where plan fiduciaries are not familiar with
some aspect of a plan provision, operation or investment, they should consult an expert
56

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1471

before proceeding and document the expert's recommendations and comments, and why
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the recommendation was or was not followed.

Diversification Plan investments must be diversified in order to minimize the risk

of large losses unless diversification is clearly imprudent.

Although the diversification requirement cannot be stated in terms of a fixed

percentage or dollar amount, fiduciaries should generally refrain from investing

disproportionately large amounts of the plan in a single security or a single type of security,
or securities dependent upon the success of one enterprise or the conditions of one locality
(i.e., must be geographically diverse, as well as diverse in types of investments and

industries represented).

Factors to consider in determining whether the plan assets are diversified include:

(1) the purpose of the plan; (2) the amount of plan assets; (3) financial and industrial

conditions; (4) the type of investment; (5) geographical distribution; (6) distribution as to
industries; and (7) dates of maturity.

Prohibited Transactions In addition to requiring that fiduciaries comply with

specified standards when discharging their duties, ERISA precludes fiduciaries from
engaging in various transactions unless an exemption applies.

1. Party in Interest Transactions ERISA § 406 prohibits a fiduciary from causing
the plan to engage in a transaction with a party in interest that constitutes a

direct or indirect transfer of goods, services, etc. between the party in interest
and the plan. 57 "Party in interest" is defined broadly to include virtually all

individuals who are related to the plan (i.e., fiduciaries, service providers, plan

57

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/1106
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sponsors) and virtually all transactions between a plan and a party-in-interest

are prohibited. Exemptions are available for a wide variety of party-in-interest
transactions under ERISA § 408. 58

2. Self-Dealing Prohibitions A fiduciary may not engage in a transaction for his

own benefit, in which he has a conflict of interest or in which he receives
compensation from a third party.

Delegation of Fiduciary Duties ERISA fiduciaries may delegate fiduciary

responsibility to a committee or a professional fiduciary (e.g., an investment manager).

Thus, plan trustees may select an investment committee or asset manager and if proper
procedures are followed, delegate to that person/committee authority to handle

investments on behalf of the plan. However, the fiduciaries remain responsible for selecting

and monitoring the performance of "outside" fiduciaries and service providers; this
"ultimate" fiduciary authority cannot be delegated away (see Lowen v. Tower Asset

Management, Inc., 1987). 59

For example, Fiduciaries may delegate certain fiduciary duties to an investment

manager. The following can assist fiduciaries in satisfying their duties to monitor the
investment managers they retain:

1. Statement of Investment Policy According to the National Council of Non-

Profits, fiduciaries should prepare a statement of investment policy and investment

guidelines. 60 Examples of items contained in an investment policy are noted below:
•

58

Plan objectives and goals.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/1108
http://openjurist.org/829/f2d/1209/lowen-mm-mm-v-tower-asset-management-inc-a-w-a-w
60 https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/investment-policies-nonprofits
59

•
•
•
•
•
•

Investment performance benchmarks.
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Authorized asset classes and allocation restraints.
Directed brokerage.

Liquidity considerations.

Minimum quality and duration limits (fixed income).

Procedures for selecting or replacing investment funds.

2. Procedures for Selecting Investment Funds When selecting an investment

fund, plan fiduciaries must follow prudent procedures. The DOL ERISA Advisory

Council provided some guidance in 1996 on selecting investment funds in the form
questions plan fiduciaries should ask when selecting investment funds in a report
entitled "Guidance in Selecting and Monitoring Service Providers."61 Examples of

questions plan fiduciaries should consider before retaining investment funds or
money managers include:
•

Does the fund company have the objective qualifications to provide

•

investment services to the plan? For the specific investment style?

•

reasonable compared to other investments?

•

process ensure objective reporting?

What are the fees associated with the investment services? Are they
How does the fund company measure and report performance? Does the
Has there been significant turnover in the fund's personnel or clients?
Significant ownership changes of the fund company?

An investment consultant can assist fiduciaries in reviewing these items.
61

https://www.dol.gov/EBSA/regs/fedreg/meetings/96_17046.htm

47

Procedures for Monitoring Investment Funds In addition to the plan fiduciaries'

duty to prudently select an investment fund, the fiduciaries must prudently monitor

investment funds. Even though ERISA does not list specific procedures for monitoring

investments, the DOL has provided guidance in its rulemaking (see Master, Mates & Pilots

Pension Plan and IRAP Litigation, 1992). 62 The DOL has identified the following items that

the fiduciaries in that case were required to consider to comply with their fiduciary duties:
•

Review, at least quarterly, each investment fund for compliance with its

•

investment guidelines.

•

appropriate indices or benchmarks.

Compare, at least quarterly, the investment results of each fund with
At least annually, review the investment fund's investment performance and
any significant changes in corporate or capital structure, investment style,

•

brokerage affiliation or practices, investment process and professional staff.
Establish, and review at least annually, procedures for communicating
information regarding investments and investment funds among the

fiduciaries, the plan's staff, and the plan's service providers (including but
not limited to the plan's attorneys and custodian).

Retaining an Investment Consultant An investment consultant can assist the

fiduciaries in fulfilling their duty to monitor. The plan's contract with the investment

consultant should obligate the consultant to perform the specific functions related to the
duty to monitor. 63 The prudent person standard provides that a fiduciary will be judged

according to the standards of others acting in a like capacity and familiar with investment
62

63

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/957/1020/2124/
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matters. A fiduciary's lack of the requisite education, experience and skill does not excuse a
trustee's negligence in ascertaining within a reasonable time whether the investment

services are proper for the plan and the investment fees are reasonable (Whitfield v. Cohen,
1988). 64

The Fiduciary Standard for Public Pension Funds under State Law

This study focuses on Public Pension plans. The next section will review specific

case matters unique to public pensions. Again, our aim is to understand how poor forms of
governance can translate into significant funding and legal problems and the relationships

thereof. An understanding of the general legal requirements of public pensions, especially in
contrast to the other types of asset owners is important background, especially as we get
into the development of a Legal Index later in the study.

More than $3 trillion in assets are managed in the United States in retirement

systems for public employees of state and local government. A mixture of state law governs
these systems. In 1997 the Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform

Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) for the purpose of

harmonizing the different sets of laws employed by the states. Unlike other uniform laws in
this category, the Act has not been widely embraced with less than a handful of states
adopting its provisions. 65

State and local governments are exempt from ERISA. No state has directly adopted

ERISA provisions. However, because ERISA and state law protections both stem from
64

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/682/188/1583488/
Uniform Law Commission, Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act Summary
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Management%20of%20Public%20Employee%20Retirement%20Syst
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common law fiduciary and trust principles, many public pension protections are similar to
those found in ERISA. ERISA and state provisions concerning fiduciary standards of care

and investment duties are similar. State law contains more rules, but ERISA-covered

fiduciaries are subject to common law fiduciary rules and may therefore be subject to the
rules found in the state statutes, but not expressed in ERISA.

Much of what states must adhere to in public fund management falls under the

Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), which embodies the prudent investor rules and

diversification principles of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), and was first promulgated in

1994. As of May 2004, the UPIA has been adopted in 44 States and the District of Columbia.
Other states may have adopted parts of the Act, but not the entire Act. According to the

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the most common portion of
the Act excluded by states concerns the delegation of investment decisions to qualified and
supervised agents. 66 State law may provide oversight to the treasurer's investment

decisions through an advisory board.

ERISA identifies many more prohibited fiduciary transactions than state law. ERISA

does not require plan oversight, but subjects fiduciaries to lawsuits from interested parties,
plan beneficiaries, and the federal government under certain circumstances. State law

places few explicit limitations on the treasurer's investment ability. However, it limits her

investment ability by stating affirmatively the transactions in which she may engage. ERISA

also sets many more specific rules than state law does about loans to- and by plans and

provision of goods, services, and facilities to the plan.

66

Uniform Prudent Investor Act
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Finally, ERISA places extensive reporting requirements on private-sector employers.

State law is more limited requiring instead an Advisory Committee to annually report to the
governor, state legislature, and plan beneficiaries on public pension security investments.

Below are common requirements of the treasurer (trustee) that will apply in most

jurisdictions:

Fiduciary Standard of Care under the UPIA State law requires the treasurer to

comply with the UPIA when making most types of investments. Under the UPIA, the
treasurer must follow the following rules.

1. Prudent investor rule The treasurer must invest and manage pension fund

assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In doing so she must exercise
reasonable care, skill and caution. Her decisions about individual assets must be

evaluated in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall

investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.
Whether the treasurer complies with the prudent investor rule is determined in
light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of a particular decision.

2. Factors the treasurer must consider when investing While managing pension

funds the treasurer must consider (a) general economic conditions; (b) the possible
effect of inflation or deflation; (c) the expected tax consequences of investment

decisions, strategies, and distributions; (d) the role that each investment or course
of action plays within the overall trust portfolio; (e) the expected total return from
income and the appreciation of capital; (f) needs for liquidity, for regularity of
income and for preservation or appreciation of capital; (g) an asset's special

relationship or special value, if any, to the purpose of the trust or to one or more
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beneficiaries; (h) the portfolio size; and (i) the trust's nature and estimated
duration.

3. Verification of facts The treasurer must take reasonable steps to verify facts

relevant to the investment and management of trust assets.

4. Asset Diversification The treasurer must diversify the investments of the
pension funds unless she reasonably determines that, because of special

circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying.
5. Initial Asset Review The treasurer must review the trust assets within a
reasonable time after accepting responsibility for the pension fund.

6. Loyalty The treasurer must invest and manage the pension funds solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries.

7. Impartiality The treasurer must act impartially in investing and managing funds,

taking into account any differing interests of the beneficiaries.

8. Investment costs The treasurer may only incur costs while investing and

managing funds that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the
purposes of the trust, and the skills of the treasurer.

9. Delegating investment and management functions The treasurer may

delegate investment and management functions that a prudent trustee of

comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. She must

exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in: (a) selecting an agent, (b) establishing

52

the scope and terms of the delegation consistent with the purposes and terms of the
trust, and (c) periodically reviewing the agent's action in order to monitor his
performance and compliance with the scope and terms of the delegation.

Investing Other Funds With regard to additional funds, state law requires the

treasurer to invest trust deposit amounts in a reasonable and appropriate manner to

achieve the objectives of the trust, exercising the discretion and care of a prudent person in
similar circumstances with similar objectives.

Acting in Accordance with Plan Documents The treasurer must invest funds in a

manner consistent with the objectives of the trust.

Oversight of the Fiduciary State law requires a statutorily created Investment

Advisory Council or Investment Committee to review all investments that the treasurer

makes and to recommend investment policies. The governor may direct the treasurer to

change any investments she makes when the advisory council advises him that doing so is
in the state's best interest.

Investment Duties For states, the rules are more limited. Treasurer need only

invest funds that are not needed for current disbursement, and may consider social
investing issues.

Loan Restrictions State law allows the treasurer to make loans to mortgage lenders

subject to certain conditions. The treasurer may lend securities from funds under certain
circumstances. The treasurer may receive loans on behalf of the state subject to the
governor's approval.

Provisions of Goods, Services and Facilities by and to the Plan Unlike ERISA,
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there are no similar state provisions.

Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Unlike ERISA, there are no similar state

provisions.

Record Keeping and Reporting Unlike ERISA whose reporting requirements are

extensive, the state requirements are modest in comparison. The Advisory Board may only
have to report annually to the governor, the General Assembly, and beneficiaries on the
pension's security investments.

The Fiduciary Standard for Non-Profit Institutional Funds under State Law

The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) is a

uniform law that provides guidance on investment decisions and endowment expenditures
for non-profit and charitable organizations. As of 2012, UPMIFA is now the law in the
District of Columbia and all states.

The major change in UPMIFA compared to the previous model law (the Uniform

Management of Institutional Funds Act or UMIFA) is that it replaces a antiquated

requirement that non-profits cannot spend below the original value of contributions or

“historic dollar value” (HDV) with a new requirement that their investing and spending will
be at a rate that will preserve the purchasing power of the principal over the long term, e.g.

university endowments. This provides more flexibility to organizations in determining their
spending rates, even in the face of losses that may be temporarily market-driven.

The UPIA served as a model for many of the revisions. UPIA updates rules on

investment decision making for trusts, including charitable trusts, and imposes additional
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duties on trustees for the protection of beneficiaries. UPMIFA applies these rules and duties

to charities organized as non-profit corporations. UPMIFA does not apply to trusts managed
by corporate and other fiduciaries that are not charities, because UPIA provides
management and investment standards for those trusts.

In applying principles based on UPIA to charities organized as non-profit

corporations, UPMIFA combines the approaches taken by UPIA and by the Revised Model

Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA). UPMIFA reflects the fact that standards for managing
and investing institutional funds are and should be the same regardless of whether a

charitable organization is organized as a trust, a non-profit corporation, or some other
entity.

According to the state of Ohio attorney general’s interpretation of the Act, non-profit

board members have four primary legal duties: 67
•
•
•
•

Duty of Care

Duty of Loyalty

Duty of Compliance

Duty to Maintain Accounts

Duty of Care The prudence standard in UPMIFA requires managers to meet their

fiduciary duty of care, the duty to minimize costs, and the duty to investigate with respect to
investment decision-making. In addition, UPMIFA directs managers of charities to consider
general economic conditions, to make decisions on a portfolio basis, to allocate risk and
return across the portfolio, and to consider the needs of the charity both to make
67

Guide for Charity Boardmembers, by Attorney General Mike DeWine,
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/9ca505a0-d926-4853-b4b7-aa7a03f68c13/Guide-for-Charity-BoardMembers.aspx
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distributions and to preserve capital. A charity can pool funds for purposes of management
and investment, and in some situations doing so can yield better investment results. Donor

intent is an important component, so a charity must follow any specific donor directions for

investment and management of assets. Of course, this emphasis on donor intent does not
mean that a donor should have control of the management of a charity.

Duty of Loyalty The Act does not specifically state the duty of loyalty, but simply

incorporates "the duty of loyalty imposed by law other than this Act." The drafters were
concerned that different standards of loyalty might apply to non-profit directors and

trustees of charitable trusts. As a result, the Act simply incorporates both standards by

using the above quoted language. The duty of loyalty under non-profit corporation law

applies to charities organized as non-profits, and the duty of loyalty under trust law applies
to charitable trusts.

The difference between the two standards is slight. The duty of loyalty under non-

profit corporation law says that a director or officer must act in a manner that he or she

reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the organization. Trust law states that the

trustee of a charitable trust must act in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in

the sole interests of the trust beneficiaries. The basic idea is that the manager must consider
the organization's or the trust beneficiary's interest as his or her own, and invest the funds
in a way that protects those interests.

Duty of Compliance Board members must understand the charity’s articles of

incorporation, constitution, bylaws, codes of conduct, codes of ethics, and any other
governing documents. They must be familiar with state and federal laws relating to

nonprofit entities, fundraising, and tax-related issues as well as legal issues connected with

the organization’s charitable purposes and operations. Finally, they must comply with state

and federal registration and reporting requirements, including filings with the attorney
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general, the secretary of state, and the IRS.

A prudently constructed and monitored administration system should deliver

comprehensive reporting on the performance of the institution’s portfolio, simplify tax
filings, provide reporting for the use of fiduciaries and donors alike and ensure the

protection of the institution’s assets.

Duty to Manage Accounts Organizations must develop policies and procedures

that protect the organization’s business interests and operations. They must develop annual

budgets that provide clear direction for all organizational spending. The budget should be a
blueprint of the board’s program plans and should be routinely monitored, tracked

throughout the year and revised as necessary. They must ensure maintenance of accurate

records of all income, expenditures, transactions, and activities throughout the year — for
the board and in all organizational operations. They must establish appropriate internal

accounting systems, including checks and balances, so one staff member or volunteer does
not have total control over finances, and so theft and improper spending can be identified
quickly.

In addition they must:
•
•

Prudently invest and reinvest assets.

•

resources for its programs.

Develop fundraising goals and policies and assist the organization in acquiring
Make certain that fundraising appeals are presented honestly and fairly by
monitoring the performance of fundraising professionals and volunteers.

•

•
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Insist upon getting the best value for goods and services through comparisons and
an informed bidding process.

Ensure board minutes are kept to indicate board approval of expenditures and

investments and to show that informed discussions were held prior to approval of
such transactions.

Breaches of Fiduciary Duty Trustees can be held individually responsible for

breaches of fiduciary standards within a charity. For example, if charitable assets are sold at
less than their fair market value, trustees may be held accountable for any shortfalls.

Transactions involving conflicts of interest also can result in fiscal penalties. Criminal fraud
charges can result when board members and key staff ignore their charitable obligations,
and personally profit from assets that should be used for community purposes.

An Investigation into Legal Cases Common to Public Pensions

In general, the current macro-trend concerning legal cases common to pensions is

consistent with one of the main observations from the introductory chapter, as explained by
Paul Secunda in a 2014 Michigan Law Article review:

Implementation of reforms, especially ones that either increase the financial

burden on employees and/or retirees, or diminish the benefits that employees and/or
retirees will receive, inevitably leads to protracted litigation.68
In that same article he reviews two recent high profile cases of how pension reform

is happening throughout the legal system: 1) legislated (and litigated) pension reform in the

state of Wisconsin; and 2) Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in the city of Detroit. He sees
68

Secunda, Paul, “Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1353, p. 1357
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both cases as part of an “emerging trend in in public pension litigation currently playing out
throughout the United States.” 69 In particular, he looks at the changes to the Wisconsin

Retirement System that were made as part of the highly publicized Act 10 case in the State
of Wisconsin, and were enacted in 2011 by Governor Scott Walker. As Secunda explains
regarding this case:

The recently completed Wisconsin litigation, Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker,

involved a provision that did not permit the City of Milwaukee to pay its employees’
pension contribution share. This case nicely illustrates some of the major
constitutional arguments being advanced concerning whether such reform proposals
are consistent with existing employee and retiree pension rights. 70
In contrast, in the Detroit bankruptcy case, these issues were left to a bankruptcy

judge to sort through. Municipal bankruptcies due to pension obligations pose an

interesting conflict between state constitutional law and federal bankruptcy law, and the

notion of “cooperative federalism” that is being invoked in more and more of these cases. As
Jack Beerman observes:

A decision that the Michigan Constitution prohibits the state’s municipalities

from reducing their pension obligations in federal bankruptcy would not amount to a
denial of the supremacy of federal law or be in the nature of state nullification of
federal law. Rather, such a decision would be an example of the sort of cooperative
federalism that has become increasingly common, under which federal law is
optional. 71

69

ibid, p. 1358
ibid, p. 1359
71 Beermann, Jack M., “Resolving the Public Pension ‘Crisis””, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Volume 41, Issue 3 2015
Article 1, p. 1008
70

William Payne and Patrick Spangler in a 2012 legal brief describe in detail the
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litigation landscape for public pensions. 72 They begin with the observation that since the

1960s state courts have turned from the earlier view that pension benefits were “gratuities”
that could be decreased or eliminated in retirement to the present view that, like private
pensions, public pensions are “contract rights”. They cite how several states, Illinois and

New Mexico as examples, amended their constitutions to explicitly provide protection for

public pensions as enforceable contract rights. They then list the common types of litigation,
all of which involve some form of benefit reduction or increase in contributions: 73
•

Cost of living adjustment changes

•

Increased contribution rates

•

Changes in calculation of benefits or eligibility

•

Retiree health contributions and benefits

So, this covers the beneficiary litigation perspective of legal cases, but what about

other fiduciary matters and conflicts? Kathleen Paisley in a 1985 article that appeared in the
Yale Law and Policy Review called for the need for federal regulation of trustee investment

decisions, a similar position that Secunda and others take when calling for a uniform set of

laws for the states that are consistent with ERISA. 74 Paisley identifies two main duties of the

trustees: 1) to act at all times with strict loyalty to participants and their beneficiaries; 2)
administer the funds of the trust prudently. She cites the case of Withers v. Teachers

Retirement System, which involved a decision by this New York pension board to purchase
$850 million of New York City municipal bonds. While in this case the court upheld the

decision by the trustees, it was clear in examining the facts of the case the city would have
72 Payne, William T. and Spangler, Patrick W., “Public Employee Pension Litigation: Legal Landscape”, 012 ABA Mid-

Winter Meeting – Breakout Session, p.1

73

ibid, p. 7
Paisley, Kathleen, “Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment Decisions”, Yale
Law and Policy Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, Article 10, 1985

74

gone bankrupt were it not for this purchase. Paisely was critical of the court’s decision
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stating “the court examined the merits of the individual investment decision without
considering its effect on the trust’s overall portfolio of assets”. 75

In general, according to Robert A. Kutcher, common fiduciary breaches come in

several forms: 76
•

Self-dealing (i.e., through conflict of interest or reaping of extra profits);

•

Usurpation of business or corporate opportunity;

•

Misappropriation of funds or property;

•

Neglect, imprudence, or want of skill (e.g., failure to administer trust property
as prudent administrator, failure to properly diversify ERISA plan investments,
or improper reliance on professionals);

•

Failure to act in another’s best interest;

•

Misrepresentation/omission as to a statement of fact (e.g., financial
condition/statement of affairs);

•

Inducement;

•

Breach of an assumed duty (e.g., to provide accurate information);

•

Misuse of confidential information/breach of confidentiality;

•

Misuse of superior knowledge;

•

Failure to disclose;

•

Aiding and abetting or acting in concert with another rendering inappropriate
advice (e.g., bad business or investment advice); and

•

75

Misuse of superior or influential position

ibid, p. 193-194
Kutcher, Robert A., “Breach of Fiduciary Duties”, Business Torts Litigation, Second Edition, American Bar Association,
2005, p. 11, David A. Soley, Robert Y. Gwin, and Ann E. Georgehead, editors
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In terms of understanding or evaluating the severity of a breach within the context

of ERISA plans, Eric Chason explain the Supreme Court’s view on this: 77

An ERISA fiduciary who harms or abuses plan assets (e.g., by negligent

investing) must make the plan whole by paying either damages or restitution. Trust
beneficiaries may seek similar redress for breach of trust. Yet, unlike trust law, ERISA
imposes fiduciary duties extending beyond the management and distribution of
property. ERISA fiduciaries have discretion to pay or deny claims for benefits, and a
wrongful denial of benefits can devastate an employee and her covered dependents.
Fiduciary breaches that harm plan assets warrant full relief. Breaches that do not
harm plan assets warrant only “appropriate equitable relief,” which excludes most
forms of monetary relief according to the Court.
While we are focused on public pension assets, we cross-apply this general

“doctrine of harm” from ERISA to evaluate the various types of cases based on their harms.
As will be further analyzed in Chapter VI we have constructed a severity variable that

categorizes seven case types found in the data we collected on public pension plans, ranging

from the most harmful, fraud, to the least harmful, minor statutory duties regarding

operations. A final category of filed, but unknown cases was also included. The details of

every case, often depending on the early stages of a case, are not always known. See Table

1.

77

Chason, Eric D., “Redressing All ERISA Fiduciary Breaches Under Section 409 (a)”, William & Mary Law School
Scholarship Repository, College of William and Mary Law School, 2010, p. 148

Table 1 – Severity Scale for Public Pension Legal Cases
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1 Concerning investments: frauds
2 Concerning investments: breaking agreements/duties
3 Concerning benefit management/disbursement
4 Concerning plan practical operations
5 Concerning minor statutory duties regarding operations
6 Concerning alterior investment concerns
7 Unknown cases

With inherent legal conflicts existing between governments, plans and retirees, and

between states and federal law as backdrop, some discussion on the current forms of legal

process in addressing the public pension funding problems, and the typical forms of

fiduciary breeches, we now turn to a review of the case data we collected and its purpose.
The legal data collected in this study was to find out: 1) what specific cases are

happening on the ground? 2) Is there a trend in the number or types of cases occurring?

And, 3) what relationship, if any, do these legal cases have to asset owner governance? We
categorize the legal environment for fiduciary problems concerning public pension
governance across three major categories: Civil, Criminal and Regulatory.

While we were able to find detailed information about cases in the courts using

Bloomberg law, there were limited regulatory action cases. This was not surprising as most
federal regulatory agencies, including the SEC, and self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
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such as FINRA, do not have any jurisdiction over state and municipal pension funds. In our
data set we found 10 SEC cases that primarily dealt with corporate disclosure matters.

Even with insurance regulated at the state level, and the extensive use of investment

products provided by the insurance industry, there was no evidence of any claims or

disputes filed with the Offices of the Insurance Commission for any of the public plans in
our sample. Likewise, there were no criminal cases found.

Some individual cases directly draw into question the effectiveness of the

administration, as in a state of Michigan supreme court case concerning unions during the

study period: Why was there a need to boost contribution levels 3% from employees? Was

this due to escalating health care costs, poor governance or management of the investments
or due to budgetary problems in relation to the pension scheme (or all of the above)?

According to the Detroit Free Press, the 2010 state law that permitted that increase in

contributions, and was later found unconstitutional, was confirmed on appeal again in June
of 2016, as the court ruled again in favor of the Michigan school employees because the
benefits were not guaranteed to employees. 78

The largest frequency of civil cases involved Denial of Benefit Claims at 51%. These

are cases where a beneficiary files suit against the plan to dispute the amount of benefits
being paid out or because they were denied. The growing number of these cases is
consistent with Secunda’s initial observation at the beginning of this section.

Second in order were SEC claims at 23%. These are cases where there was alleged

improper reporting or outright fraud by an issuing company, and the pension fund enjoined

litigation against the company as a shareholder of the security. One example is the case of

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds for securities fraud. The action

centered on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made by Amgen on two of its
78

Egan, Paul, “Appeals court rules for school employees on 3% refund”, Detroit Free Press, June 7, 2016
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flagship products Aranesp and Epogen, both cancer drugs, and the case concerned primarily
product safety, and went to the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. 79 This was affirmed by the

court in a split decision that proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a

securities-fraud class action seeking money damages for alleged violations of Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule #10(b) and Rule 1.

These cases seen in the data are recognizable from the headlines, with several

directly related to the Financial Crisis, and are primarily Rule 10B-5 or Section 20(a)

actions: Toyota’s large recall of vehicles for sticky acceleration pedals; Fannie Mae when

drawn into bankruptcy / conservatorship in the summer of 2008; and Washington Mutual’s
bankruptcy are examples present in the data among others.

The last quarter of cases include Gross Negligence, Civil Rights Violation,

Constitutional Challenge, Contract, Creditor, Fraudulent Conveyance, Garnishment of

Wages, Personal Injury, Probate, Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) and Wrongful
Termination. Note that half of these are similar to the Denial of Benefit claims in that the

purpose of the claim is to recover property and concerns a question regarding rights to that
property i.e., Fraudulent Conveyance, Garnishment of Wages, QDRO, Wrongful Termination

and Probate.

This data, combined with other plan governance data and analytics, should offer

opportunities to further understand the legal and societal impact of public pension plans.
From an effectiveness perspective, analysis of funding ratios and performance statistics

provide the barometers of how the pension fund is performing, but the legal and regulatory
cases that arise over time as a result of this performance have the potential to inform us on
the magnitude of the impact of this performance on society itself. Lower levels of

79
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performance (i.e., ineffectiveness) over time necessitate either an increase in contributions,
which impact taxpayers and employees, or reductions in benefits, which impact retirees.
An overlay of legal analysis allows us to monitor how this tension plays out as

people turn to the judicial system to address a retirement system that over time is less able
to meet its commitments without further burdening one group at the expense of another.

The case severity scale for categorizing and scoring is the proposed tool for integrating this

information into a broader fund governance model as will be further developed in Chapter
VI.

CHAPTER III

66

GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
Introduction

This study focuses on the governance or fiduciary effectiveness of asset owners, and

specifically public pension plans. To understand the dynamics, challenges and opportunities
for these organizations, and have a basis for developing a system of effectiveness measures,
it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of governance and organizational

effectiveness from an interdisciplinary perspective. This means reviewing governance

theory through the lenses of the law, as we just did, social psychology and organizational
behavior, ethics, finance and economics.

The next two chapters will review theory, research and the literature for the

purpose of narrowing our field of factors for examination in applying corporate governance
methods to institutional fund evaluation, and specifically for public pension funds. This

chapter will review organizational governance theory in general, and Chapter IV will look

specifically at body of work in the field of public pension and asset owner governance. Each

section will have a concluding segment entitled “Implications for Pension Board Governance
Factors”. This will form the basis of the factors that were selected and analyzed in Chapter
VI.

Group effectiveness is a topic of ongoing interest in the management field. How

effective organizations operate, ranging from small teams to large corporations, is a field of
inquiry that is virtually endless in its theories and case examinations. My narrow field of
study, of course, looks at one particular type of group: a group of financial governance

fiduciaries, the investment committee (or board) of public pension funds.
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The record of effectiveness of these groups is mixed at best. One common measure

of effectiveness is the rate of return performance. Looking only at public pensions over the
2008 to 2012 study period, the range of annualized returns across the entire population
was -0.9% to 15%. 80 Even accounting for differences in asset allocation and investment

objectives, these results show enormous disparity in performance, and on a dollar basis

potentially represent an opportunity cost in the billions. What is it about these groups, and
the individuals that comprise them, that can drive such varying results across such a large
group? The answer lies in how these groups organize (governance structure), the people

that reside on the boards and committees of these organizations (human factors) and how

they interact with each other and the investment consultants and managers with whom
they work (group processes).

A 2001 U.K. government report, known as the Myners Report, concluded that one

problem is that ‘many trustees are not especially expert in investment’.

To illustrate this finding, the Report observed a majority of trustees had no

professional qualifications in finance or investment, had little in the way of initial
training, did not attend training courses after the first 12 months of appointment, and
spent hardly any time in the course of a week preparing for pension fund investment
decisions. Pension fund trustees may be well intentioned but there is no ‘legal
requirement for trustees to have any particular level of expertise in investment
matters ’. 81
In the next few sections, we will highlight earlier research that shows institutional

norms, practices and rules can have a positive effect on collective decision-making. This
study questions whether institutional factors are sufficient to overcome the issues

80 Public Plans Database, Center for Retirement Research, Boston College http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/
81 Clark, Gordon L., Caerlewy-Smith, Emiko, and Marshall, John C., “Pension Fund Competence: Decision Making in

Problems Relevant to Investment Practice”, Cambridge University Press, March, 2006, p. 4

associated with heterogeneity of trustee competence. Given the frailties of human beings,
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we examine whether there are common governance factors that can mitigate these effects
such as the use of outside consultants (people with formal training in investments), and

board turnover (duration of engagement and consistency of collective experience). If these

factors can be linked to better performance measures, this may provide some positive new
directions for public policy.

Examining Group Performance and Decision-Making

When assessing governance fiduciaries (trustees), this section draws from a 2006

study of pension fund trustees by Clark, Caerlewy-Smith and Marshall. The study

specifically looks into pension fund trustee competence. The authors indicated that while
there had been a significant amount of research done on individual decision-making, up
until this point there had been very few studies specific to trustee decision-making.

The study considers trustee problem-solving skills with regard to investments and,

in particular, their discount functions, their willingness to take risks with their own money
and other people’s money, their understanding of probability, and their efficiency in
processing information.

The survey was designed to examine widely recognized problems drawn from the

psychology literature, and drew from a number of established tests and techniques:

Problems relevant to investment decision-making…each problem is linked to the relevant
literature...Where possible, the same problem was set in two different ways so as to test the
consistency of respondents’ solutions…Care was taken throughout to present the problems in
simple ways using common vernacular… 82

82

ibid, p. 10

Study Highlights The conclusions drawn from the experimental study found
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several shortcomings that suggest pension trustees are no better than members of the
broader population in overcoming common cognitive biases as documented in the
literature:83

1) Trustees generally have shallow and non-exponential discount functions. As a

group, it is nearly impossible to define a simple function. This implies that trustees

do not evaluate consistently the time value of money within the context of inherent
conditions of uncertainty and risk.

2) Trustees in general responded that they would assume a moderate amount of risk.
However, in measuring implicit risk preferences it was found that individuals are
risk averse (loss averse).

3) Trustees are ill-equipped to make probability estimates. Without training, people do
not typically understand the steps necessary for calculating probabilities.

4) Finally, trustees are subject to confirmation bias, selecting information to confirm
pre-suppositions, and do not use available data efficiently to test solutions to
problems.

Implications for Pension Board Governance Factors: What role do investment

professionals including both outside consultants and internal staff have in improving

the fiduciary effectiveness of pension plans given concerns about trustee competence?

What about board and committee leadership? Training and education could also play a
role.

83

ibid, p. 22

Boards in Concept
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Leadership theory runs swift and deep, the river banks crowded with animated
commentators and interested observers. Governance theory trickles along the
shallower backwaters; it attracts little notice and even fewer devotees (Chait, Ryan &
Taylor, 2005). 84
Chait, Ryan & Taylor’s observation may be true when looking at governance theory

through the lens of social psychology, however when examining this topic through the

financial and legal disciplines, a different picture emerges, more like a flood than a trickle.

The last fifteen years have witnessed heightened attention that could be ascribed to two

main periods of corporate and financial dysfunction: 1) the wave of accounting scandals of
the early 2000s; and 2) the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

Both periods elicited deep and expansive legislative and regulatory response, first in

the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and later in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street

Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). Many point to the failure of

boardroom governance, starting with Enron in 2001, as the main culprit in destroying

trillions of dollars of shareholder wealth, and particularly in the latter case, bringing the
global economy to the brink (Fortuna & Loch, 2012).

While corporate governance (CG) has clearly received the most interest both by

mainstream media and academia, other areas of governance across American society are

also receiving some attention, ranging from school districts to pension funds. Public sector
and non-profit organizations are facing their own range of challenges from a governance

perspective, and further research into these areas, with information sharing across multiple
disciplines, is needed.
84

Quoted from Adamson, 2011

One such opportunity is in the area of organizational dynamics. Boards and their
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related committee structures are unique organizational forms. Their power is significant,
and is wielded across virtually the entire range of corporations and non-profits

organizations, and many state and municipal agencies. Yet, with the exception of certain
public sector boards that must go on the record and be open to the public, their
transparency is generally quite limited.

Boards are, in effect, black boxes, where there is an effect of “outward appearance,

and inward decisions” (Barratt and Korac-Kakabadse, 2013). Academic research has

primarily focused on board structure, but evidence is gathering that “structure and board
composition are not good predictors of good governance…there is a need to broaden the
board performance measures in use”. The focus is shifting over to processes, instead of

structural aspects alone, despite the obstacles to gaining access to the “live boardroom”
(ibid).

The discipline and research methods of organizational dynamics may offer the tools

to help fill in the gaps of our current understanding of board effectiveness. This

understanding and how it may apply to improving our systems of governance have a

number of public policy implications such as improved governance practices and greater
accountability.

This section explores the topic of board governance effectiveness, and current

theories and practices around assessment. After reviewing the current background of board
governance and board effectiveness, later on in Chapter V on Methodology, we will examine
certain communications research methods of organizational dynamics that may offer the
potential to “open the black box” of governance processes and behaviors to enhance the

methods for board governance evaluation. We will draw some preliminary conclusions, and
discuss current and future research on this topic, specifically as it relates to research of

investment boards and committees, e.g. public and private pensions, foundations,
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endowments and trusts.

A board, and its related committee structures, is a unique species among

organizations. Boards govern a range of organizations with varying mandates and

motivations: for-profit, special purpose, philanthropic and/or community-minded. They

may represent or balance the interests of a narrow and limited, or broad and diverse, body

of stakeholders. They typically meet with relative infrequency, perhaps no more than three

to six times a year, so the level of contact among members may be limited. 85 In certain cases,

there may even be legal restrictions that limit board member contact outside of the public
board meeting as, for example, required by the Brown Act in California for public school
districts (Mar, 2011).

The economics and incentive forms vary: some members may be volunteers or

receive some form of compensation. In the case of public company boards, the issue of

compensation structure may be a key factor in aligning interests with shareholders. The
process governing selection is inherently political; some are appointed while others are

elected. 86 The nomination process, especially in the case of public pensions, can be highly
politicized, with byzantine rules governing the selection of members including combined

nomination and confirmation processes through the governor, state legislature and public
unions. In the case of public corporations, takeover bids and expensive proxy fights are
waged to influence the slate of directors and board actions.

Member retention can, in certain circumstances, be tenuous at best with high

turnover rates. For example, 45 percent of school district board members in the state of

Indiana serve only for one full, four-year term (Adamson, 2011). Lack of experience and

consistency in membership has obvious implications for board effectiveness with the
85
86

https://www.quora.com/Corporate-Governance-How-often-does-the-Board-of-Directors-of-a-public-tech-company-meet
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/06/nyregion/school-boards-elected-or-appointed.html?pagewanted=all

73

insufficient institutional knowledge present among the boards. By comparison in our own
data set, we noted that turnover rates among public pension boards on average were

approximately 20% per year, which means that board members in aggregate typically serve
no more than 5 years.

Many board members have inadequate training or background experience to

operate at the level required of a board. In the state of California, to serve on a school

district board, the only single requirement is that the member be at least 18 years of age

(Mar, 2011). Less than half of board members in the state of Indiana receive any training
(Adamson, 2011). Similarly, public pensions, the focus of my research, have limited

requirements for board members (Clark, Caerlewy-Smith & Marshall, 2006). In that study,

they reference the findings from the Myner’s Report, noting that “a majority of trustees had

no professional qualifications in finance or investment, had little initial training, did not

attend training courses after the first 12 months of appointment, and spent little time in the
course of a week preparing for pension fund investment decisions.” 87

Board Governance Governing boards in any setting are composed of the following

elements: organizational structure, people, processes/behaviors and tasks/functions. They
are charged with the following responsibilities: a monitoring or oversight role, typically of
management and executive staff; decision-making power for policy formulation, strategy

determination and allocation of resources; and they are bound by fiduciary duties, namely,
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

Since the early 1930s, corporate governance theory has focused on four structural

foundations: Agency theory, management theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship

theory (Fortuna & Loch, 2012). These theories have focused on explaining the complex,
interconnected relationships between the board, management, shareholders, and other

87 Clark, Gordon L., Caerlewy-Smith, Emiko, and Marshall, John C., “Pension Fund Competence: Decision Making in
Problems Relevant to Investment Practice”, Cambridge University Press, March, 2006, p. 4

stakeholders. The main bone of contention has been centered on the separation of
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ownership from control, the agency problem of shareholders versus management, and the
potential misappropriation of wealth by management. Over the years, this concern has

expanded to other stakeholders including customers, employees, creditors, the government
and the community at large, and the impact the corporation can have on each constituency,
whether economic, environmental or social. Management – especially CEO – compensation

and societal (economic and environmental) impacts have been particularly controversial
subjects.

While the structural and normative framework for corporate governance has been

adequately covered and understood in the literature, what has only begun receiving

attention in recent years is this notion of penetrating the black box of corporate governance

to understand what transpires within the boardroom itself – how and why decisions are
made. Furthermore, linking this to a proper and thorough understanding of governance

effectiveness is the final step in making any inquiry into this subject worthwhile. Making the
boardroom accessible is where organizational dynamics may offer some promise in the
field:

To answer the how (sic) to prevent these financial crises, the literature review
focus needed to shift to what transpires within the boardroom culture in order to
understand how and why decisions are made. Two details were immediately
discovered. First, behavioral elements in the success of corporate governance and its
actors had been noted in past publications, but limited empirical studies addressing
this phenomena (sic) exist. The second discovery was that boardrooms with their key
actors beliefs, values, and inferred behaviors have their own discrete organizational
cultures. (Ibid)

What Makes for an Effective Board?
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Industry is crowded with many opinions about what ingredients are needed for

effective boards. A brief web search will bring up not just academic papers on governance,

but the briefs and articles of many consultancies, proxy advisors and accounting firms that
offer advice and services in this area. Giving advice, especially to financial intermediaries
and investors, on the business of governance is big business.

Corporations It’s important to note that while public pension boards are non-

profit, in that they are charged with maximizing beneficiary returns, they are like corporate
boards that are charged with maximizing shareholder returns. Thus, the characteristics of
effective corporate boards are likely to be relevant for pension boards.

On page 5 of the Conference Board’s 1998 report, “Determining Board

Effectiveness”, there are five key questions that provide a framework for assessing the
effectiveness of corporate boards:
•

What standards and metrics are appropriate for assessing the effectiveness of the
board?

•

What impact does the board’s infrastructure have on its effectiveness?

•

How does the composition of the board relate to its effectiveness?

•

How does the board evaluate itself either collectively or individually?

•

How does the board go about making necessary changes in strategy, structure and
processes to improve its effectiveness?
John & Senbet (1998) describe how the effectiveness of the corporate board is

driven by several structural elements: its independence and composition, size, committee

structure and compensation structure. Independence and composition of the board simply
mean that the board members are not all employees of the company, and this, of course,
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establishes a group to oversee management that is not conflicted in the sense of overseeing

themselves. It also calls for the independence and separation of the two roles of chairperson
and CEO.

The one downside, as pointed out in the literature, is that independent, outside

directors may not have access to all of the necessary information, or the time or inclination
to review it, to make effective decisions (Schaffer, 2002). So, the most effective boards will
have a mix of internal and external board members, and then see, especially in certain

committees such as audit, where absence of any conflict is key, that the composition of the
committee is purely independent.

Empirical studies have shown that smaller boards are more effective, and that

relationship declines as board size increases from four to ten members. Beyond ten no
relationship appears to exist looking at the dependent variables of valuation and

profitability in relation to the independent variable of board size (John & Senbet, 1998). The
Ringelmann Effect (also known as Social Loafing) may be at play when groups become too
large to be effective (Latané & Harkins, 1979).

Klein (1995) researches the impact of the committee structure of boards and the

role of directors within the committees on the effectiveness of the board. Committees

should be organized with specialized roles to enhance the board’s performance in both its

productivity and monitoring functions. Each committee should be set up with a defined set

of functions and goals, and be staffed with directors most likely to attain each goal. Common
committee structures follow this framework: governance/nominating, audit, compensation,
strategy, finance (investments/capital budgeting) and other ad hoc committees.

Committees exist to do the work of the board within a task-specific area. They are

used to facilitate, evaluate and ratify long-term investment decisions and to monitor the

performance of senior management. One would expect productivity-oriented committees to
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be staffed by insiders and monitoring-oriented committees by outsiders. This is, in fact, how
many boards arrange themselves, and research has found a positive relationship between a
higher percentage of outsiders involved in the monitoring function and improved
performance results of the firm (Klein, 1995).

Board of director compensation structure is important for aligning interests of the

board with those of shareholders (e.g. stock ownership). Agency theorists assert that

effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Boards
are also responsible for hiring the CEO and other top management, and structuring

management compensation. The compensation issue has drawn much ire in recent years as
the pay packages of CEOs have become increasingly larger, in many cases despite retention
or turnover. It has been a hot button issue, and “say on pay” rights of shareholders have
recently been under scrutiny.

Non-profits Bridgestar in 2009 published a brief article outlining the keys to

becoming a more effective non-profit board, paraphrased here:

1. Need for improved oversight due to increased regulatory scrutiny

2. Leadership activities: strategic support and expertise, raising funds, building
community support, and goal and task prioritization.

3. The right board processes: people, culture, decision-making processes and
structures

4. Understanding and executing on areas that need strengthening
5. Self-assessments

Public Sector For school district boards, which can be extended to other

government municipalities and agencies, effective governance teams must provide

leadership based on needs and community values as well as provide fiscal viability. The
primary attributes of effective governance teams include (Mar, 2011):

1. Ability to set priorities
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2. Ability to maintain the districts and schools

3. Ability to determine effective agendas, make sound decisions and exercise good
political judgment

Furthermore, Mar (2011), elaborates on the specific elements and strategies of effective
boards in this area:

1. Respect for differing opinions to promote open and effective communication
2. Strategies to promote unity, and manage conflict
3. Effective superintendent-board partnerships
4. Governance team training

So, if these are the attributes of effective governance across the range of sectors:

corporate, non-profit and governmental, let’s drill into the specific elements of structure
and process/behaviors in many ways common to all three.

Group process and behaviors Extensive research has been completed on corporate
governance. The related empirical studies have generated ambiguous and confusing
results, which have inspired calls for new alternatives to board and governance
research. These appeals have generated numerous articles expressing the necessity for
studies that define behavioral processes inside and outside the boardroom for a clearer
understanding of what is effective governance. (Fortuna & Loch, 2011)
Surprisingly, despite this clarion call to CG scholars, the vanguard of behavioral

research is not on the frontlines of corporate America, but in the backwaters of school

district board governance.

Mar (2011) states the problem:

The governance structure of school boards requires that decisions be reached

as a multi-member team. While the goal is to reach consensus, effective decision-

making often involves conflict or disagreement that allows for diverse perspectives.
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The challenge is for governance to allow for such diversity without erupting into
unproductive and damaging conflict. Decision-making can be problematic for any
group. Individual members may have a desire to conform to group expectations,
causing groups to overlook viable choices in favor of an unrealistic alternative, termed
groupthink. Defensive avoidance, the suppression of differences, can occur in groups
unable to handle conflict. Status seeking can cause individuals to attempt to dominate
the group, resulting in dissatisfaction and unproductiveness. Miscommunication
interferes with group decision making, adding an emotional aspect. Group members
often have different values that result in internal conflict. (Mar, 2011)
Fortuna & Loch, in their groundbreaking 2012 article, identified key attributes of

corporate boards from a behavioral perspective. They assembled these attributes into two

categories, positive and negative. Positive group beliefs and values included: collaboration,
collegiality, respect and cognitive diversity. Negative attributes included: combativeness,
dysfunction, disrespect, and cosmetic diversity.

Mar (2011) applies team-based models in assessing board effectiveness. In

particular she references Bales & Strodbeck’s (1951) model that is based on problems

concerning orientation, evaluation and control. The model focuses on socio-emotional

responses that produce positive or negative interdependence, and ultimately the group’s
ability to perform.

Mar operates under the theory that successful boards must develop both task skills

and relationship skills in order to collaborate successfully. For that she applies the Team

Development Matrix, developed by Jones and Beardley (2001), a two-dimensional model
that correlates task and relationship behavior to examine group development stages.

A group that is well established over time may lose sight over how the group is
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working together. This lack of relationship-focus can impede the ability of the group to
work together and complete tasks. Both must be functioning, and functioning well for

overall effectiveness. The stages of process behavior include: dependency, conflict, cohesion
and interdependence. Task behavior stages include: orientation, organization, open data
flow and problem solving. See Table 2, the Team Development Matrix, for further
information.

Measuring the success of teams through task accomplishment alone is

insufficient…Effective groups understand that they must develop relationships that
foster trust and mutual feedback, in addition to establishing a clear focus on goals.
(Mar, 2011)
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Table 2 – Team Development Matrix 88
Interdependence

“Flying Circus”,

free expression
of feelings
Cohesion

communication

Harmony,

Sharing, dialogue

Resistance,

Fractionation

Encounter task-

struggle,

disagreements

confrontation

leadership

disagreement

Dependency

negotiation

Supportive, good

Tightly knit,
“we-ness”

Conflict

Flexibility,

Cooperation

reactive,

trust

oriented

shared decisionmaking,

camaraderie
Ownership,
safety

Issue-oriented
polarization

“Square 1”

Inefficiency,

Telling-asking,

Experting,

newness

procedures

communication

decision-

Organization

Open Data Flow

coping with

search for

one-way

Relationship Behavior /
Task Behavior

Collaboration,

Orientation

leader-centered
making

Problem
Solving

The Team Development Matrix is a helpful model in conceptualizing and

understanding the development stages of teams, and where there may be problems and
challenges because it relates both relationship behaviors with task behaviors. Most
88

Team Development Matrix. From “Facilitating Team Development: A View from the Field,” by J.E. Jones and W.L.
Beardley, 2001.
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importantly, these behaviors are observable in the group setting, so that a researcher, who
has access to the boardroom, has the tools to determine and identify the level of
effectiveness of the board from a behavioral standpoint.

This has been a review of the perspectives of effective board governance, in both

theory and practice. We reviewed the determinants of board governance across the

spectrum of corporate, non-profit and public sector boards. In particular, we addressed the
current state of knowledge and the present call for a new approach to a better

understanding of effective governance by looking at boards from the inside out. This entails
looking at governance phenomena beyond organizational structure, the traditional focus of
CG research, and also the role of processes, relationships and culture to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of what constitutes effective board governance. We

discussed how team-based models may be applied from a theoretical perspective, and
referenced in particular Jones & Beardley’s (2001) Team Development Matrix model.

Implications for Pension Board Governance Factors: There are numerous questions
and implications from this section for governance factors:
•

•

How engaged is the board, and how can the level of engagement be measured?

•

committees?

•

its members, including its leadership?

•

and substance of discussion).

Who serves in what capacity? Is there cross-over between committees? Which

How large is the board, and what kind of continuity exists (i.e. turnover) among
How is the board / committee spending its time and on what issues? (e.g. type
Who serves on the board? Are they elected or appointed? Who attends the
meetings? How often?

•

•
•
•

Does the board engage in self-assessment? How does it report on its meeting?
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What level of transparency exists?

Professional background, expertise and training among members.
The role and level of compensation.

•

The role and level of diversity.

•

members and committees.

Staff / insider participation balanced with independence among certain
Finally, what factors are readily accessible, and might there be proxies for
certain information that can be obtained? For example, is the duration of

meetings a good proxy for careful deliberation, an important process attribute?
Human Error in Asset Owner Governance

Those who manage university endowments have at their disposal some of the finest
scholars, and university trustees who are drawn from the highest ranks of the business
world. Who would presume to call these people foolish? But, that is what one would
apparently have to do if one wishes to attribute the market behavior to human error.
― Robert Shiller, “Bubbles, Human Judgment and Expert Opinion” 89
What is human error? Human error means that something has been done that was

"not intended by the actor; not desired by a set of rules or an external observer; or that led

the task or system outside its acceptable limits" (Senders and Moray, 1991). In short, it is a
deviation from intention, expectation or desirability. Logically, human actions can fail to
89

Shiller, Robert, “Bubbles, Human Judgment and Expert Opinion”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1303, May
2001, p. 2
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achieve their goal in two different ways: the actions can go as planned, but the plan can be

inadequate, leading to mistakes; or, the plan can be satisfactory, but the performance can be
deficient, leading to slips and lapses (Hollnagel, 1993). However, a mere failure is not an
error if there had been no plan to accomplish something in particular.

Guastello (2014) further identifies five common types of human error:
•

Errors of commission – these are the most obvious, where the operator

•

takes the wrong action.

•

action.

•

have been the preferred course.

•

order.

Errors of omission – this is where the operator neglects to take the right

Extraneous acts – the operator takes an action, when doing nothing would
Sequential errors – the operator takes perhaps the right action, in the wrong
Timing errors – the operator takes the right action, but at the wrong time.

I would add one to the list, particularly in competitive situations, the so-called

“unforced error”, as typically described in tennis. 90 This is where a loss on the court results

only from one’s own blunder and not from the skill or action of the other player. This is

relevant especially when considered in the context of the zero-sum game of securities
trading, where every dollar “won” by one trader must be lost by another. 91

90 Krames, Jeffrey A., The Unforced Error: Why Some Managers Get Promoted While Others Get Eliminated, Portfolio,
2009
91 http://247wallst.com/investing/2007/03/08/why_trading_is_/

In investment management, where risk management is a central concept, human

85

error in practice is most narrowly defined as “operational risk”. According to KPMG,
operational risk in banks, funds and insurance companies is:92

Defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,

people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes
strategic and reputational risk.
As an example, in 2001 the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB), made a

clerical error in a performance calculation that cost the pension approximately $4.5 million
when determining a payout to the Milwaukee Public School system’s supplemental early
retirement plan. In this case, a simple decimal error was the culprit. The board told the

pension plan administrator that the February 2001 all-stock variable return was negative
0.089%, when it was actually negative 8.90%, and the return for the fixed fund, which
contained a stock and bond mix, was negative 0.046%, when it was actually negative
4.60%. 93

According to the state board’s former chief operating officer, Ken Johnson, “It wasn't

the technology that wasn't performing correctly, it was a case of human error. The decimal
point was put in the wrong spot when the person read the return off the report - the

number e-mailed [was wrong]."

While operational risk is a simple concept to understand, the behavioral finance

literature has focused on another form of risk (behavioral risk) to explain irrationality in
financial decision-making, a subject we will elaborate on in a later section.

92 https://www.kpmg.com/lu/en/services/advisory/risk-consulting/financialregulatoryreporting/documents/operationalrisk.pdf
93 http://www.globalaging.org/pension/us/socialsec/milwaukeeplan.htm

Behavioral finance is a relatively new field that seeks to combine behavioral
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and cognitive psychological theory with conventional economics and finance to
provide explanations for why people make irrational financial decisions
(Investopedia). 94

These two forms of error present in investment management, operational risk and

behavioral risk or error in human decision-making, are very different forms of error. As will

become clear by the end of this paper, one is very functional in form, and the other is more
strategic. Operational risk can be more easily controlled and safeguarded against through
audits, procedures and practices; Behavioral Risk is more subjective, ambiguous and

difficult to judge in practice, and requires structural and process adjustments to limit it. See

Table 3 for a summary.

Table 3 – Two Forms of Human Error in Investment Management
Form
Operational Risk
Behavioral Risk

Discrete

Continuous

Safeguard
Procedural / system enhancement

Governance structure / process enhancement

Finally, there is, of course, a range of tolerance for human error in human affairs.

This largely depends whether there is a “second chance” attribute, an opportunity to

recover from the error. The examples of zero tolerance in human error are countless,
94

http://www.investopedia.com/university/behavioral_finance/
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mostly where human life is at stake: surgery, nuclear power, air travel, heavy construction,
etc. Of course, the financial and reputational cost are also of major importance.

Todd and Walsh (2013) describe common oversight mistakes of pension

committees. Oversight of plan investments is a fundamental duty of governance
committees.
•

Focusing on investment manager selection over the asset allocation decision.
They reference investment research such as the 1995 Brinson, Hood & Beebower

study, which assert that investment outcomes are as much as 90% determined by

the asset allocation decision, making this the primary lever by which investors can
impact long-term performance. Their admonition is that many committees get

bogged down in a “this versus that” manager discussion, and lose sight of the bigger
•

picture.

Not focusing on plan liabilities. Plan sponsors can fall into the trap of not forming

investment policy in light of long-term liabilities. The interplay of liabilities and time
horizon are important considerations when making the asset allocation decision. An
allocation that doesn’t tolerate short term volatility in asset classes such as equity

and alternatives, may undermine the ability of the investment pool to meet liability
payments in the future without significant additional contributions by the sponsor
•

to make up the shortfall.

Backward looking bias. The section on Behavioral Finance will provide an

exhaustive list of biases that individuals and groups are subject to in investing.

However, Todd and Walsh highlight this one given its all too common appearance
with investment committees. They describe the problem:95
95

https://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/pension-oversight-mistakes.aspx
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Unfortunately, investment committees are subject to the same biases
as retail investors, such as a tendency to look in the rear-view mirror when
making decisions, which causes them to increase their investments in asset

classes that have performed well recently. This backward-looking approach is
dangerous. Instead, plan sponsors need to be forward-looking by asking,
‘Based on current valuations, what can each asset class (and the whole
portfolio) reasonably expect to return on a forward basis?’
They highlight one very simple tool to avoid the guesswork of when to buy and sell:

The use of rebalancing. Maintaining an allocation target and tolerance band forces the

investment committee to trim portfolio allocation as valuations become stretched, and to
buy investments that may be undervalued relative to other segments of the market.
•

Lack of an investment policy. Organizations that fail to produce and adhere to this
governing document do so at their own peril. First, it protects fiduciaries from

allegations by beneficiaries that they did not comply with their “duty of care” by

demonstrating a piece of important evidence of a clear process. Secondly, it guides
investment decision-making and action i.e. as noted above with regard to

rebalancing policy. A disciplined investment process is another key factor to driving
•

effective results over time (Dalbar, 2015).

Dysfunctional investment committees. As examined in the last section, group
dynamics are another key factor in limiting and avoiding mistakes. A “bully”

member may exert inordinate influence on a committee’s investment decisions. A

strong and fair committee chair is key to dampening this effect to build consensus
toward effective decisions. Diversity of committees is important for avoiding
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groupthink. Relevant – and depth of – experience of the members of the committee

•

must be adequate for successful evaluation of investment decisions.

Failure to exercise the duty of loyalty. Committee members must have a duty of

loyalty to the plan and its beneficiaries only. Temptation to direct economic benefits
of the plan to the employer or to third parties is a common conflict of interest to
which members of committees and boards are subject. This was a topic we
•

examined in depth in Chapter II.

Working with a conflicted advisor. Likewise, organizations are often subject to
working with a consultant or advisor who is conflicted by fee arrangements or

internal corporate pressures. Such advisors may not be acting in the best interest of

the plan, which can result in sub-optimal outcomes. Not picking up on these conflicts
is where committees regularly err. However, one reason they are common is
because many firms find themselves in the position, from the standpoint of

economic incentive, of acting as both “manufacturer and distributor” of their own
product, which structurally creates the conflict in the first place. The growth in

“independent advisors” has been a form of reaction to that conflict and has been a
significant trend in the industry over the last several years. 96

Turning to the investment manager function, at the Operating Fiduciary level, a

recent blog posting asked the thought-provoking question, “Is it possible for an investment
management firm to operate with the same level of precision and reliability found in

industries where failure is simply not an option?” 97 Here the focus on operational risk is
again emphasized:

96

97
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To answer this question, we looked at operational practices in industries such as
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nuclear power, space travel, aviation and healthcare, which face the prospect of
catastrophic failure on a daily basis and have the highest standards for reliability and
quality – after all, failure in these industries is a matter of life or death. While the
consequences of success or failure in the investment management industry may not be
quite as extreme, we do believe that investment managers must treat their investors’
dollars with the same level of respect and thus operate to the same standards.
In this post, we explore what investment management would look like (sic) if we
applied the same level of operational excellence found in these industries. Investment
management is a business of precision, yet far too often you hear rumours of ‘fat-finger’
execution errors, or other more serious issues due to operational failures. And these are
only the failures that you hear about – what about the failures that go unreported to
clients, or even worse, failures that the investment manager itself is not aware of? What it
all comes down to is that errors in investment management, no matter how small, are a
sign of a lack of quality, and with a lack of quality there is a potential for loss and
deviation from strategy…
…Despite the best intentions of employees, an underlying issue in investment
management is that firms are made up of people and people make mistakes – it is
inevitable…the staff at these organizations face legitimate challenges such as time
availability, stress levels, distractions, and even ergonomics and office culture. As such, a
lot can be assessed from a review of the processes in place to manage the ‘human factor.’
The author describes application of several methods including due diligence

practices, systematic examinations, and even Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA),

which can all aid in the selection of “quality” investment managers with good operational
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risk management practices. FMEA is one of the systematic techniques for failure analysis. It
was developed by reliability engineers in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise

from malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability
study. It involves reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible
to identify failure modes, and their causes and effects. 98

The Human Error Problem: Models and Approaches

Reason (2000) described the human error problem as something that can be

approached in two ways: the individual and the system. The “person approach” focuses on
the errors of individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention or moral weakness.

The associated countermeasures are directed mainly at reducing unwanted variability in
human behavior. These methods include raising awareness, changing procedures,

disciplinary measures, threat of litigation, retraining, “naming, blaming, and shaming”.

Followers of this approach tend to treat errors as moral issues, assuming that bad things
happen to bad people. Psychologists have referred to this as the “just world fallacy”, a

cognitive bias or belief that a person’s actions will automatically bring about morally fair
and fitting consequences to that person, good or bad. 99

The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work

and tries to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects. The basic premise in the
system approach is that humans are fallible and errors are to be expected, even in the best

organizations. Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not

so much in the perversity of human nature as in “upstream” systemic factors. These include
98

Nune Ravi Sankar, Bantwal S. Prabhu, (2001) "Modified approach for prioritization of failures in a system failure mode
and effects analysis", International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, Vol. 18 Iss: 3, pp.324 - 336
99
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recurrent error traps in the workplace and the organizational processes that give rise to
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them. Countermeasures are based on the assumption that although we cannot change the

human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work. A central idea is
that of system defenses. When an adverse event occurs, the important issue is not who
blundered, but how and why the defenses failed.

Error Management Theory

Johnson et al (2013) describe the ubiquity of error and apply adaptive systems

theory in describing an approach to error management theory (EMT). In an interesting

counterpoint to the heuristics and biases described at length in the behavioral economics
and finance literature, a topic we will cover in depth in the next section, they describe

biased decisions as adaptive in nature to a world in which decision-making occurs under
uncertain – and at times – stressful conditions.

In recent decades, economists and psychologists have documented a long list of

biases in human judgment and decision-making, with important consequences for
economics, politics, and society. Rather than being mere quirks of human nature,
however, there is growing evidence that these biases represent adaptive solutions to
the decision-making problems of our evolutionary past. 100
They highlight two states under which decision-making occurs: One where

resources are plentiful and one where resources are scarce. Decision-making strategies

under either state do not necessarily maximize expected payoffs, but Darwinian fitness.
100 Johnson, Dominic D.P., Blumstein, Daniel T., Fowler, James T., Haselton, Martie G., “The Evolution of Error: Error
Management, Cognitive Constraints, and Adaptive Decision-making Biases”, Trends in Ecology & Evolution, TREE-1711,
0169-5347, 2013, p. 2
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Under a state of abundance, conservatism is a more effective strategy, where it is better for
the organism or actor to err on the side of caution. Under the opposite state of scarcity,

rolling the dice for survival, a high-risk strategy, may be the appropriate response. Figure 4

demonstrates the theoretical relationship between the probability of positive outcomes and
the relative benefits and costs.

Figure 4- A Generalized Illustration of Error Management

An example here is warranted, which ties in a bit of Signal Detection Theory. As

humans we are more likely to mistake a stick for a snake, than the other way around. The

cost of being wrong is relatively high, and therefore our adaptive response is to make a false
positive much more frequently than a false negative. What about under circumstances of

trying to identify a bad investment manager? Do committees see more snakes or sticks? On
balance the decision to terminate a manager, perceived by the committee as suddenly less
than desirable, has at best a neutral outcome (Goyal & Wahal, 2008), which suggests the
committee sees more snakes than sticks. Better to be safe than sorry.
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As an aside, sometimes action is preferable to inaction when inaction would be the

better course. Committees may feel they must do something. This is the extraneous act form
of error referenced earlier. Market timing is an example where investors buy or sell, to
avoid a decline or pursue an extraordinary gain, and research consistently shows that
people tend to be ineffective market timers (Dalbar, 2015). Warren Buffet famously
described his dictum for avoiding extraneous acts in investing:

Benign neglect, bordering on sloth, remains the hallmark of our investment process.
Reason (2000) discusses the importance of dynamic and resilient systems in error

management. Error management has two components: limiting the incidence of major

errors as much as possible, and creating systems that are better able to tolerate errors and
mitigate their impact. The systems approach is comprehensive and focuses on the entire

the organization (tasks, individuals, work teams, departments, divisions, etc).

Most managers of traditional systems attribute human unreliability to unwanted

variability and strive to eliminate it as far as possible. In high reliability organizations,
on the other hand, it is recognized that human variability in the shape of
compensations and adaptations to changing events represents one of the system's
most important safeguards. Reliability is “a dynamic non-event.” It is dynamic because
safety is preserved by timely human adjustments; it is a non-event because successful
outcomes rarely call attention to themselves.
Effective risk management depends crucially on establishing a reporting culture.
Without a detailed analysis of mishaps, incidents, near misses, and “free lessons,” we
have no way of uncovering recurrent error traps or of knowing where the “edge” is
until we fall over it. The complete absence of such a reporting culture within the Soviet
Union contributed crucially to the Chernobyl disaster. Trust is a key element of a

reporting culture and this, in turn, requires the existence of a just culture—one
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possessing a collective understanding of where the line should be drawn between
blameless and blameworthy actions. Engineering a just culture is an essential early
step in creating a safe culture. 101
Resilience, adaptability in the face of change and a culture that embraces

transparency and accountability – and also a better understanding of where people are

inclined to react the way they do and take risks and why – are among the keys to better
error management in business and finance.

Implications for Pension Board Governance Factors A study of human error is

important for this research because as discrete events, practically speaking, human error
will be in most cases unobservable to the researcher, and for that reason we must
acknowledge especially in striving to model governance that these are inevitably

unobservable effects within the model. We also seek to find proxies, or “markers” of

governance structures that may help mitigate human error. For example, as will be detailed
in Chapter VI, there are a number of proxy “engagement” variables that indicate the extent
of focus and attention by the board. While we cannot per se see exactly how the board is

engaged, or specifically on what they are engaged, we can at least find measures that imply
engagement, such as attendance in meetings or the duration of meetings.

101 Reason, James, “Human Error: Models and Management”, BMJ. 2000 Mar 18; 320(7237): 768–770.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1117770/

Behavioral Finance Theory
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The need for justifiable authority to change investing behavior that has been
successful in the past imposes a sort of conservative compliance with broadly
perceived conventional wisdom and past procedures. Committees apparently have
great difficulty taking action to alter their decisions on the basis of changing
weight of evidence. One does not easily stand up and have impact in challenging
conventional wisdom because one’s intuitive assessment of probabilities is a little
different. One needs a striking argument that is trenchant and on target, otherwise
one is likely to have little prospect of impact. When one senses that there is little
prospect of having an impact, one tends to hold one’s silence, or make only perfunctory
objections.
― Robert Shiller, “Bubbles, Human Judgment and Expert Opinion” 102
Behavioral finance has changed the way we fundamentally view the investor. It has

effectively challenged the rational expectations model of neo-classical economics. The

theory asserts that people are not walking calculators, seeking optimality at every given
point, but rather they are emotional decision-makers that are often lazy, rushed or

pressured, and therefore seemed doomed to repeat the same errors, over and over again.

Behavioral finance holds that investors tend to fall into predictable patterns of

destructive behavior. In other words, they make the same mistakes repeatedly.
Specifically, many investors damage their portfolios by under-diversifying; trading
frequently; following the herd; favoring the familiar (domestic stocks, company stock,
and glamour stocks); selling winning positions and holding onto losing positions
102

p.14, Shiller, Robert, “Bubbles, Human Judgment and Expert Opinion”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.
1303, May 2001

(disposition effect); and succumbing to optimism, short-term thinking, and
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overconfidence (self-attribution bias). 103
One piece of substantial empirical evidence taken in aggregate is the plight of

markets to repeat the creation – and eventual collapse - of market bubbles, also known as

financial mania, which are characterized by first gradual and then sudden rapid expansion

of prices in a given commodity or asset class segment. This is not a new phenomenon, with
two significant bubbles in the U.S. over the last 15 years alone (e.g., 1999-00 “dot com”

bubble and the 2005-07 housing bubble). The combined irrationality of investors is the
driving factor in every asset bubble.

What lies behind investor irrationality? The nuts and bolts of investor behavior are

the heuristics and biases that impel that behavior. In psychology, heuristics are simple,
efficient rules which people often use to form judgments and make decisions. They are

mental shortcuts that usually involve focusing on one aspect of a complex problem and
ignoring others. These rules work well under most circumstances, but they can lead to
systematic deviations from logic, probability or rational choice theory.

The resulting errors are called "cognitive biases" and many different types have

been documented. These have been shown to affect people's choices in situations like

valuing a house, deciding the outcome of a legal case, or making an investment decision.

Heuristics usually govern automatic, intuitive judgments but can also be used as deliberate
mental strategies when working from limited information.

Here is a summary of patterns and biases that are commonly found in investor

behavior: 104

103 Elan, Seth, Goodrich, Malina, “Behavioral Patterns and Pitfalls of U.S. Investors”, A Report Prepared by the Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
August 2010, p.1

•

Loss aversion – Investors are not so much risk averse as they are loss

averse, which can bring about excessive conservatism, particularly at the
wrong points in time. In fact, under certain circumstances, investors will
engage in risk-seeking behavior, especially when trying to make up for
losses. See Figure 5. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)

Figure 5 – Value Function in Prospect Theory

•

Endowment effect – People easily attach themselves to things and then

value them much more than they valued them before they identified with
them. As a result, people tend to hold on to bad or underperforming
investments much longer than they should.

104 Source: Prentice, Robert A., “Ethical Decision Making: More Needed Than Good Intentions”, Financial Analysts
Journal, November/December 2007, unless otherwise indicated.
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•

99

Overoptimism – People have a tendency toward optimism, an expectation

of positive outcomes. It can be so strong it can lead to misguided beliefs and
imprudent decisions. In some circumstances, it can also induce unethical
•

conduct.

Overconfidence – Errors caused by overoptimism may be exacerbated by
overconfidence, an overendowed sense of belief in one’s self, capabilities

and decisions. Students, psychologists, engineers, stock analysts, financial

analysts, investment bankers and investors among many other categories of
people have been shown to tend toward irrational confidence in the

•

accuracy of their decisions.

Self-serving bias – This is a decision maker’s bias to gather, process and

even recall information to advance perceived self-interest and to support
•

pre-existing views.

•

information to confirm the original theory or belief system.

•

long after the basis for those beliefs has been substantially discredited.

Confirmation bias – A related bias where the decision maker seeks out

Belief persistence – This is the tendency among people to hold on to beliefs
Causal attribution theory – Another tendency among people to attribute

above average credit for group success or below average responsibility for
•

group failure.

Framing – Psychologists have demonstrated how a simple reframing of a

question can produce a completely different answer from the same

respondent. For example, reframing an option in terms of a gain instead of
loss can change a person’s risk preference dramatically.

•

Sunk costs – Economists and accountants can demonstrate how
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consideration of sunk costs is an illogical exercise. Yet, people will attend
plays they don’t want to, just because they already purchased the tickets.

Worse yet, is that sunk costs can lead to an escalation of commitment, where
more good money is poured in after bad. This can explain a lot of ineffective
– and even catastrophic – behavior, for instance rogue traders, and

•

companies “doubling-down” on products that are failing in the marketplace.

Time-delay traps – People tend to emphasize the consequences of the near

term over the long term. This tends toward short-termism in decision-

making and a common inability to delay gratification. Successful investing
•

most often requires a long-term approach.

Conformity bias – In every aspect of their lives people take cues from those

around them about the proper way to act. This bias strongly pushes people
to conform their judgments to the judgments of their reference group. This
produces a poor group decision-making process, what Shiller described in

the opening quote to this section as “conservative compliance with broadly

•

perceived conventional wisdom and past procedures”.

Groupthink – Conformity bias rears its ugly head in the form of groupthink.

Pressures from superiors and peers can be reinforced by the tendency of
members of a group to avoid introducing stress into unanimity by

suppressing dissent and silencing critics. This leads to decisions that aren’t
•

subject to an independent, deliberative and thoughtful process.

Reluctance to save and invest – Mitchell and Utkus (2004) refer to an

individual’s preference for deferring or not deferring consumption based on
an individual’s subjective discount rate. They define those who defer more
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and discount less as “exponential discounters” and those who save little or
nothing and discount more as “hyperbolic discounters”. Exponential

discounters tend to assign a higher value to future money. This also relates
to the concept of bounded rationality, or the flawed decisions people make
•

because of limited time, information and cognitive ability.

Lack of knowledge / trust – Financial illiteracy and lack of trust in the

financial markets may also play a role in people’s unwillingness to engage in

productive investing. Guiso et al (2010) attribute limited participation in the
stock market, particularly among wealthy investors, to a lack of trust and to
the fear of being cheated by participants in the capital markets. Subjective

and cultural factors also determine how trusting people are, as well as
•

whether and how much they are willing to invest.

Active trading – Some gender differences may be a driver of ineffective

behavior. Barber and Odean (2009) show how active traders underperform
the market. Active trading correlates with overconfidence. They find a

correlation between male overconfidence and excessive trading, particularly
when comparing single men and single women. Because women are less

•

likely to indulge in excessive trading, they outperform men.

Disposition effect – The tendency of investors is to sell winning positions

and to hold onto losing positions to recoup losses on the losing positions

(Odean, 1998). Myopic loss aversion is a related concept, where investors
evaluate their portfolios too frequently and make moves to avoid losses
during periods of short-term volatility (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).

•

Hindsight bias – This is the tendency, referred to earlier, of investors to
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look only at the most recent past returns in extrapolating future
•

performance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

Familiarity bias - People prefer to invest in what is familiar, favoring their

own country, region, state, and company. This is also known as “equity home
bias”, and can lead to ignoring or eliminating a broad swath of potential
investments across the investing universe and over-concentration in a

•

specific geography (Huberman, 2009).

Under-diversification – Related to familiarity bias, Statman (2010)

explored the lack of diversification in U.S. investors’ equity portfolios.

Although mean-variance portfolio theory recommends that portfolios hold
at least 300 stocks, the average investor actually holds only three or four,

representing an extremely underdiversified portfolio. The typical investor’s
concentration in employer, large-capitalization, and domestic stocks also

•

works against the advantages of diversification.

Naïve diversification – Investors are often subject to equally weighting

every investment option available to them as they don’t have the tools or
understanding to understand differences in each investment. This is a
•

common occurrence in 401(k) investing (Bernartzi and Thaler, 2001).

Noise trading – This describes the activities of “an investor who makes

decisions regarding buy and sell trades without the use of fundamental data.
These investors generally have poor timing, follow trends, and overreact to
good and bad news.” (Barber and Odean, 2008)

Combatting these biases, particularly in the governance setting, requires education

and training. It also requires strong and engaged leadership to help foster an open and
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thoughtful arena for deliberation, debate and communication. This may be a tall order for
many groups that may only meet four times a year for a couple of hours at each meeting.

The general lack of education to promote financial literacy is also a significant and

widespread problem. In the “Retirement Income Literacy Survey” conducted for The

American College of Financial Services in 2015, 80 percent of the respondents received

scores of 60 or lower on financial questions about retirement. Just 20 percent received what
amounted to a passing grade. 105

The results are just as dismal when it comes to general financial knowledge. Asked

five multiple-choice questions about topics like interest calculations, mortgage payments
and investments, just 39 percent of the 25,509 adults answered at least four correctly,

according to a 2012 survey from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation. That was down
from 42 percent in 2009. 106

Governance Fiduciary Tools for Stanching the Human (Error) Factor

Sufficient oversight and control are two key concepts in effective governance.

Transparency, accountability and trust are key ingredients to an effectively governed
organization. Better quality – and independent – advice from outside advisors is also

extremely important. Trustees can never know everything, so getting access to informed
and un-conflicted counsel is important. Better, concise and more timely information and

reporting is also important. How that information is disseminated and reviewed is key. Do

people understand what they are reviewing? How is the information displayed? As we saw
in the Behavioral Finance section, the framing of information is key for decision-making.
105
106
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One of the key findings of behavioral science is that investors need streamlined, transparent
investment disclosure, particularly in graphical format (Elan and Goodrich, 2010). Finally,

training and education cannot be emphasized enough. Throughout my research, the lack of
emphasis on training and education as well as relevant prior experience of trustees is a
huge impediment to success.

Should We Turn Investment Management over To a Robot?

The last topic, which should not be ignored especially at this point in our

technological development, is the rise of the “robo-advisor” and artificial intelligence (AI) in

investing. Much has been made of this in the financial press and trade publications as of late.
The reality is that the amount of assets moving to firms that use AI is glacially slow. Firms,
such as Betterment and WealthFront, emphasize online automation for retail investors in

exchange for lower fees. The process of investment selection and portfolio construction is

actually more or less the same as it is through more traditional routes, although this might
eventually become an area ripe for new research if this notion of what I call “behavioral
channeling” occurs, in effect driving the investor through online automation into a

disciplined process within a reduced band of activity. This could potentially limit the more
damaging effects noted above through reduced degrees of freedom by the investor, in a

similar way that better plan design can improve investor behavior for 401(k) investors.

Finally, within the area of asset management artificial intelligence may eventually

offer some avenue for boosting performance, and reducing errors, in a way beyond what
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“quants” and traders do today with trading algorithms to drive additional return. But as a
recent Financial Times article cautioned: 107

Even quants that are cautiously optimistic on the future of AI in investing warn

of many pitfalls. Algorithms that may look ingenious and backtest superbly against
historical data have a nasty habit of unravelling when confronted with unforgivingly
fickle financial markets.
“Playing Super Mario might not necessarily work for markets. If you hit the
button you always know what will happen, but you don’t in markets,” says another
quant at a large hedge fund. “It can take time for it to find the good trades and to
optimise them. It can go through a lot of bad trades.”
This has been an examination of human error in investing and institutional fund

governance. We have covered extensive ground in this section looking at the essential forms
of human error, how that is defined within the industry under the concept of “operational
risk”, and approaches to understanding and managing this risk. The contribution of
behavioral finance over the last four decades has expanded our knowledge and

understanding of deficiencies in the cognitive machinery of the human brain that lead to

common errors in investing. Outside of group dynamics, this perspective helps to define the
inherent weaknesses of human actors and constituent members that face every investment
committee charged with the oversight and management of dedicated funds. It also

underscores the importance of structure and process to mitigate these fundamental
challenges. Training and education could go a long way as these are generally

underemphasized and in short supply. Finally, we touched on the potential future offered by

“robo advisors” and AI. Still too early to tell, but both could offer interesting avenues toward
107
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reducing error and improving the outcomes of investors, and obviating some of the inherent
deficiencies that affect all of us.

Bond Market Vigilantes: When Public Pension Governance Fails

Chicago isn't alone in not having enough money to cover all the benefits that have
been promised. Unfunded state and local pension liabilities total $3.5 trillion, Moody's
Investors Service said in a report Wednesday. The consequences of not finding a
solution are dire: unfunded pension debt helped drive Stockton, California, into
Chapter 9, and Detroit into the biggest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. Those
same unfunded obligations contributed to the crisis in Puerto Rico.
- Elizabeth Campbell, Bloomberg, April 12, 2016 108

Imperfect governance is everywhere. However, one of the virtues of the capital

markets is that it puts investors, those who bear direct financial risk, in the middle of many
issues, including the funding of future retirement benefits. For stock and bond investors,

public companies are at risk on their corporate plans. For municipal bond investors, state

and municipalities are at risk on their public pension obligations. And because of the time

value of money, the financial risk to investors is not out in the far distant future, as it is for
retirees, but here today.

How does that work mechanically? If the current market value of the assets is

significantly below the projected liabilities, then the plan sponsor is left to make up that

shortfall today with a pension contribution. Plans historically have depended on investment
108 http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-chicago-bonds-eedbc0be-fce0-11e5-813a-90ab563f0dde-20160407story.html
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returns to fill the funding gap. One study indicated that 64% of pension system revenues

come from investment returns (U.S. General Accountability Office, 2007). 109 If this mismatch

between assets and liabilities is expected to persist into the future, the investor may

perceive significant risk to the future viability of the sponsor to be able to continue to make
up these shortfalls indefinitely, putting at risk other obligations such as a bond issue on

which it must also make interest and principal payments. The liabilities may come to dwarf
the income producing capacity of a company or the tax revenue collecting capacity of a
government. In view of this heightened risk factor, the investor may demand a higher

premium, or yield in the case of a bond, to offset it, as the creditworthiness of the issuer may
be perceived as greatly diminished. Figure 6 shows the aggregate growth in liabilities of
state and municipal plans since the 1970’s. Figure 7 shows the growing gap relative to

assets since 1997.

Figure 6: Liabilities of State and Local Pension Funds 110
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As cited from Matkin et al, “The Governance of Public Pensions: An Institutional Framework”, 2016
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Figure 7 - Public Pension Assets and Liabilities, 1997-2012 111
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This condition is no longer theoretical, but now empirical. The Chicago pension

crisis is proving to be a watershed moment for municipal bond investors. Recent research

by Fidelity and J.P. Morgan has demonstrated an increase in the risk premium based on the
pension funding risk across the entire municipal market. 112 Figure 8 shows the divergence
of bond spreads as defined by two classes of municipalities, those with higher and lower
relative pension liabilities as a percentage of revenue. Note in the figure the increase in

spreads around the time of Moody’s downgrade of Chicago to “junk” status in May 2015.

Investors were demanding in aggregate a 1.6% higher yield to hold the paper of

municipalities with higher pension liabilities, more than doubling the interest cost. The

increase in the spread reflects an increase in their risk of their municipal bond investment.
111Pew
112
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There have been a number of academic studies on the economic linkages between

pension liabilities, bond ratings and borrowing costs that go back to the early 1980’s. Martin
and Henderson (1983) found that the ratings agencies were attributing importance to a

firm’s pension obligations. A later 2008 study found that unsecured corporate bonds were
Figure 8 – Pension Liability Impact, State General Obligation Bond Borrowing Costs

influenced by pension risk, but not senior secured issue (Chen et al). The only security

backing a general obligation municipal bond is the ad valorem taxing authority of the issuer,

which has its limit as witnessed in a number of recent high profile municipal bankruptcies
(e.g. Detroit, MI - 2013; Stockton, CA - 2013; Harrisburg, PA - 2011; Birmingham, AL -

2011). 113 “Ad Valorem” from Latin literally translates as “according to the value”. In the
113 There have been several high profile municipal bankruptcies over the last five years. All of these bankruptcies noted
here with the exception of Birmingham were related to pension problems. Detroit was the largest municipal bankruptcy in
U.S. history. The city filed on July 18, 2013, and at the time had $18 billion in outstanding general obligation bonds. The
Washington Examiner (July 20, 2013 issue) cited public employee pensions as three of the top 10 reasons for the
bankruptcy. For more information on these and other municipal bankruptcies see Winegarden’s, “Going Broke One City at
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context of a municipality, it can imply the unlimited taxing authority of the municipality in
relation to a bond issue. 114

Where public policy may fail, the experience in the credit markets is that bond

investors may force changes as the interest cost increases on a municipality. One could

argue that the path the private sector took in the late ‘80s to move from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans was a reaction to the vigilance of its own shareholder base. At
the same time, it gives further impetus from a public policy standpoint to avoid such a

condition, which could take an already precarious financial situation for an issuer, and make
it worse, resulting in a downward financial spiral as appears to be the case in the city of

Chicago. This situation is not limited to just Chicago, but effects the entire state. See Figure
9 for the growth of total Illinois’ retirement systems liabilities since 2000, up nearly seven
fold. Illinois has the worst funded pension system in the country, with a funding ratio of
39% in 2015. 115

Figure 9: Unfunded Pension Liabilities for all Illinois Retirement Systems 116

a Time: Municipal Bankruptcies in America”, Pacific Research Institute, January 2014
https://www.pacificresearch.org/fileadmin/documents/Studies/PDFs/2013-2015/MunicipalBankruptcy2014_F.pdf
114 Nuveen Asset Management, “Municipal Bonds: Understanding the Fundamentals”, August 2016
http://www.nuveen.com/Home/Documents/Default.aspx?fileId=54108
115 http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/07/28/top-10-worst-funded-state-pensions-2015?slreturn=1476471598&page_all=1
116 http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-illinois-pension-crisis-info-20150512-story.html
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CHAPTER IV

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: ASSET OWNER GOVERNANCE AND FIDUCIARY
EFFECTIVENESS
Risk taking cannot be destroyed, it can only be moved from one spot to another.
Jack Cohen, Chairman, Association of BellTel Retirees 117
While the Fiduciary Standard has a long and established history, and in its current

form has received the most clear definition and guidelines since the passage of ERISA in
1972, most academic research has focused on the standard itself, and ignored the

effectiveness as linked to performance condition because, as commonly accepted,
performance effectiveness has not been a requirement of the standard.

Evolution of the Prudent Expert Rule and MPT

Definition of the Fiduciary Standard has been clarified and refined over the years.

Brown (1977), Klesch (1977) and Pozen (1977) explain the evolution and application of the
prudent man and prudent expert rules as defined under ERISA. Landsberg (2013) reviews

developments in the standard and how it applies to plan administrators. One initial focus of
the standard under ERISA was integrating Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Brown finds
that ERISA was intended to allow flexibility in the selection of investments not found in

personal trust law. In particular, it was not intended to restrict pension fund investment to
117

Segal, Julie, “Can the U.S. Supreme Court Save the American Dream”, Institutional Investor, May 12, 2016
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3553866/investors-pensions/can-the-us-supreme-court-save-the-americandream.html#/.Vzr-navhrBY

a narrow list of the largest corporations; the fund manager instead is to consider each

112

investment in the light of its effect on the overall riskiness of the portfolio.
Ethics and Agency Problems

Ethics, particularly conflicts of interest, has been a recurring topic in the literature,

and rightfully so, as there have been numerous scandals over the years and cases of self-

dealing. A.C.G. (1978) discusses the de facto standard of loyalty adopted by the courts, and

gives examples where self-dealing may be tolerated and actually beneficial in the case of

charitable organizations. A recent study by the Tellus Institute (2012) notes the high degree
of affiliate relationships with trustees, particularly among northeastern private colleges and
universities, which raise questions about the current system of transparency. Schmidt
(2011) further explores the limits of the self-dealing principal and common sense

boundaries. Ennis (1988) discusses the problems of agency, particularly among public

funds, which has led to a condition of chronic underfunding of state and municipal pension
plans, and has visited and revisited this topic over the years.

Ribstein (2003) has explored the limits of applying a fiduciary standard due to the

increase in litigation and contracting costs and decreasing the effectiveness of owner’s
governance rights, a topic that has been frequently in the press lately, as Congress and

regulatory agencies (the SEC, the Department of Labor) consider a number of proposals to
expand application of the Standard to most investment advisors, brokers and financial

planners. 118 Varnavides (2011) examines the problems and issues with expansion of the

fiduciary standard to cover the vast majority of broker/dealers and investment advisors.
118

“Advisor Groups Urge Congress To Support Fiduciary Standard, SEC,” by Jeff Schlegel, Financial Advisor, March 29,
2011 http://www.fa-mag.com/news/advisor-groups-urge-congress-to-support-fiduciary-standard-sec-6969.html

Effectiveness Measures
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There is presently no system or methodology in place to examine the fiduciary

effectiveness of organizations. Cackowski (2007) discusses how the fiduciary standards of
the two main bodies of laws laid down by ERISA and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act

(UPIA) do not lend themselves to a straightforward performance analysis methodology or
evaluation of fiduciary practice and cites Schwartzel (2006): 119

When you are finished, you may or may not agree with me that the twin UPIAs

represent “Voodoo Trust Investonomics” – a new set of rules which are so flexible and
so fuzzy that in addition to the assistance of outside experts and perhaps a very good
computer program, many trustees may need a Witch Doctor to divine the settlor’s
purpose and distribution scheme from the entrails of the settlor’s intent left him in the
trust agreement.
His purpose was to come up with a method that would put the effectiveness review

under a judicial standard. He goes on to explain how traditional quantitative methods of

assessing a money manager’s performance do not meet the Daubert judicial standard, under
which the Supreme Court in that case adopted the proposition that scientific methodology

should be "based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be

falsified...". He instead proposes a methodology using statistical inference in assessing the

effectiveness of a money manager’s performance or process to determine whether there is
statistical consistency, and not randomness, present in the data from which to draw
conclusions.

119

“The Twin UPIAs and the new Regulations: Progress, or "Voodoo Trust Investonomics"? C. Boone Schwartzel,
April 06, 2006, Estate Planning Strategies

Other related work includes Saeli (2011), who suggests a methodology for
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quantitatively evaluating the effectiveness of defined contribution plans in the public sector
by looking at a number of factors including employee participation rates, average
contributions, periodic review of managers and service quality and fees.
Governance

For understanding asset owner governance, there are essentially three main

approaches: 1) the effect of the political and economic environment, especially as it relates
to public pension funds; 2) the organizational design method, particularly employed by

Ambachtscheer (1998) and Clark (2007); and finally 3) the institutional framework, which

incorporates not just political influences, but a number of other exogenous factors amongst
established institutional structures (Matkin et al, 2016).

Clark and Urwin (2007) utilize a number of case studies taken from institutional

funds globally to understand the best practices of pension fund governance. They

summarize the results of this research with 12 findings under three main categories
including Institutional Coherence, People and Process.

Matkin et al (2016) are highly critical of the conventional approach taken by prior

researchers in looking at the political economic impact on public pension fund performance,
and recommend a new approach that examines the impact of institutional factors in the

environment including, for example, policies and procedures and professional norms and
standards (i.e. GASB, actuarial standards). They perform a thorough examination of the

Florida Public Pension System utilizing this approach, and demonstrate how investment

markets, legislative action and actuarial norms and standards impacted the performance

and funding level of the plan over a thirty-year time period. They conclude by calling for
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more national level data to enhance our understanding of public pension finance:

More data on each of the formal institutional categories in this study will help

researchers understand how and why these institutions change over time and the
effects of those changes on the financial performance of public pensions. 120
Ambachtsheer examines fund governance structure in several papers and a book,

Pension Fund Excellence. “Improving Fund Performance” (1998) looked at three drivers of

pension fund performance: fund size, proportion of assets passively managed, and quality of
the fund’s organizational design, and offered suggestions on improving performance by
improving elements of the fund’s organization. In addition, Ambachtsheer (1994) has

explored the cost – value relationship of pension managers, and found marginal significance

in the relationship, i.e., the higher the management fee, the marginally greater the return.
Over the last fifteen years, two organizations have produced a fiduciary ratings

system of mutual funds:

1. Morningstar launched the Stewardship Grade rating system in 2005. This
system looks at alignment of interests between fund managers and

shareholders. The Stewardship Grade is determined using some quantitative
measures, but it is primarily based on Morningstar's qualitative analysis of a
fund family’s stewardship of fundholders' capital. 121

2. Fiduciary Analytics (now FI360 since 2003), launched its Mutual Fund Family
Fiduciary Rankings in 1999, now called the Fiduciary Score.

120 Matkin, David S.T., Chen, Gang, and Khalid, Hina, “The Governance of Public Pensions: An Institutional Framework”,
Administration & Society, 1-29, January 28, 2016, p. 25
121
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=115118
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The Score evaluates mutual funds on nine different criteria across a spectrum of
quantitative data points to determine if the investment meets a minimum fiduciary

standard of care. The nine criteria include: regulatory oversight, track record, assets in
the investment, stability of the organization, composition consistent with asset class,
style consistency, expense ratio/ fees relative to peers, risk-adjusted performance
relative to peers, and performance relative to peers. 122 123
Chen and Huang (2011) have examined the effectiveness of the Morningstar

Stewardship Grade rating, and have identified certain relationships between governance
practices and fund performance. While these systems are intended to assist investors in
mutual fund selection, they do not address asset owner governance.

A white paper, “Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Committees”, written by

Fund Evaluation Group (2011), an investment consulting firm, successfully defines many of
the issues that are the focus of this study. 124 Maurek (1996) discusses the usefulness of

fiduciary audits in improving pension plan operations across a number of areas.

IIkiw (1997) explains how imperfect fund governance can lead to poor performance

outcomes. He describes how many unqualified people find themselves in the position of a
governing fiduciary. He describes this condition:

What should be disconcerting is that many funds are governed by fiduciaries

with limited or poor understanding of pension financing, investment and
organizational principles, which can impair fund returns.

122

www.fi360.com
http://www.fi360.com/products-services/tools-overview/fi360-fiduciary-score
124
“Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Committees”, Christopher M. Meyer, CFA, (White Paper), Fund Evaluation
Group, 10/1/2011, http://www.feg.com/research/focus_topic.php?nID=151&issue=2011_10
123

He also suggests that two lines of defense against catastrophic failure among
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pension funds in general are: 1) diversification, and 2) an infrastructure of service

providers (including actuaries, investment managers, lawyers, auditors, custodians and

consultants), that while maximizing fees for service, generally provide competent service.
There have been periodic studies that have attempted to quantify the impact of

decisions particularly with respect to the hiring and firing of investment managers by plan
sponsors. In two separate studies, Heisler et al (2004) and Goyal and Wahal (2008)

conclude that terminations are usually at the wrong time based on subsequent investment
performance of the terminated manager, or are neutral at best to improving performance.

Wood (2006) has looked at the behavioral biases of investment committees, which

act as impediments to goal achievement. For example, he explains the Ringelmann Effect,

which describes the inverse relationship that exists between the size of a committee and the
magnitude of each group member’s contribution to the accomplishment of the committee’s
goals.

A recent collaboration between Spence Johnson, a pension research and advisory

firm in the U.K., and Russell Investments produced the “The Russell Pension Governance

Index 2013”. This involved survey work with 40, mostly large, corporate pension plans. The

survey examines three areas and is based on six measures: 1) costs, total costs and nature of
costs; 2) forms of decision-making, degree of delegation, and degree of internal delegation;

3) people, extent of trustee input as measured by committee hours and people with specific
qualifications – a financial or accounting background – as a percentage of all trustees.

While the variables reviewed were of interest, and this provided some method for

peer benchmarking, deficiencies in the study were several: 1) no single comprehensive
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measure of governance despite its name; 2) no link to performance; 3) reliance on survey
(i.e. self-reported) information; and 4) finally, the study has not been repeated. 125

The inherent problem of being reliant on survey data that many studies around this

topic, like the Spence study face, is that it introduces self-reporting bias in the data, which
renders any claims or conclusions dubious at best. Donaldson and Grant-Vallone (2002)
explain the issue: 126

Accurate measurement of organizational behavior is essential for advancing

the field. Despite its importance, measurement in organizational settings is often
referred to as one of the main shortcomings of organizational behavior research
(Donaldson, 1995; Donaldson, Ensher & Grant-Vallone, 2000; Mersman & Donaldson,
2000). This is because researchers must rely to a large extent on self-reports. Such
measures are common because they are relatively easy to obtain and are often the
only feasible way to assess constructs of interest.
Sackett and Larson (1990) found that over a third of all studies published in
mainstream organizational behavioral journals between 1977 and 1987 were
questionnaire-based. It was found that 83% of these studies used a cross-sectional
design and 52% relied solely on self-report measures. Studies which rely on self reports
as the only measure of organizational behaviors have come under attack recently for
two primary reasons: 1) self-reports are prone to many kinds of response bias (see
Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Donaldson, Thomas, & Gra- ham, 2002; Graham, Collins,
Donaldson, & Hansen, 1993; Schwartz, 1999; Stone et al., 2002), and 2) inferences
about correlational and causal relationships may be inflated by the problem of

125 “The Russell Pensions Governance Index 2013,” October 2013,
http://www.pensionsgovernanceindex.com/resources/RPGI_Oct+2013_Final.pdf
126
Donaldson, Stewart I. and Grant-Vallone, Elisa J., Understanding Self-Report Bias in Organizational Behavior
Research, Journal of Business and Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 2, Winter 2002
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common method variance (Borman, 1991; Donaldson, Thomas, Graham, Au, & Hansen,
2000; Spector, 1994).
Blake et al (2012) describe the trend away from centralized to decentralized

management by plan sponsors and greater portfolio diversification through the use of

multiple managers in each asset class, trading off higher anticipated alphas of specialist
managers with the increased difficulty in coordinating risk-taking and the greater

uncertainty regarding their true skills.

While there has been to date few studies undertaken to look for the discrete factors

that define and determine governance and fiduciary effectiveness – and no empirical factor
analysis to explore a link to performance, the gap is narrowing as, for example, in the

Cackowski study. Why has it taken this long? Because common wisdom has lead people to
overlook undertaking a factor analysis of organizations linking fiduciary attributes to
performance outcomes. 127

Most systems have focused on investment managers, such as the Morningstar and

FI360 ratings, and others have looked at one or two aspects of the fiduciary issue. To date,
no study has comprehensively examined fiduciary effectiveness of asset owner

organizations as a whole, nor applied it so that it can be used in comparing across
organizations and across time.

Table 4 shows a summary of empirical studies in this field. Each are interesting in

their own right for the particular area of research they take on, and to their credit offer
methodologies on which to build, but none have focused on an overall fiduciary

effectiveness score for the governing fiduciary. A new approach might take the techniques
of corporate governance, the approach of our research method, and apply them to asset
127

“Fiduciary Responsibility: Liability and Consequences, Stuart Ober, AIFA, Journal of Financial Planning, 2005, p. 50

owner governance in a similar way. Empirically, there is a positive relationship between
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corporate governance scores and firm performance as described by Brown and Caylor
(2004).

Table 4 – Summary of Relevant Empirical Research

Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Ambachtsheer,
1994

Economics of
pension fund
management

a. Fund size,
management
type, sponsor
type, may
explain policyadjusted
returns

a. and b.:

a. Analyzed
pension fund
production
function

a. Raw fund returns
“too noisy” to be
subjected to
comparative
measurement.

b. Systemic
factors may
impact fund
operating costs
c. Higher
manager fees
may be linked
to higher
performance

184 pension
funds
(1990-1993)
c. 76
pension
funds
(1991-1993)

b. Examined fund
implementation
returns versus
fund
characteristics
c. Analyzed
payback on
incremental cost

b. Systematic
factors explain 60%
of the variance in
fund operating
costs.
c. One unit of
discretionary
operating costs
produced three
units of incremental
return, but results
were only
marginally
significant.
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Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Ambachtsheer et
al, 1998

Drivers of
pension fund
performance

Fund size,
proportion of
assets passively
managed,
quality of the
organizational
design may be
the key drivers
of pension fund
performance,
adjusting for
costs and risk

a. 80 U.S.
and
Canadian
pension
funds
(19931996),
differing and
smaller
sample sets
for each
factor

Regressed
RANVA (Riskadjusted net
value added)
against four
factors CEO,
(Pension Fund
CEO average
scored responses
to
questionnaire),
fund size,
percentage of
funds invested in
passive
investments,
Jaques OD score
(organizational
design score)

When adjusting for
cost and risk, funds
in aggregate are
underperforming
their benchmark
return by 60 bps.,
which is a
significant
opportunity cost.
Organizations that
are large should
passively manage
their portfolios,
smaller
organizations
should outsource.
Governance and
organizational
design are
important factors.
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Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Heisler, 2004

Why do plan
sponsors
terminate
their
investment
managers?

Poor,
inconsistent
performance
drives
investment
decision to
terminate a
manager.

Active
domestic
equity funds
from PSN
database of
7,000
separate
account
investment
managers
(1989 to
2000)

Fixed effects
regression
looking at asset
flows as a proxy
for hire/fire
decisions using
unbalanced
panel sets.

Plan sponsors may
minimize job risk by
hiring and firing
managers based on
excess returns with
incremental
allocations based on
total returns,
thereby satisfying
both their mandate
and their clients.

51 of the
largest
mutual funds
with 10 years
of data
(5/29/1997
– 6/4/2007)

Back testing
manager returns
through the use
of a binomial
model to test
whether the
returns are
consistently and
significantly
different from
the relevant
benchmark.

Cackowski, 2007

Fiduciary
selection and
monitoring of
investment
managers
under the
Daubert
judicial
standard

Statistically
testing that a
money manager
is worse than
random.

Smaller and older
products capture
greater flows.

Statistical inference
is more robust than
a ranking
methodology, and
would meet the
judicial test under
Daubert.

A manager who
cannot be identified
as better than
random or
statistically
consistent should
undergo further
review.
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Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Goyal & Wahal,
2008

Selection and
termination
of investment
managers by
plan sponsors

The
effectiveness of
plan sponsors
in making
hiring and firing
decisions of
investment
managers

8,755 hiring
decisions by
3,417 plan
sponsors
(1994-2003)

Examination of
pre- and posthiring and post termination
returns of
investment
managers.

Post hiring of
managers show on
average, with zero
excess returns, no
timing ability of
plan sponsors.

869 firing
decisions by
482 plan
sponsors
(1996-2003)

Transition to a new
manager poses both
opportunity and
friction costs to a
new manager that
range from 1-2% of
assets.
Behavior of funds is
not irrational as
there is persistence
in active excess
returns of
investment
managers, but
results are on
average, after costs,
no better than if no
change had been
made.
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Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Chen & Huang,
2011

Morningstar
Fiduciary
Grades and
mutual fund
performance

Study of
relationships
between the
grades and
performance,
“motivated by
the expanding
literature on the
uses of
corporate
governance
indexes.” Expect
a positive
relationship.

4,164 mutual
funds graded
by
Morningstar,
2006 to 2009

OLS and
quantile
regression
models looking
at overall
grades, manager
incentive
ratings, board
quality ratings,
and portfolio
turnover

Strong relationship
between the
Stewardship Grade
and the Sharpe
ratio.

Performance
evaluation
models, Jensen’s
alpha, residualresampling
bootstrapping
procedure,
Treynor-Mazuy
total
performance
measure.

Most pension funds
shifted over the
period. Competition
between multiple
managers produces
better performance,
and due to
coordination
problems of
additional managers
fund managers react
by controlling risk
levels.Total pension
fund risk is lower
under decentralized
investment
management.
Change is preceded
in most cases by
poor performance.

Blake, 2012

The longterm secular
trend of
sponsors
move from
balanced
managers to
multiple
specialist
managers

Investigation of
the extent and
effectiveness of
the trend. Is it
rational?

2,385 U.K
pension
funds, 19842004

Manager incentives
not a good
predictor of future
performance, but
board quality is.

Corporate
governance policies
can be effective.

In the latter case,
part of the poor
performance was
due to the fund
becoming too large
for a single manager
to manage
effectively.
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Author Study

Topic

Hypotheses

Sample

Tests

Findings

Matkin et al,
2016

Institutional
framework

Institutional
approach is
superior to
political
economic one;
critical of
common
explanatory
factors

Florida
pension
system

N/A

Several institutional
factors caused
changes in the value
and funding level of
Florida’s pension
system over 30
years including
allocation, changes
in standards and
legislative action.
More national level
data is needed.

CHAPTER V
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METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, we discuss the methods we employed for original research on

fiduciary effectiveness. As noted throughout, many prior studies on asset owner governance
utilize survey-based methods of research, which, as we will discuss in some depth below,
are problematic in their reliance on the opinions from their subjects of study, in this case
governance fiduciaries. In this study, we departed from this trodden path, to gather data

from primary sources, namely meeting minutes of public pension plan boards. Before we go
through the specific steps and procedures applied in this study, let us first review the range
of methods that were available to us.

Background on Communications Research Methods

There are three general methods of gathering board governance data:1)

Assessments: self-assessments, audits and surveys; 2) Live Action: interviews and direct
observations; and 3) Board Artifacts: the gathering of information from available board

documents, such as meeting minutes, policies, memoranda, notices and reports. Each has
their advantages and disadvantages.

Assessments Board self-assessments and audits are for boards interested in

gauging the effectiveness of the board itself, and identifying areas for improvement. While
anecdotal in nature, although repeated across several sources, the mere anticipation of a

self-assessment can bring about an improvement in board effectiveness (Conference Board

report, 1998; Great Boards, 2013). The Governance Self-Assessment Checklist (GSAC) is one
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instrument developed by Gill, Flynn & Reissing in the early 2000s (Gill, Flynn & Reissing,
2005). It was developed to:

…assist board of directors of non-profits and public sector organizations, educate

board members about the essentials of good governance, and improve governance
practices.
Gill et al set out to develop a tool that improved on the Board Self-Assessment

Questionnaire (BSAQ), a frequently used instrument for non-profit board self-assessment –
but one the authors’ found lacking in the assessment of structure, processes and behaviors.
The goal of the GSAC was to measure board effectiveness and link that to measures of

organizational performance. Gill et al understood that to be a valid instrument it needed to
have explanatory power. Their 2005 study reports success in assessing best governance
practices and predicting organizational effectiveness (ibid).

To be a useful and effective tool, in the authors’ view, the assessment questionnaire

needed to be easy-to-use and be composed in simple language, have a reasonable

completion time, be comprised of research-based best practice benchmarks empirically

associated with organizational effectiveness, relevant, use general systems theory

constructs, be comprehensive, generate interpretive reports, and finally, collect data for

purposes of comparison and benchmarking. They intended that the instrument not only act
as a self-diagnostic, but also be used for education and governance improvement (ibid).
To demonstrate the usefulness of self-assessment scores in research studies,

Adamson (2011) in his examination of school district boards compared the effect of board
member training on differences in BSAQ scores. He found positive correlations between

board members’ perceptions of performance in specific competencies measured by the selfassessment instrument and the aggregate training of their respective boards.

Internal audits are a similar approach to self-assessments. The only difference is
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that instead of the board undertaking it, a department from inside the organization,
typically the internal audit department, undertakes a review of the board and its

committees. For example, the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan in 2013 completed a multi-

year audit of the effectiveness and accountability of the board’s six key committees. Kaiser’s
board and management found this to be a successful means to improving governance
effectiveness (Totten, 2013).

The audit examined board and committee activities and evaluated the charter and

corporate governance guidelines against best practices in areas such as director

qualifications, corporate code of ethics, annual board performance evaluations and the role
of the board convener. The board convener is a unique board position at Kaiser that acts
independently of the CEO and chairperson, which are not separate roles, to approve

meeting agendas and schedules, preside at all meetings of non-management directors and

at executive sessions, act as the liaison to the board’s independent directors and balance the
board and CEO functions (ibid).

The auditors identified best practices using resources such as Sarbannes Oxley

(SOX) requirements, governance policies of other large organizations and the Conference

Board’s report on “The Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise”. A senior audit
manager conducted the audit. Methods of gathering information included observation of
committee meetings to assess the dynamics of interactions and to determine whether

enough time was spent on each agenda item. The auditor also interviewed members of each
committee (ibid).

For a social science researcher, the primary advantage of self-assessment and

survey data is that the information can be collected and analyzed from a large number of
organizations. The downside, of course, is making sure the data are meaningful and not
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biased. How organizations report on themselves is bound to be fraught with some bias, and
the nuances of how board members work together may not carry over. An example of the
use of survey data was in the Clark et al (2006) paper on pension fund board member

competence. A 60-minute survey was administered to 40 pension fund board members. The
survey covered a range of topics around reasoning and decision-making.

Self-assessments of boards are now very common among public companies, with

92% of companies participating in some form of self-evaluation, up from 25% in the early
1990’s (Conference Board Report, 1998). 128 While the data is out there, gaining access to

that information may still be quite limited, although some boards do release that
information as part of their annual disclosures and proxies.

Live Action Direct contact with the boards and directors is the obvious choice in

seeing first hand their effectiveness. Unlike survey and self-assessment data, this

information is real-time and directly accessible. These methods have been utilized in two

research papers referenced for this dissertation (Loch & Fortuna, 2012 and Mar, 2011).

Fortuna & Loch in “Boardroom Cultural Governance” interviewed 24 directors representing
61 corporations, 31 Fortune 500 and 12 Fortune 1000 companies.

Mar (2011) selected three school district boards and videotaped board meetings for

each. She then applied a methodology for collecting and interpreting the data from each

meeting using the Observable Task Behaviors and Observable Process Tables for coding and
analyzing verbal interactions. She was then able to interpret the information statistically to
draw inferences and conclusions.

This kind of approach can generate some genuine insights. To truly penetrate the

black box, one must enter it. However, the data gathering is inherently restrictive to a small

number of organizations. Additionally, selection bias is a likely to enter in to any study.

128 2012 NACD Public Company Governance Survey, http://blog.nacdonline.org/2012/08/undertaking-an-honest-selfassessment-is-your-board-aligned/

While Mar (2011) was interested in examining effective boards ex ante, and knew she
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would be only able to work with a very small number of organizations (less than six), based
on her data gathering technique, which involved hours of videography, this created a

sample selection problem. Because she relied on the opinions of others in making those

selections, and because this method was clearly not randomized, this introduced an effect
that meant her population under study was not necessarily or even likely to be
representative.

Board Artifacts Finally, the last source of information to undertake direct

examination of boards is what the boards say about themselves in written form to glean

insights on their effectiveness. Again, the goal is to understand more about their process

and decision-making that is not accessible through an examination of board structure alone.
Corporate boards disclose all kinds of information, particularly public companies in the

form of proxies and other SEC filings. Public pension funds make publicly available many
forms of documents and disclosures including meeting minutes, investment policies,

agenda, and other information. Collection and examination of these data can provide

insights into how the board conducts itself, what it decides and when. Unlike interviews and
direct observation, which may limit the researcher to a small sample, gathering information
from public documents can broaden the dataset in the same way that survey data can.

Information can be gathered from literally hundreds, or even thousands, of organizations.
The challenge here, of course, is collecting the information in a usable format, which is a
labor-intensive process.

For my research into institutional fund governance effectiveness, we have

constructed a dataset from an examination of sample public pension funds. We have

gathered data primarily from meeting minutes and legal disclosures over a five-year period

for a longitudinal unbalanced panel study of pension fund governance and performance.

This data set offers the opportunity to glean a better understanding of board process,
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examination of factors behind effective boards, and link those factors to performance and
legal outcomes. By leveraging the existence of performance metrics already available
through other public databases, the Boston College Public Pension Fund database in

particular, we have the opportunity to combine both process and performance data to
understand the interplay of factors in driving board effectiveness with a large set of

empirical data. 129

In this way, we are able to bridge the gap between survey and interview data: The

former fraught with self-reporting and selection bias (what people say about themselves
and their organizations, and how organizations are selected), and the latter with sample

sizes that are inherently limited because of the time involved in hand-collecting the data.

The new methodological approach is different in one compelling and penetrating

respect: industry and academia for the last twenty years have based notions of best

practices on the collection of survey data. The 2013 Spence Johnson study mentioned

earlier and more recently, a 2016 study commissioned and published by State Street, are
but two of only many examples of this. 130

Using a combined approach of both board disclosures and surveys may offer the

best way of tackling the problem. Gill et al (2005) in their development of the GSAC utilized
the self-assessment form along with separate survey information to understand the link

between board practices and performance. Our intention is to follow up this dissertation
with the development of a best practices survey for future research. In approaching the

problems of pension fund governance as it relates to performance outcomes, we can then

determine whether the survey has some explanatory power by analyzing survey responses,
129

Boston College Center for Retirement Research U.S. Public Pension Plan Database
“Pensions with Purpose: Meeting the Retirement Challenge”, State Street Corporation, February 2016 and the 2013
Pension Governance Index Report, Spence Johnson.
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compared to the independent measures of board evaluation through document disclosure,

and then examine both sets of relations to performance outcomes.

In the end, any instrument, survey or self-assessment, to be an effective governance

evaluation tool, should meet the following criteria: “have excellent internal consistency
reliability, exhibit good criterion-related validity and be able to discriminate between
stronger and weaker aspects of board functioning”(Gill et al, 2005).

We discussed a number of communications research methods already being

employed, referencing two recent school district board studies that used observational
(video-taping) and survey approaches, as well as a corporate governance study that
employed an interview-style approach. I also shared how using publicly available

documents and disclosures, such as meeting minutes and investment policies, may be useful

in gathering larger amounts of data for analysis and comparison. Consideration was given to
the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

Research Method

The research method is made up of three overarching steps:

Step 1: Factor Identification The first step is comprised of identifying the key

factors that determine fiduciary effectiveness. The interdisciplinary approach of this

research references the current literature across finance, law, organizational behavior

(sociology and psychology) and ethics, which has informed the process of understanding

and determining applicable categories and attributes. These factors have been gleaned from
our review of the literature presented in Chapter III and IV, so it has been a matter of

prioritizing and selecting the ones that are most important, finding what data are available
for each, and then analyzing the data to determine which factors are significant.

These factors fall within the following four general categories: Board Structure,
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Board Process, Human Factors and Decision-making. Table 5 lists comparative factors from
four distinct theoretical approaches of examining public pension fund governance, which
include:

•
•
•
•

Political economy

Organizational design
Institutional

Empirical / "corporate governance”
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Table 5: Public Pension Fund Governance Factors Comparative
Theorist

Approach

Clark
and
Urwin

Organizational
design

Mission
clarity

Investment
executive

Effective time
budget

Required competencies

Leadership

Effective compensation

Strong beliefs

Competitive
positioning

Institutional

Political

Managerial

Macroeconomic

Investment markets

Legal

Professional norms and
standards (actuarial,
GASB)

Stakeholders

Policies and practices

Matkin
et al

Comparative Factors

Environment

Risk budget

Real time
decisions

Mgr. line-up
process

Learning
Org.

Multiple
plans
/multiple
boards

Internal
/
external
mgt

Investment
Policy
Statement
(IPS)

Member
Turnover

-Personnel
-Benefits

-Contributions
-Actuarial

Merker
& Peck

Empirical /
“Corporate
Governance”

Type of
Member

professional
staff

- appointed/
elected

-retiree /
other

Meeting
duration

Length of
meeting
minutes

Committee
membership

-audit

Use of
Consultant /
Present at
Meeting

Nature and character
of discussion

-operations

-performance

-personnel

-on notice

-legislative

-administrative
-budget

-education

-evaluation

-executive review
-benefits

-deferred comp

- claims & service

-watch

-termination
-fees
-risk

-asset

-allocation
-adjust

-pay for play
-change

Attendance
and Form of
attendance (in
person/by
phone)

Investment
conference interest
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-law & rules

-compliance
-disability
-elections

Governance
Issue

Theorist

Approach

Cogburn,
Carney,
Marks, &
Chaney
et al

Political
economy

(quality of
attention)
(expertise/p
oltical
process/stak
eholders)

Political preferences

-political ideology or
culture

-partisan representation
and competitive control of
legislatures
-Union representation

-Number of employees and
payroll size

-Employee classifications of
plan participants
-Median voter proxies
-political intervention

(transparency,
quality of
attention)

(structure/number of
committees)

(outside
expertise)

(quality of issues)

Comparative Factors
Fiscal stressors and constraints
-fund balance
-credit rating

-unemployment rate

-budget stabilization fund

-balanced budget requirement
-tax burden

-debt burden (outstanding debt or
interest cost

Administrative professionalism

-accounting and disclosure quality

-external recognition (i.e. Government
Performance Project – GPP scores,
Government Finance Officers
Association (GFOA) certificates)

-legislative professionalism

(quality of
attention)

(competency)

(fiduciary
oversight)

(org.
form)

(fiduciary
oversight)

(org.
stability)

Step 2: Population and Sample As was mentioned earlier, for the study period,
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there were approximately 6,300 public retirement systems in the United States with over

$3 trillion in assets. Our sample begins with 163 of the largest state and municipal pension
systems from this population representing assets of over $1.4 trillion, or 47% of the

population by assets. It is based on the Public Plans Database provided by the Center for

Retirement Research (CRR) at Boston College. In addition to covering a wide swath of the
asset universe among this sample, we also utilized it because CRR has collected extensive

financial and actuarial data over the past 15 years. This dataset made available many of the
financial and control variables as necessary inputs into the governance models we

developed, and discussed in the next chapter. Additionally, using this list of plans from the
sample, we were able to locate and collect extensive legal data on each. Finally, we

examined these plans over a five-year period, 2008-2012, to capture a market cycle.

This timeframe, of course, coincides with the GFC, which effectively began with the

collapse of Bear Stearns on March 13, 2008 and its aftermath. 131 While we view this as an

extraordinary period in financial history, we do believe it strengthens the power of the test
of our analysis, because it allows us to examine governance practices and their related

effects under extreme conditions. It is highly likely that how organizations prepare, think
and act in advance and during times of crisis is critical to their performance during such
periods.

We used one-year forward returns reflecting that the governance process has a one-

year lag based on our analysis of the data. What this means is that at the point when
decision are taken, there is a time delay effect in place for those decisions to see a

measurable impact. For example, the decision to change investment strategies, while having
131 Kelly, Kate, “Inside the Fall of Bear Stearns In 72 nail-biting hours, an investment bank turned from healthy to nearly
insolvent”, Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2009
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some immediate effect of course, for it to be quantifiable takes time, and this bears out in
the data.

Once collection of the data was completed, we went through the exercise of

cleansing the data, and making sure there were no errors in the recorded observations. In
addition to a manual review of the data, it also involved reviewing and analyzing the
aggregate statistics for any abnormalities in the data including any unusual outliers.

Step 3: Data Collection and Procedures Once the set of factors was determined,

the next step was to identify the data sources to gather empirical data on each factor. We

have chosen public pensions as our primary organizational type for analysis. We could have
chosen any number of institutional categories as the issues are similar, if not the same. The
reason we have chosen this population for study is threefold: 1) source data is readily

available through public disclosures. Public organizations have more information publicly

available, which include, for example, meeting minutes, agenda, and other memoranda that

are in the public domain; 2) we are able to leverage existing data sets e.g. the Boston College
database and other industry data; and 3) to contribute to the debate within the public
sphere around this topic.

Over the last two years, we have hand-collected data on 163 public pension plans

over a five year period, 2008-2012. We have collected these data in two separate databases,
one containing over 50 asset owner governance variables (the Governance Database, and
one containing over 20 legal variables (the Legal Database). We employed research

assistants in both the Marquette law school and in the business school finance department
to gather data for each separate database. For the Governance database, our research

assistants collected the meeting minutes for every organization available online over the

five year study period. They then reviewed every document and recorded observations for
each data point. For the legal database, the research assistant collected data from multiple
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legal database sources, using Bloomberg, Westlaw and Lexis Legal, to collect observations

for each pension plan in the sample over the five-year period. See Table 6 for the full list of

plans from the BC database, and Table 7 for the study sample. A summary of the variables

for each data set is included Tables 8 and 9.

Table 6 – Boston College Database Public Plans List (Market Value in ‘000s), 2012

Source: Boston College Center for Retirement Research, Public Pension Plans Database
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Table 7 – Public Plans Governance Study Panel (Market Value in ‘000s), 2012

Source: Data collected from meeting minutes available on each public pension plan websites.
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Table 8 – Governance Database Variables
1) Name of Pension
Plan

2) Chair or President?
(Yes=1, No=0)

3) Alternate (Yes=1,
No=0)

4) Board Member on
Investment

Committee? (Yes=1,
No=0)

5) Board Member on

Other Committee #2?
(Yes=1, No=0)

6) Number of times
"watch"

7) Number of times
"risk"

8) Number of times
"change"

9) Board Member on

Other Committee #4?
(Yes=1, No=0)

10) Investment

Conference Interest

Indicated (1=Yes, 0 =
No)

11) Date of Minutes

21) Name of Board

Treasurer? (Yes=1,

22) Retirement or

12) Comptroller or
No=0)

13) Alternate (Name)

14) Board Member on
Audit or Compliance
Committee? (Yes=1,
No=0)

15) Investment
Consultant at

Meeting? (Yes=1,
No=0)

16) Number of times
"on notice"

17) Number of times
"asset"

18) Phone In? (Yes=1,
No=0)

Member

Pension Office Staff
Member

23) Time Meeting Call
to Order

24) Other Committee
#1 (Name of
Committee)

25) Name of

Investment Consultant
Representative at
Meeting

26) Number of times
"termination"

27) Number of times
"allocation"

29) Other Committee

19) Other Committee

#3 (Name of

Committee)

30) Board Member on

#5 (Name of

20) Dollar Amount for
travel

Committee)

Other Committee #5?
(Yes=1, No=0)
31) State

32) Present? (Yes=1,
No=0)

33) Elected Employee
(Yes=1, No=0)

34) Time Meeting
Adjourned

35) Board Member on
Other Committee #1?
(Yes=1, No=0)

36) Number of times

"performance"

mentioned in minutes
37) Number of times
"fees"

38) Number of times
"adjust"

39) Board Member on
Other Committee #3?
(Yes=1, No=0)

40) Other Committee
#6 (Name of
Committee)

41) Multiple Boards?

42) Appointed (Yes=1,
No=0)

43) Elected Retiree
(Yes=1, No=0)

44) Length of Meeting
Minutes (# pages;

round up to nearest
page)

45) Other Committee
#2 (Name of
Committee)

46) Number of times
"alert"

47) Number of times
"returns"

48) Number of times
"pay for play"

49) Other Committee
#4 (Name of
Committee)

50) Board Member on
Other Committee #6?
(Yes=1, No=0)

51) Overriding

Pension Board for

Multiple Plans in Same
State?
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Table 9 – Legal Database Variables
1) Pension Plan

Number from the

Boston College Data
Base

2) Court (1=federal;
0=state)

3) CRIMINAL Action
(1=yes; 0=no)

4) FINRA Description

5) Case Resolved?
(1=yes; 0=no)

9) Description of
Resolution

6) Name of Pension

10) Date Filed

7) Plaintiff Type

12) Claim (Type)

Plan

CIVIL Action (1=yes;
0=no)

8) SEC? (1=yes; 0=no)

11) Plaintiff Name
13) SEC Description

14) Bankruptcy
(municipal)

15) Initial Filing

20) Description of

16) Defendant Type

21) Defendant Name

(1=yes; 0=no)

17) Claim Description

18) DOL? (1=yes;
0=no)

19) Case Frequency

Filing

22) FINRA Action
(1=yes; 0=no)

23) Other Regulatory

24) Case Severity
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Step 4: Data Analysis and Testing There are two ways to test whether the index is

a useful measure, in terms of both absolute and relative effectiveness. An absolute measure
is binomial in nature: either the organization was effective, or it was not. If we have

identified the correct factors, then the factors should be explanatory in nature. An absence

of the critical factors could be indicative that the organization is bound for a fiduciary
problem (e.g., underfunding, bankruptcy, litigation, etc.). A high FEQ, according to the

theory, should translate into to a low ineffective score based on the two variables, case
frequency and severity.

The second method of testing whether the grade is effective, on a relative, and as

noted earlier, a lagged basis given the delayed effect of governance on performance

outcomes observed in the data, i.e. fund returns, is a phenomenon that can be measured

ongoing. How well has the organization governed itself, and then in turn performed in its

investment returns and other financial measures? Theoretically, the more critical
governance factors that are satisfied, the better the investment performance.

Absolute Effectiveness: The Probability of Being an Effective Organization

Our first step in analyzing the data for our effectiveness factors is determining the

data whether effectiveness is conditionally present based on the combined variables. The

FEQ as a rating and measurement system can only be useful if it, in fact, demonstrates some
explanatory power. For this purpose, we have additionally constructed a Legal Index to

evaluate each organization. This is based on a reversed scale (to be consistent with the FEQ

scaling), 0-80 is ineffective and 80-100 is effective. These ranges were determined from
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what was observed in the data. Plans that fell below the critical value of 0.50 for a funding
ratio consistently saw Legal Index measures below 80 on the index.

We gathered legal case data, and scored qualitative data to make quantitative, to

formulate a qualitative framework for integrating our aggregate data set into a broader

Asset Owner Governance model as shown in Table 1 on page 56. We subsequently refine

this conceptual framework in Chapter VI into further sub-categories.
We then construct the following equation:

FUNDR = ƒ(FEQ, LI, X), where

FUNDR is the funding ratio of the pension, and is our best measure of overall effectiveness:
it addresses how well funded the retirement plan is. The Legal Index (LI) variable is

comprised of the frequency and severity variables. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness

Quotient, and FEQ is defined by an index rating of (all or some portion) of the following

factors: Structure, Process and People. X is defined as other control variables needed for the
model.

An ineffective condition is defined as significant underfunded position, bankruptcy,

significantly poor underperformance, criminal case, civil litigation, or significant board,

committee or management reorganization. There could be any number of cases we can look

at empirically to test the theory that if certain conditions are not met, then the probability of
an organization being effective diminishes with each factor, as we will know in retrospect

whether the organization was effective. In this case, because there were no bankruptcies in
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our data set, we focused on significantly underfunded plans by which we define any plan

with a funding ratio below 0.50 as significantly underfunded, and therefore ineffective. 132

As we note above, there are two summary variables that we have isolated to test for

absolute effectiveness: 1) severity of an ineffective condition; 2) frequency of the ineffective
condition.

Relative Effectiveness: The Effectiveness to Performance Link

For the final step, we use portfolio and performance data for the specified period of

each organization in our sample.

We test the validity of our hypothesis that we have identified the correct

effectiveness factors and compositing methodology through this analysis by examining the
composite rating as the independent variable and the investment performance outcome as
the dependent variable, and assess the relationship between these metrics. We will at this
stage be testing the hypothesis that the governance factors, which determine fiduciary
effectiveness, also impact return performance.

And so we will create and test the following regression model:

R = ƒ(FEQ, X), where,

R is the investment return, and FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient defined by an

index rating of the following factors: Structure, human factors and process. X represents

132

Fitch, a bond rating agency, defines any plan with a funding ratio below 0.60 as “weak”, the lowest category on a four
point scale. https://www.actuary.org/files/80_Percent_Funding_IB_071912.pdf

several other control factors that include size of the assets, types and proportions of the
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investments, investment expenses, and demographic and fiscal variables.

A priori we, of course, expect there will be a strong linear relationship between

these two variables. Depending on the outcome of the research, if we are successful in

finding statistical support for this hypothesis, then we will have established an empirical
link between fiduciary effectiveness and performance outcomes, and have a basis and

methodology for quantitatively measuring, predicting, evaluating and comparing fiduciary
effectiveness.

Limitations of the Study

This study represents the first foray into gathering empirical data on governance

and legal activities of asset owners, specifically for public pension plans. It is, therefore,

exploratory in nature, and not exhaustive in either its collection of data or in the analysis of
the data. However, we have collected sufficient data on which to develop a theoretical

framework around asset owner governance and fiduciary effectiveness for development of
the Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient (FEQ).

We also have no information on the individuals, particularly their backgrounds and

areas of expertise, but this information could be filled in by future research using survey
methods.

CHAPTER VI
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
There are two research goals:

1) To understand the relationship of an organization’s FEQ and investment returns
(and other financial measures such as the funding ratio and bond interest cost or

yield spread) of the organization’s respective investment pool to link organizational
structure and behavior with performance outcomes.

2) To assess the model in identifying and correctly categorizing plan fiduciary

problems. This will be shown through a binary response (Probit) model to assess

the accuracy of the model in correctly predicting (categorizing) plans as effective or

ineffective.

Essentially, through this research, we are taking the prudence is process concept to

the next level, by evaluating and measuring prudent process and tying it to direct,

measurable and comparable outcomes.

Presentation of the Data
Model I: Relative Effectiveness - Selected Variables

Henceforward, when referring to the governance of institutional funds, I will use the

term Fiduciary Effectiveness. Mathematically, fiduciary effectiveness may be reduced to this
basic equation:

Eq. 1: FE = G(S, Pr, P)

Where,
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FE: Fiduciary Effectiveness

S: Board / Committee Structure
Pr: Process (or Engagement)
P: People

Consistent with corporate governance theory, we have narrowed the list of

variables down to a set of 17 variables for the purpose of analysis. Table 10 shows a

summary of descriptive statistics. Tables 11-12 shows a summary of the variables, their
expected and estimated signs, and related p-values, testing that the estimated coefficient

does not equal zero. In general, governance variables will be proxies for the decision-

making that occurs within the organization. Engagement variables such as attendance,

meeting length, minutes page length and meeting frequency convey information about how
active and focused the board is. Structural variables, which were first discussed in Chapter
III, such as board turnover, use and attendance of the consultant and number of members
likewise consider how the board is set up to interact and make decisions.

As shown in Table 11, using OLS we reviewed seventeen governance factors in

relation to investment returns. Nine out of 17 governance factors had consistent estimated
signs with expected signs. We expected the following factors would result in higher
investment returns: 1) meeting length would indicate greater levels of focus and

engagement; 2) more board members on the (a) audit and (b) investment committees

would indicate deeper involvement; 3) more staff involvement would result in greater

knowledge sharing; 4) less (a) board and (b) board chair turnover would mean greater

continuity in governance; 5) fewer board members would be more effective, which would
be consistent with other CG findings; and 6) involvement by the consultant through

attendance and participation would be helpful to the organization for their outside
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expertise and guidance.

We also constructed “Investment Discussion” as a variable, which involved key word

counts within the meeting minutes as a proxy for the type and substance of the discussion.
These key words included “performance”, “watch”, “returns”, “on notice”, “alert”, “fees”,
“risk”, “asset”, “allocation”, “pay to play”, and “adjust”, which denote ideas around

investment concepts, decisions-points, and investment governance issues. While the

expected signs did not match the estimated, the results found in the quintile analysis,

discussed in Chapter 7, were consistent with the theory that more key words found in the
documents were common among better governed, higher performing organizations.

These data are in addition to the data available to us from the Center for Retirement

Research (CRR) at Boston College. CRR, in their Public Pension Plans database, has a host of

financial and actuarial data gleaned from public filings and disclosures. For our purpose, we
have incorporated a number of financial variables for analytical purposes, primarily to

examine investment performance. In particular, we have used three variables from this data
set: 1) market assets, which represents the total asset value of the plan in nominal U.S.

dollars; 2) investment returns, which are available on a rolling basis of 1, 5, and 10 years;

and 3) the funding ratio, which is the market value of the assets in relation to the liabilities

as measured by the actuarial Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). We have used the one-year
investment returns to examine each cross section’s factors and related performance. We
have determined that a one-year forward relationship exists, and therefore have

incorporated the 1-year investment return as a leading dependent variable; returns

essentially lag the fiduciary process by a year. We have used market assets as a control
variable for plan size.
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For the control variables, as shown in Table 12, with the exception of investment

expenses, we had no particular expectation of signs. In the case of investment expenses it
was surprising on a couple of levels: 1) we expected that this would be a detractor to

returns, and the opposite relationship was indicated in the estimation; and 2) the estimated
coefficient was not statistically significant. The reason why this was a surprising result is

because the industry has become obsessed with investment expenses over the past several

years, which has fed into a debate over “active” (higher cost, research-driven and actively-

managed investments) versus “passive” (lower cost, index-defined) investments, and in this

case we found no such relationship to investment returns.

We have also incorporated asset allocation measures (equities, fixed income, real

estate, alternative investments, and cash and cash equivalents) to account for the

differences in types and proportions of investments. While governance decisions drive the
investment process, investment returns are also influenced by decisions that occur at the
manager level, so it is necessary to apply both sets of variables in examining the

relationship to investment returns. In looking for proxies for state and municipal budgetary

influences, as well as demographics of the beneficiary population, we used the actual annual
contribution rates and total beneficiaries variables for each factor, respectively.

Funding of the pension through contributions has a direct relationship with the

fiscal health and condition of the state (Chaney, Copley and Stone, 2002). Total beneficiaries
embody both “active lives” or those still working, and “retired lives”, those who are

obviously in retirement and already receiving benefit payments. These will vary based on
the distribution of the beneficiary population for each plan. In preliminary analysis, these
additional variables were assigned to ascertain the formulation of five final models. We

applied the same set of primary and control variables in two of the models (1a. and 2 b.).

The other models only required one or two primary variables in fitting a complete model,
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and based on the principle of parsimony, and using a “stepwise” approach to each model,
we used the fewest variables in each case to find the best “fit” for the model.

Finally, we have also examined the funding ratio as a dependent variable, consistent

with the conceptual overview presented in Chapter I. To understand why all three

dependent variables would be impacted by the FEQ in a similar way, one need only refer to
the U.S. Public Pension System schematic on page 21 to review the theory and chain of

relationships. Governance is among the set of endogenous factors that affects investment
returns. Investment returns impact the funding disparity and requirements of state and

local governments, as measured by the funding ratio. And as detailed in the section, “Bond
Market Vigilantes: When Public Pension Governance Fails” (p. 100), we examined the

relationship of pension risk to bond yield spreads to understand how the funding status of
the pension system impacts the bond yield spread of related general obligation municipal
bonds.

For each dependent variable, we had data available for all years 2008-2012. The

source of investment returns and funding ratios was the Boston College Public Plans

Database. We had 31 and 35 cross sections available for analysis, respectively. We used the
Citigroup bond yield spread indexes, and had 10 cross sections in the sample available for
analysis.

Table 10 – Model 1: Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of 35 Public Pension Plans
(2008-2012)
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Governance Variables
On
Employee
Investment
Staff
Board
Composition Committee Composition Attendance
7.55
29.87
3.92
81.24
0.00
11.11
0.00
83.33
54.86
100.00
100.00
97.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
33.94
11.53
36.49
16.46
10.42
1.93
0.87
5.01
-1.49
7.20
2.07
27.39
6.29

Investment
Return
9.01
12.70
24.80
-24.40
11.24
-1.15
4.01

Bond Yield
Spreads
176.90
163.74
259.67
40.08
65.38
-0.32
2.00

Funding
Ratio
0.73
0.72
1.18
0.35
0.16
0.12
3.14

FEQ
19.70
15.08
100.00
0.00
17.50
2.20
8.31

Meeting
Length
2.73
2.41
6.91
0.04
1.40
0.52
3.00

Page Length
10.17
6.70
71.83
3.00
11.49
3.55
15.86

Appointee
Composition
6.41
0.00
64.06
0.00
12.90
3.03
12.58

On Audit
Committee
16.14
11.11
66.67
0.00
18.29
0.96
2.91

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

1018.05
14146.92

4776.29
111152.90

82.41
2.79

2226.58
34318.67

308.20
220.44

1148.96
14799.06

724.51
18625.57

1823.66
37477.72

853.38
14878.60

3374.89
149120.50

442.57
30346.97

9180.21
12151.23

Observations

113

27

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Retiree
Composition
2.71
0.00
25.00
0.00
6.64
2.27
6.71

Board Chair
Turnover
4.98
0.00
183.33
0.00
17.86
8.95
89.61

Treasury
Composition
1.96
0.00
16.67
0.00
3.69
1.70
5.04

Board
Turnover
20.22
14.29
93.75
0.00
23.74
1.57
5.03

Board Size
11.00
11.00
22.00
6.00
3.29
0.54
3.36

Investment
Discussion
20.17
9.45
228.42
0.00
35.95
4.21
21.82

Meeting
Frequency
10.07
10.00
26.00
2.00
3.77
0.75
5.14

Consultant
Attendance
0.56
0.67
1.00
0.00
0.37
-0.32
1.61

Consultant
Turnover
0.21
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.41
1.41
2.98

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

306.59
4932.56

562.75
35727.83

221.23
1525.02

2284.86
63100.08

1243.00
1214.00

2278.66
144788.80

1138.00
1593.43

63.41
15.43

24.00
18.90

Observations

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Control Variables
Annual
Total
Contribution
Beneficiaries
Rate
40212.69
0.31
26363.50
0.21
121927.00
7.75
2391.00
0.06
31709.95
0.75
0.94
9.65
2.75
96.02

Market Asset Value
10,966,949
8,375,970
37,471,268
842,811
8,544,207
1.3
3.9

Equities
0.52
0.54
0.65
0.12
0.10
-1.67
6.92

Fixed
Income
0.28
0.28
0.45
0.13
0.07
0.12
2.71

Real Estate
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.00
0.04
0.10
2.37

Cash
0.03
0.02
0.11
0.00
0.03
1.26
4.22

Alternatives
0.12
0.10
0.57
0.00
0.09
1.82
8.39

Investment
Expense
-47558.17
-30543.97
-1079.00
-326523.10
56103.65
-2.54
10.14

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

1.E+09
8.E+15

58.47
1.02

31.48
0.49

5.86
0.15

3.12
0.08

13.30
0.99

-5.E+06
3.E+11

4.E+06
1.E+11

31.24
57.16

Observations

113

113

113

113

113

113

102

102

102

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Investment Return is the 1-year return. Bond Yield Spread is the difference in the index yield of the given plan’s municipality’s
general obligation bonds and the referenced broad index yield for similar duration general obligation municipal bonds.
Funding Ratio is the ratio of plan assets to projected liabilities. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient, an index variable
composed of 17 governance variables. Meeting Length is duration in hours. Page length is the number of minutes pages.
Appointee Composition is the percentage of appointees on the board. Audit Committee is the percentage of board members
on the committee. Employee Composition is the percentage of employees on the board. Investment Committee is the
percentage of board members on the committee. Staff Composition is the percentage of staff attending the meeting. Board
Attendance is the percentage of board members attending the meeting. Retiree Composition is the percentage of retirees on
the board. Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of board size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every year
and the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%, every two years 5%, etc. Treasury Composition is the
percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff. Board Turnover is also expressed as a percentage of board
size. Investment Discussion is the number of key words counted in each meeting minutes. Meeting Frequency is the number
of board meetings per year. Consultant Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the consultant. Consultant
Turnover is expressed as a ratio of number of consultants per year. Market Asset Value is the value of the pension plan
assets in nominal dollar terms. Equities, Fixed Income, Real Estate, Cash and Alternatives are expressed as a percentage of
the portfolio allocation. Investment Expenses are total investment manager fees and expenses in dollars. Total Beneficiaries
are the total number of beneficiaries covered by each plan. Annual Contribution Rate is the percentage of covered plan
compensation. All financial variables are from the Boston College Center For Retirement Research with the exception of bond
yield spreads, which are from Citigroup. All governance variables are collected from meeting minutes available on public
pension plan websites.
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Table 11 – Model 1: Selected Governance Variables for a Sample of 35 Plans,
(2008-2012)

Reject above the 10% statistical significance level using the t-test. **One tail test.
Investment Return is the 1-year return. Bond Yield Spread is the difference in the index yield of the given plan’s
municipality’s general obligation bonds and the referenced broad index yield for similar duration general obligation
municipal bonds. Funding Ratio is the ratio of plan assets to projected liabilities. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness
Quotient, an index variable composed of 17 governance variables. Meeting Length is duration in hours. Page length is the
number of minutes pages. Appointee Composition is the percentage of appointees on the board. Audit Committee is the
percentage of board members on the committee. Employee Composition is the percentage of employees on the board.
Investment Committee is the percentage of board members on the committee. Staff Composition is the percentage of staff
attending the meeting. Board Attendance is the percentage of board members attending the meeting. Retiree
Composition is the percentage of retirees on the board. Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of board
size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every year and the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%, every
two years 5%, etc. Treasury Composition is the percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff. Board
Turnover is also expressed as a percentage of board size. Board Size is the number of board members. Investment
Discussion is the number of key words counted in each meeting minutes. Meeting Frequency is the number of board
meetings per year. Consultant Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the consultant. Consultant
Turnover is expressed as a ratio of number of consultants per year. Source: Public pension plan meeting minutes
available on plan web sites.

Table 12 – Model 1: Selected Control Variables for a Sample of 35 Plans
(2008-2012)
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Reject above the 10% statistical significance level using the t-test. **One tail test.
Market Asset Value is the value of the pension plan assets in nominal dollar terms. Equities, Fixed Income, Real Estate,
Cash and Alternatives are expressed as a percentage of the portfolio allocation. Investment Expenses are total
investment manager fees and expenses in dollars. Total Beneficiaries are the total number of beneficiaries covered by
each plan. Annual Contribution Rate is the percentage of covered plan compensation. All financial variables are from the
Boston College Center For Retirement Research.
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In addition to testing the hypothesis that there is no relationship between fiduciary

effectiveness factors and investment returns (Model 1a), we have also incorporated the
same analysis by examining both bond yield spreads (Model 1b) and the funding ratio
(Model 1c) as dependent variables, separately. Referring back to Figure 1 on page 20,

stronger forms of fiduciary effectiveness should result in higher investment returns. All

other things being equal, higher investment returns should drive stronger funding ratios,
and stronger funding ratios overall should result in less aversion among municipal bond

investors to related municipal bonds. In theory, the end result should be lower bond yield
spreads; and in other words, lower interest costs on outstanding bond issues.
Model I: Relative Effectiveness – Specification and Tests

When working with unbalanced panel data with a large number of regressors (17

governance factors), but with a limited time series (five years of annual periods) there are a
number of steps that must be taken to ensure the model is correctly specified to handle the

potential cross-section effects. As we noted earlier, an unbalanced panel is one where there

are missing observations, in this case due to the inconsistency of reporting by the public
pensions both in points of time of when they report and what they report. Because their
meeting minutes are obviously determined by when the boards meet – and every

organization maintains their own meeting schedule, which, of course, varies by organization

– this created an unbalanced panel sample. Additionally, there were some years when

minutes for a number of plans were not available.

We first undertook an OLS regression to begin examining the data. We applied the

Hausman test to test whether the model is subject to fixed or random effects. In this case, it
was clear that the model would be subject to fixed effects when running the comparison
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test. The Chi-squared statistic had a p-value of 0.0000, which required strongly rejecting the

null hypothesis that the model was subject to random effects. We then checked for

redundancy among the instrumental variables by applying the fixed effects redundancy test,

and again our cross-section F and Chi-squared statistics both had p-values of 0.0000,

strongly supporting non-redundancy of fixed effects among cross sections. This is important
because we do not want to subject the model to omitted variable bias.

Next, we applied the White diagonal co-efficient covariation method for correcting

for heteroscedasticity, which is a common problem with panel data. This did not, however,
address the issue of multicollinearity one encounters when applying a large number of
regressors within a multivariate equation.

Principal Components Analysis (PCA or Factor Analysis) is one method for

addressing multicollinearity among regressors. A data reduction technique, it seeks to

explain observable phenomena with a fewer number of variables. By reducing the number
of variables to their “principle components”, the essential statistical properties are

preserved, without the repetitive and potentially distortive effects of multicollinearity (i.e.,

sign reversal or over-estimated standard errors.) It also has the additional benefit of making
possible the summarization of factors to a manageable index term, which can then be

applied to comparative peer group analysis (i.e., through separation of economic units into

quintiles), which was one goal of the research. One drawback to the use of the PCA method

is that, in general, regressors can bias the results (Enns, 1979). See Table 13 (a.-b.) for the

Principal Component Extraction based on an Eigenvalue of 1 or greater and the PCA factor
loadings and interpretation of the components.

In this case, we analyzed the seventeen governance variables using PCA. This

generated 17 factor loadings. We applied the Kaiser Criterion to extract our Eigenvectors.
By this we mean, we determined our principal component factor selection by eliminating

any factor with an Eigenvalue less than 1. This generated six components that captured

157

69% of the total variance of all 17 variables. Once we had our factor loadings we were able

to combine the loadings with each variable, and then apply PCA-determined weights to each
new factor. This was done after applying a Varimax rotation. Any individual factor that had
an Eigenvector of 0.20 or greater was considered as containing meaningful, relevant

information for the principal component and helped in the interpretation. The principal

components are summarized here:

(F1) Professionalism – This principal component may be interpreted as the level of

professionalism within the organization. It is comprised of consultant attendance, meeting

duration, page length of the minutes, board participation on the audit committee, employee
composition, board participation on the investment committee and investment discussion.
(F2) Board Composition – This principal component may be interpreted as the

composition and capacity of those serving on the board. It is comprised of appointee
composition, employee composition, board attendance and retiree composition.

(F3) Engagement – This principal component may be interpreted as the degree of

engagement by the board members, staff and consultant. It is comprised of consultant
attendance, staff composition, board attendance and board chair turnover.

(F4) Staff –This principal component may be interpreted as the extent of

involvement by professional staff. It is comprised of staff composition and treasury
composition.

(F5) Institutional Knowledge – This principal component may be interpreted as

the continuity within the organization of its institutional knowledge. It is comprised of
appointee composition, board turnover, board size and consultant turnover.

(F6) Diligence – This principal component may be interpreted by the extent of the

diligence and thoroughness of the organization in exercising its governance process. It is
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comprised of consultant attendance, page length of meeting minutes, treasury composition
and investment discussion.

The weighted combination of these principal components ultimately constituted our

index for each plan and year for a total of 35 Plans and 113 observations. Each variable was

standardized prior to combination. Once the variables were reduced to a single index, we

could then normalize or scale the index to reinterpret the index values on a scale of 0-100.
This final step allowed the ranking and segmentation of cross-sections into quintile
groupings for further analysis and comparison.
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Table 13a. – Principal Component Extraction Using the Kaiser Criterion (Eigenvalue
Greater than One), Reduction of 17 Governance Factors to Six Principal Components
for a Sample of 35 Pension Plans, 2008-2012
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 17, Average = 1)
Number

Value

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative
Value

Cumulative
Proportion

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

3.479836
2.299295
1.716712
1.650281
1.425771
1.156132
0.965665
0.883860
0.719340
0.646664
0.496045
0.408949
0.348246
0.315384
0.253751
0.189269
0.044802

1.180541
0.582583
0.066430
0.224510
0.269639
0.190467
0.081805
0.164519
0.072677
0.150619
0.087096
0.060703
0.032862
0.061633
0.064482
0.144467
---

0.2047
0.1353
0.1010
0.0971
0.0839
0.0680
0.0568
0.0520
0.0423
0.0380
0.0292
0.0241
0.0205
0.0186
0.0149
0.0111
0.0026

3.479836
5.779131
7.495842
9.146123
10.57189
11.72803
12.69369
13.57755
14.29689
14.94355
15.43960
15.84855
16.19679
16.51218
16.76593
16.95520
17.00000

0.2047
0.3399
0.4409
0.5380
0.6219
0.6899
0.7467
0.7987
0.8410
0.8790
0.9082
0.9323
0.9528
0.9713
0.9862
0.9974
1.0000

Table 13b. – PCA Factor Loadings and Descriptions for a Sample of 35 Public Pension
Plans, 2008-2012
Eigenvectors (loadings):

Variable
Consultant Attendance
Meeting Length
Page Length
Appointee Composition
Members on Audit
Employee Composition
Members on Investment
Staff Composition
Board Attendance
Retiree Composition
Board Chair Turnover
Treasury Composition
Board Turnover
Board Size
Investment Discussion
Consultant Turnover

F1
PROFESSIONALISM

F2
BOARD
COMPOSITION

F3
ENGAGEMENT

0.20167
0.31674
0.481462
-0.100938
0.390887
0.342396
0.291348
-0.007464
0.108416
-0.137818
-0.007237
-0.058854
-0.040989
-0.009606
0.424635
0.117985

-0.35485
-0.183035
0.107649
0.49792
0.085559
0.308711
0.008718
-0.050076
0.328723
0.42396
-0.19
-0.094901
-0.33842
-0.072723
0.025089
-0.14583

0.296089
-0.035747
-0.046327
0.07179
-0.070833
-0.161528
-0.120038
0.387652
0.234105
0.160074
0.26172
-0.335382
-0.01786
-0.590289
0.018508
0.15546

F4
STAFF

F5
INSTITUTIONAL
KNOWLEDGE

F6
DILIGENCE

0.022429
-0.099442
-0.088895
-0.143892
0.179205
0.105109
0.055951
0.548569
-0.365364
0.3092
-0.259232
0.206969
-0.022783
0.160405
-0.05834
-0.211002

-0.156851
-0.105578
0.101081
0.254281
0.012845
0.187257
-0.145885
0.082912
-0.216942
0.153039
0.117989
-0.37604
0.539119
0.323791
0.010803
0.450661

0.270038
-0.117912
0.217728
0.082751
-0.039565
0.041429
-0.469485
0.198688
-0.087215
0.143249
0.001436
0.27057
0.168518
-0.058492
0.440987
-0.229631

Factor loadings descriptions based on a minimum Eigenvector of 0.20. Varimax was the rotation method used. Data in
table represents 35 plans and 113 observations for the years 2008-2012. Governance factors are comprised of: 1)
Meeting Length is duration in hours; 2) Page length is the number of minutes pages; 3) Appointee Composition is the
percentage of appointees on the board; 4) Audit Committee is the percentage of board members on the committee; 5)
Employee Composition is the percentage of employees on the board; 6) Investment Committee is the percentage of board
members on the committee; 7) Staff Composition is the percentage of staff attending the meeting; 8) Board Attendance is
the percentage of board members attending the meeting; 9) Retiree Composition is the percentage of retirees on the
board; 10) Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of board size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every
year and the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%, every two years 5%, etc; 11) Treasury Composition is
the percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff; 12) Board Turnover is also expressed as a percentage
of board size; 13) Board Size is the number of board members; 14) Investment Discussion is the number of key words
counted in each meeting minutes; 15) Meeting Frequency is the number of board meetings per year; 16) Consultant
Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the consultant; 17) Consultant Turnover is expressed as a ratio of
number of consultants per year. Source: Public pension plan meeting minutes available on plan web sites.

Model I: Relative Effectiveness – Regression Models (1a-1c)
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Now that we had a single standardized index measure, it was time to re-estimate

our regression model with the specifications outlined above. Table 14 shows the

estimation results for investment returns:

Eq. 2: R(Y)citi+1=C + Β1FEQ(X1)citi + Β2MVA(X2)citi + Β3Eq(X3)citi + Β4Fx(X4)citi +

Where,

Β5Re(X5)citi + Β6A(X6)citi + Β7CCE(X7)citi + Β8IE(X8)citi + Β9BN(X9)citi + Β10RC(X10)citi + µ
Rti+1: One year forward investment return

C:

Constant

FEQ: Fiduciary Effectiveness Index (FEQ) (S_INDEX)

MVA: Market Asset Value (MKTASS)

Eq: Equity allocation (EQUITIES_TOTSA)

Fx: Fixed income allocation (FIXEDINCOME_TOTSA)

Re: Real estate allocation (REALESTATESA)

A: Alternative investment allocation (ALTERNATIVESSA)

CCE: Cash and cash equivalent allocation (CASHANDSHORTTERMSA)
IE: Investment expenses (EXPENSE_INVESTMENTSSA)
BN: Total beneficiaries (BENEFICIARIES_TOTSA)

RC: Required contribution rate (REQCONTRATE_TOTSA)
ci: Cross-section (Plan)

ti: Time period (Annual)
µ: Random error term

The dependent variable is the one-year forward return, to allow for a one-year lag in

the regressor. This reflects the point that fiduciary activities do not immediately have an

impact (e.g., managers are hired and fired over time, allocations may change periodically,
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etc.) Also, to fill out our model, the inclusion of some additional demographic, actuarial and
financial factors reduced the number of common cross-sections to 31(102 observations).

The control variables chosen for the model were selected to capture the additional

effects that also determine investment returns. Market asset value, or plan size, represents
the total assets in the plan. The size of the plan may impact the types of investments

available to the plan or the direction of those investments. Asset allocation percentages

related to equities, fixed income, real estate and alternatives were also chosen. Differences
in asset allocation can have a large impact on investment returns. Brinson, Hood and
Beebower (1986) assert that asset allocation is the primary determinant of portfolio

performance. We also incorporated investment expenses. Many across the industry, such as
the investment firm Vanguard, believe that investment expense is also a key driver of

investment return. 133 Finally, we selected total beneficiaries and required contribution

rates, two actuarial variables, to capture differences in plan populations and funding

requirements, which we considered also potentially influential in investment decisionmaking.

With the exception of investment expenses and required contribution rate, every

coefficient estimate associated with the regressor is statistically significant below the 3%

level using a one-tail test for the primary variable (FEQ) and a two-tail test for the control

variables. The model based on the F-Statistic is statistically significant below the 1% level.

This combination of factors explains 69% of the variation in one-year forward returns (R-

squared). The expected and estimated signs for the FEQ were consistent, an increase in the
FEQ is related to an increase in returns. The FEQ coefficient may be interpreted as follows:
A one-unit change in the index is associated with a 0.36% change in investment return
when all other variables are held constant.
133

https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/investingtruths/investing-truth-about-cost
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Table 14 (1a.) – The FEQ in Relation to Pension Plan Investment Returns for a Sample
of 31 Public Pension Plans, 2008-2012*
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

80.039

15.643

5.117

0.000

FEQ**

0.360

0.156

2.312

0.012

-5.64E-06

1.03E-06

-5.448

0.000

Equities

-24.525

4.706

-5.211

0.000

Fixed Income

-9.873

3.491

-2.828

0.006

Real Estate

-16.904

6.287

-2.689

0.009

Alternatives

-16.150

5.886

-2.744

0.008

Cash and
Equivalents

-5.021

1.764

-2.846

0.006

Investment
Expense

1.723

3.657

0.471

0.639

Total Beneficiaries

149.673

46.097

3.247

0.002

Required
Contribution Rate

14.586

9.959

1.465

0.148

Market Asset Value

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic
Prob.(F-Statistic)

0.686
0.480
3.335
0.000

*One-year forward investment returns
**One-tail test

Mean dependent var.
Five periods only
N=102

8.726

Measures are expressed as: Investment returns in annual percentage total return (capital gains and income); FEQ in
scaled index units. The rest are in standardized form: Market Asset Value in thousands of U.S. dollars; Equities, Fixed
Income, Real Estate, Alternatives and Cash and Equivalents as a percent of the total investment allocation; Investment
Expense in U.S. dollars; Total Beneficiaries in number of people; and Required Contribution Rate as a percentage of
covered plan compensation.

Having demonstrated statistical evidence of a relationship of the FEQ with
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investment performance, we turn now to the other dependent variables to continue our

exploration of the potential far-reaching impact of fiduciary effectiveness. The next model
examines the relationship between the FEQ and bond yield spreads.

Beginning, of course, with our focal variable, the FEQ, which as noted above, is a

summary of 17 governance variables, it was not necessary to use control variables in this
case, as we were able to explain most of the variation in the dependent variable with the

FEQ index alone. See Table 15 (1b) for estimation results. Here is the regression equation:
Where,

Eq. 3: BY(Y)citi=C + Β1FEQ(X1)citi + µ

BY: Bond Yield Spread (BNDYLDS)

C: Constant

FEQ: Fiduciary Effectiveness Index (FEQ)
ci: Cross-section (Plan)

ti: Time period (Annual)
µ: Random error term

Here, we are more limited in terms of available bond yield spread data. 134 Over the

last few years there have been some new municipal bond yield indexes that have become
available for several states and larger municipalities, but this only represents 10 cross-

sections in our data set (27 observations). Table 14 provides a description of the bond yield
spread statistics.

134

Source: Citigroup
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Table 15 (1b) – The FEQ in Relation to Municipal Bond Yield Spreads for a Sample of
10 Public Pension Plans
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

42.793

62.729

0.682

0.505

FEQ**

5.645

2.527

2.234

0.020

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic
Prob.(F-Statistic)
**One tail test

0.908
0.851
15.828
0.000

Mean dependent var.
Five periods only
N=27

176.900

Measures are expressed as: Bond yield spreads are in basis points (1 bp = 0.01%); FEQ in scaled index units.
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The estimated coefficient of the FEQ is statistically significant at the 2% level. The

model comprised of the one regressor is significant below the 1% level. This factor explains
91% of the variation in bond yield spreads (R-squared).

I was expecting an inverse relationship i.e., a one-unit increase in the FEQ would

mean a commensurate decrease in the bond yield spread, but the sign was positive. In other

words, my expectation was that better governance would translate into lower yield spreads.
Here this was not to be the case, and yet in our quintile analysis described in the next

chapter, we did find such differences among the groupings, albeit somewhat inconsistently
across peer groups, and again this may be due to a couple of factors. First, we had limited

data availability for this analysis, and secondly, as noted earlier, and as shown especially in

Figure 8 on page 106, investors during the study period were not as attune to pension risk,

which came after especially starting in early 2013. So, what I conclude is that there is strong
evidence of a relationship, although the direction of that relationship was not consistent
either in the available data, during the study period or both.

Finally, and in summary from the model estimation, the FEQ coefficient may be

interpreted as follows: A one-unit change in the index is associated with a 5.6 basis point

change in the bond yield spread. Bond yield spreads are measured in basis points (i.e. 1% =

100 basis points or bps).

The final model under relative effectiveness examines the relationship between the

FEQ and the funding ratio (Table 16 (1c)). Here we have no data limitation and may make

use of our complete sample of 35 cross-sections (113 observations):
Where,

Eq. 4: FR(Y)citi=C + Β1FEQ(X1)citi + µ

FR: Funding Ratio (FUNDR)
C: Constant

FEQ: Fiduciary Effectiveness Index (FEQ)
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ci: Cross-section (plan)

ti: Time period (annual)

µ: Random error term

Table 16 (1c.) The FEQ in Relation to Pension Plan Funding Ratios for a Sample of 35
Public Pension Plans
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

0.811

0.024

34.038

0.000

FEQ**

-0.004

0.001

-3.672

0.000

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Prob.(F-Statistic)
**One tail test

0.926
0.892
0.000

Mean dependent var.
Five periods only
N=113

0.729

Measures are expressed as: Funding ratio, total assets in relation to total projected liabilities (e.g. 0.70 is 70%,) FEQ in
scaled index units.
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The estimated coefficient of the FEQ is statistically significant below the 1% level.

The model comprised of the one regressor is significant below the 1% level, and explains

93% of the variation in the funding ratio (R-squared). Here again I expected the sign to be

positive, that if the FEQ increases in value, then the funding position of the pension should
increase, but the results were slightly negative. This may be explained by the fact that the
coefficient estimate is so close to zero, which was true both for the FEQ, and in the next

section, the Legal Index, the former having a negative value and the latter a positive value,
which was consistent with the theory. The quintile analysis also gave somewhat

inconsistent results across peer groups. The FEQ coefficient may be interpreted as follows:
A one-unit change in the index is associated with a -0.004 change in the funding ratio.

Pension funding ratios are measured in decimals, but can be interpreted as a percent (i.e.

0.70 is 70%).

Appendix B provides a quintile breakdown of the governance factors, factor by

factor, which generated many of the key findings discussed in the next and final chapter.
Model II: Absolute Effectiveness - Selected Variables

Working with the Marquette Law School, we collected case information during the

study period on available legal and regulatory case for almost every plan included in the BC
database (153), regardless of whether the plan is noted in the case as the defendant or

plaintiff. Using these data, we have constructed four variables for examination relative to

fiduciary effectiveness: case severity; total case frequency; defendant case frequency; and
plaintiff case frequency. As we indicated, two main factors, how often cases occur and the
quality of the cases involved, may be indicators of how severe a system may be under

financial and ultimately legal stress. See Table 17 for case distributions by plan across all

study years, 2008-2012. The inclusion of the defendant and plaintiff variables help
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distinguish between “good” legal activity, where the board is diligently protecting its rights
versus “bad” legal activity, where the questions of fairness and equity keep recurring – and
potentially growing – between stakeholders and the plan.

Table 17 – Legal Case Distribution by Pension Plan and Year
Plan Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Name of Pension Plan
Alabama ERS
Alabama Teachers
Alaska PERS
Alaska Teachers
Arizona Public Safety Personnel
Arizona SRS
Arkansas PERS
Arkansas Teachers
California PERF
California Teachers
Chicago Teachers
City of Austin ERS
Colorado Municipal
Colorado School
Colorado State
Connecticut SERS
Connecticut Teachers
Contra Costa County
DC Police & Fire
DC Teachers
Delaware State Employees
Denver Employees
Duluth Teachers
Fairfax County Schools
Florida RS
Georgia ERS
Georgia Teachers
Hawaii ERS
Houston Firefighters
Idaho PERS
Illinois Municipal
Illinois SERS
Illinois Teachers
Illinois Universities
Indiana PERF
Indiana Teachers
Iowa PERS
Kansas PERS
Kentucky County
Kentucky ERS
Kentucky Teachers
LA County ERS
Louisiana SERS
Louisiana Teachers
Maine Local
Maine State and Teacher
Maryland PERS
Maryland Teachers
Massachusetts SERS
Massachusetts Teachers
Michigan Municipal
Michigan Public Schools
Michigan SERS
Minneapolis ERF
Minnesota PERF
Minnesota State Employees
Minnesota Teachers
Mississippi PERS
Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol
Missouri Local
Missouri PEERS
Missouri State Employees
Missouri Teachers (see BC 62)
Montana PERS
Montana Teachers
Nebraska Schools
Nevada Police Officer and Firefighter
Nevada Regular Employees
New Hampshire Retirement System
New Jersey PERS
New Jersey Police & Fire
New Jersey Teachers
New Mexico PERF

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
1
3
3
2
1
5
4
3
4
1
1
2
4
3
4
6
6
8
13 23 18 24 28
3
10
4
11 11
5
2
1
3
4

2
1
1

1
1
1
5
3
1
1
1

1
1
1
3
4
2

3
1
1
1
1

1

2

5
1

8
2

1
5
3
30
30

6
11
46
46

1
1
1
2
2
5

1
2
3

5
10
1
3
5

1
7
1
1
5

5
1
1
17

1

15

9

3
5
5

7

1
1

2

2

1
1
1
2
1

2
2
2
2

2

3
2
6
1

3
1
8
1
1
4

1
1
3
2
1
2
1
26
26
2
1
1
1
5
4
7
13
1
2
9
2
3
2
2
13
1
1
9
6
1
1
2

1
1
2
1
1
5

1
1
1
4

1
5
1
1
1
5

3

1
2
2
33
33
5
3
3

3
2
2
1
1
3
3

3
12
2
1
4
1
3
1
1
2
4
25
25
4

10
3
1
4
3
5
7
3
4
2

1
1
8
1
2
4
3
2
5
1
4
1

9

4

2
2
1

1
1
1

2
2
1
2
2
4

1
1
1
1
1

3

3

Total
5
2
4
4
9
17
8
27
106
39
15
0
3
3
3
16
7
6
4
4
3
8
1
0
13
7
31
7
3
5
8
1
22
6
2
8
22
10
160
160
0
13
7
7
4
4
35
8
16
38
9
13
31
6
17
6
3
58
1
7
17
22
0
5
5
3
3
5
13
3
2
2
18
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Plan Number
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
115
119
121
124
126
128
130
132
134
136
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
Grand Total

Name of Pension Plan
New Mexico Teachers
New York City ERS
New York City Teachers
New York State Teachers
North Carolina Local Government
North Carolina Teachers and State Employees
North Dakota PERS
North Dakota Teachers
NY State & Local ERS
NY State & Local Police & Fire
Ohio PERS
Ohio Police & Fire
Ohio School Employees
Ohio Teachers
Oklahoma PERS
Oklahoma Teachers
Oregon PERS
Pennsylvania School Employees
Pennsylvania State ERS
Phoenix ERS
Rhode Island ERS
Rhode Island Municipal
San Diego County
San Francisco City & County
South Carolina Police
South Carolina RS
South Dakota PERS
St. Louis School Employees
St. Paul Teachers
Texas County & District
Texas ERS
Texas LECOS
Texas Municipal
Texas Teachers
TN Political Subdivisions
TN State and Teachers
University of California
Utah Noncontributory
Vermont State Employees
Virginia Retirement System
Washington PERS 2/3
Washington Teachers Plan 2/3
West Virginia Teachers
Wyoming Public Employees
Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System
{MERS}
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees Retirement
System {MPERS}
Louisiana State Parochial Employees Retirement System
{PERS}
Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System
{Police System}
Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System
Kern County Employees Retirement Association
{KCERA}
Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System
{LACERS}

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2
2
5
4
37
15 21 13 17 10
8
2
5
6
8
13 12
8
2
3
4
1
1
1
3
3
1
3
2

Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension System {Pensions}
Los Angeles Water and Power Employees Retirement
Plan {DWP}
Orange County Employees Retirement System {ERS}
Sacramento County Employees Retirement System {The
System}
San Diego City ERS
Chicago Municipal Employees Annuity Benefit Fund
{"The Plan"}
Chicago Police
Cook County Employees Annuity Benefit Fund {CEABF}
Boston Retirement Board
New York City Fire Dept Article 1B Pension Fund
New York City Police Pension Fund Article 2
Milwaukee City Employees Retirement System {The
System}
Philadelphia Municipal Pension Plan
Dallas Police and Fire

1

22
1
9
1
1
5
2
7
7
2
1

42
1
6
2
1
5
1
2
1
5

46
3
9
1
1
6

2
4

2

2
2
3
1

4

2

1

2
1
2
8
8

1
10
10

2
16
16

3

3

1
1
6

1
2
20
1
6
5
1

1
2
2
24
2
4
2
1

1

3

1

11

12

16

6
6

1

1
1
3
2
2
4

3
2
2

50
76
29
38
7
12
0
0
152
5
45
11
8
28
5
9
5
14
15
1
11
11
19
11
2
13
1
5
1
3
36
37
0
18
18
18
4
8
10
77
6
18
11
7

2

7

28

89

28

14

9
3
1
8

12
4
4
4
2

4
5
2

2

7
7
5
2

1
1
8
4

2
1

1

1

1

3
4

9
9

6
2
2
3
2
3
13
3
5
1
3

4

22

2
2
14

1

1
3
1

2

2

5
3

2

5
2

5
1

3

17
4
8

1
3
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2

11
1

3

1
5

1

4

3

1
16

4
3

1
6

6
2

8
5

2
3

21
19

1
15
5
11
2
5

2
7
5
4
2
18

6
1
2
3
24

3
7
1
3
1
10

6
45
12
32
12
70

10
12
4
13

3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
445 543 491 526 462
1

6
3
6
2467

Therefore, I constructed a Legal Index based on the following equation:
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Eq. 2: LI = H(CS, CF)

Where,

LI: Legal Index

CS: Case Severity

CF: Case Frequency

As introduced in Chapter II, I have developed a qualitative case severity framework,

which has been further refined and expanded to incorporate the many varieties of cases
encountered in this area of the law. These range from fraud on one extreme to minor
statutory duties of plan operations on the other. These were expanded to cover the

following categories, in order of declining severity: investments: fraud; investments: breach

of fiduciary duty/ contract; benefit management/disbursement; plan operations; minor

statutory duties concerning operations; alterior investment concerns; and undefined. Table

18 provides detail on the refined severity measures, ranging from 1 to 20 subcategories,

and these apply across both defendant and plaintiff cases.
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Table 18 – Case Severity Measure

a. Variable Group Rationale

Variable Group Rationale
1 Concerning investments: frauds
2 Concerning investments: breaking agreements/duties
3 Concerning benefit management/disbursement
4 Concerning plan practical operations
5 Concerning minor statutory duties regarding operations
6 Concerning alterior investment concerns
7 Unknown cases
b. Variable Summary and Ranking

Claim Type

Variable
Rank

Variable
Group

Secfraud

1

1

Securities fraud (usually under '34 act Rule 10b-5
or section 20(a)) (pension as plaintiff).

Fraud

2

1

An action for fraud (pension as defendant).

2

The pension fund is alleging breach of fiduciary
duty against a company which is one of its
investments or against an investment advisor.

breach of
fiduciary duty

3

Claim Type Explanation

breach of k;
breach of
fiduciary duty

4

2

The pension fund is alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and contract against a company which is one
of its investments or against an investment
advisor.

breach of K

5

2

The pension fund is alleging breach of contract
against a company which is one of its investments

or against an investment advisor.

Bankruptcy

Antitrust

constitutional
challenge

6

7

8
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2

The pension fund is attempting to collect against a
company that it's invested in which has gone into
bankruptcy.

2

The pension fund is attempting to block a merger
of a company it is invested in or is a shareholder of
a company that another shareholder is attempting
to block the merger of.

3

The plaintiff (beneficiary or other party) is bringing
a federal or state constitutional challenge against a
law the defendant (pension fund) is trying to
follow or enforce.

declaratory
judgment

9

3

The plaintiff (beneficiary or other party) is bringing
an action to nullify or enforce a federal or state
law against a law the defendant (pension).

Proxy

10

2

An action to include a provision in a public
company's proxy vote.

Negligence

11

2

A claim that the defendant (pension) did not act as
a reasonably careful person would have under the
circumstances.

Employment

12

4

An action for discrimination or harrassment.

Recovery

13

3

An action to recover money or property (usually
overpayment of benefits).

Denialbene

14

3

Denial of pension fund benefits.

5

Request that information be made public or given
in response to a subpoena.

3

Request that an individual (in the legal sense) be
foreclosed from some specific action.

condemnation 17

2

The pension fund is invested in real estate which is
being condemned.

Tax

6

An action to discern whether tax is owed (usually
regarding tax-exempt status).

information
request
Injunction

15
16

18

174
Interpleader

[unavailable]

19

20

3

7

A request that the court decide who owns money
or property.
The type of claim is unavailable to the researcher.
Not all case detail is available through the legal
databases. In some instances only a filing can be
discerned, but no details regarding the filing are
available.
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We have measured both the frequency of the above cases and the severity of each

case. Table 19 shows a summary of descriptive statistics. Table 20 shows a summary of the

variables, their expected and estimated signs, and related p-values using one and two tail

tests.

Table 19 – Model II: Descriptive Statistics
Model IIa. – The Legal Index and FEQ in Relation to Pension Plan Funding Ratios
Case
Frequency
2.62
1.00
37.00
0.00
4.79
5.08
33.73

Case
Severity
23.04
4.00
440.00
0.00
60.09
5.67
38.20

Plan as
Defendant
0.76
0.00
33.00
0.00
3.34
8.49
79.68

Plan as
Plaintiff
1.20
0.00
18.00
0.00
2.38
3.96
24.59

FEQ
19.70
15.08
100.00
0.00
17.50
2.20
8.31

Legal Index
91.19
94.88
100.00
22.95
11.66
-3.18
17.80

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

296.00
2570.64

2604.00
404446.80

86.00
1250.55

136.00
634.32

2226.58
34318.67

10304.67
15236.07

Observations

113

113

113

113

113

113

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Legal factors are comprised of: Defendant Case Frequency (Plan as Defendant) as measured by number of cases, where
the pension was identified as defendant; Total Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant or
plaintiff; Plaintiff Case Frequency (Plan as Plaintiff), where the pension was identified as the plaintiff; Case Severity,
where the case was measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 17. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness
Quotient in scaled units and the Legal Index is the Legal Index in scaled units.

Model IIb. – Probability Estimate of the Funding Ratio, Cutoff of 0.50
Market Asset
Value
10,966,949
8,375,970
37,471,268
842,811
8544207
1.307863
3.904759

Equities
0.52
0.54
0.65
0.12
0.10
-1.67
6.92

Fixed
Income
0.28
0.28
0.45
0.13
0.07
0.12
2.71

Real Estate
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.00
0.04
0.10
2.37

Cash and
Equivalents
0.03
0.02
0.11
0.00
0.03
1.26
4.22

Alternatives
0.12
0.10
0.57
0.00
0.09
1.82
8.39

Total
Beneficiaries
40212.69
26363.50
121927.00
2391.00
31709.95
0.94
2.75

Annual
Contribution
Rate
0.31
0.21
7.75
0.06
0.75
9.65
96.02

FEQ
19.70
15.08
100.00
0.00
17.50
2.20
8.31

Legal Index
91.19
94.88
100.00
22.95
11.66
-3.18
17.80

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

1.24E+09
8.18E+15

58.47
1.02

31.48
0.49

5.86
0.15

3.12
0.08

13.30
0.99

4.E+06
1.E+11

31.24
57.16

2226.58
34318.67

10304.67
15236.07

Observations

113

113

113

113

113

113

102

102

113

113

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient in scaled units and the Legal Index is the Legal Index in scaled units. Market
Asset Value is the value of the pension plan assets in nominal dollar terms. Equities, Fixed Income, Real Estate, Cash
and Alternatives are expressed as a percentage of the portfolio allocation. Total Beneficiaries are the total number of
beneficiaries covered by each plan. Annual Contribution Rate is the percentage of covered plan compensation. All
financial variables are from the Boston College Center For Retirement Research.
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Table 20 – Model II: Selected Variables
Legal Variables
Variable

Case Frequency
Case Severity
Case Frequency – Plan as
Defendant
Case Frequency – Plan as
Plaintiff
Legal Index**
FEQ**

Description

Expected
Signs

Estimated
Signs

P Value

Reject /
Not
Reject

Total case
f requency
Case sev erity

+/-

-

0.6073

Reject

-

-

0.9905

Reject

Def endant
f requency
Plaintif f
f requency
Legal index

-

+

0.9668

Reject

+

-

0.7820

Reject

+

+

0.0265

+

-

0.0003

Not
Reject
Not
Reject

Fiduciary
Ef f ectiveness
Index

Control Variables

Reject above the 10% statistical significance level using the t-test. **One tail test. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness
Quotient in scaled units and the Legal Index is the Legal Index in scaled units. Legal factors are comprised of: 1)
Defendant Case Frequency as measured by number of cases, where the pension was identified as defendant; 2) Total
Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant or plaintiff; 3) Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the
pension was identified as the plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case was measured based on the qualitative scale
shown in Table 17. Market Asset Value is the value of the pension plan assets in nominal dollar terms. Equities, Fixed
Income, Real Estate, Cash and Alternatives are expressed as a percentage of the portfolio allocation. Investment
Expenses are total investment manager fees and expenses in dollars. Total Beneficiaries are the total number of
beneficiaries covered by each plan. Annual Contribution Rate is the percentage of covered plan compensation. All
financial variables are from the Boston College Center For Retirement Research.

Model II: Absolute Effectiveness – Regression Model (2a-2b)
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For the legal factors we also subjected the four legal variables to PCA. This

generated 2 factor loadings. We applied the Scree Plot to extract our Eigenvectors. By this

we mean, we determined our principal component factor selection by eliminating any factor
that appeared to contain less information (i.e. percentage variance) based on the Scree Plot.
This generated two factors that captured 83% of the total variance of all 4 variables. Once
we had our factor loadings we were able to combine the loadings with each variable, and

then apply PCA-determined weights to each new factor. We used a minimum eigenvector of

0.40 to aid in interpreting each component. See Figure 10 and Table 21 for the principal

component extraction and factor loadings and descriptions.
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Figure 10 – Principal Component Extraction Using the Screen Plot, Reduction of Four
Legal Factors to Two Principal Components for a Sample of 35 Pension Plans, 20082012

Scree Plot (Ordered Eigenvalues)
3.0
2.5
2.0

Two components at the “elbow”.

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1

2

3

4

Data in table represents 35 plans for the years 2008-2012. Legal factors are comprised of: 1) Defendant Case Frequency
as measured by number of cases, where the pension was identified as defendant; 2) Total Case Frequency, where the
pension was identified as either defendant or plaintiff; 3) Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as the
plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case was measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 17.

Table 21 – Legal Index PCA Factor Loadings and Descriptions for a Sample of 35
Public Pension Plans, 2008-2012
Eigenvectors (loadings):
Variable
Defendant Case Frequency
Total Case Frequency
Plaintiff Case Frequency
Case Severity

Frequency
0.559107
0.595327
0.434593
0.379624

Severity
0.105774
-0.170935
-0.586978
0.784251

Factor loadings descriptions based on a minimum Eigenvector of 0.40. Varimax was the rotation method used. Legal
factors are comprised of: 1) Defendant Case Frequency as measured by number of cases, where the pension was
identified as defendant; 2) Total Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant or plaintiff; 3)
Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as the plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case was
measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 17.

The weighted combination of these factors ultimately comprised our index. Each
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variable was standardized prior to combination. Once the variables were reduced to a single
index, we could then normalize the index to reinterpret the index values on a scale of 0-100.

It was necessary to reverse the index (subtract each measure from 100) to make consistent
with the FEQ measure (i.e., 0 worst, 100 best). This final step allowed the ranking and

segmentation of cross-sections into quintile groupings for further analysis and comparison.
Using the same specification and tests for this unbalanced panel regression, we

developed the following regression models. Again, the panel was unbalanced because not

every observation was available for all plans as described in the earlier section. Legal case

data was also uniquely varied in that states report legal cases inconsistently, as well. When
considering the most relevant variable for measuring the health of the overall plan, which
could be affected by governance issues, financial and legal problems, or all three, it was

logical to select the funding ratio as the dependent variable. The first model is an extension
of the model in Table 16 (1c) that considered the FEQ as the only regressor. Now, taking

both the Legal Index and the fiduciary effectiveness index as the regressors, we constructed

the following equation:
Where,

Eq. 5: FUNDR(Y)citi=C + Β1LIciti + Β2FEQ(X1)citi + µ
FUNDR: Funding Ratio
C: Constant

LI: Legal Index (LegIdx)

FEQ: Fiduciary Effectiveness Index (S_INDEX)
ci: Cross-section (Plan)

ti: Time period (Annual)
µ: Random error term
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Table 22 (2a) – The Legal Index and FEQ in Relation to Pension Plan Funding Ratios
for a Sample of 35 Plans, 2008-2012
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

0.725

0.049

14.742

0.000

FEQ**

-0.004

0.001

-3.719

0.000

Legal Index**

0.001

0.000

1.965

0.027

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic
Prob.(F-Statistic)
**One tail test

0.928
0.893
27.073
0.000

Mean dependent var.
Five periods only
N=113

0.729

Measures are expressed as: Funding ratio, total assets in relation to total projected liabilities (e.g. 0.70 is 70%,); FEQ and
Legal Index in scaled index units.
.
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While the addition of the Legal Index did not impact the overall fit of the model from

the original regression model in Table 16 (1c) (i.e., small increase in the adjusted R-Square

and slight decrease in the F-Statistic), we do find the estimated coefficient on the Legal

Index is statistically significant at below the 3% level, and the FEQ is significant at below the

1% level in Table 22 (2a). The overall model is significant below the 1% level. This

combination of factors explains 93% of the variation in the funding ratio (R-squared). The
expected and estimated signs for the Legal Index were consistent, and as noted earlier,

remain inconsistent for the FEQ. The model results may be interpreted as follows: A oneunit change in the Legal Index is associated with a 0.000971 change in the funding ratio

when the FEQ is held constant. It is worth noting when modeling the same relationship

without the presence of the FEQ variable, the Legal Index has no significance (p-value is

0.9145).

The next and last model is where we provide the final test of the model in being able

to differentiate effectiveness on an absolute basis. Because there were no cases of

bankruptcy in the sample, we instead established an absolute ineffectiveness criterion of

50% funded or below for any plan. We selected 0.50 as the threshold for this analysis based
on a 2012 brief published by the American Academy of Actuaries on pension plan

funding. 135 In that brief they established a four-point scale for evaluating the strength or

weakness of a pension plan. The lowest level in that scale, defined as “weak,” was anything

below 0.60. We used that observation as a starting point and then took it down even further

for the purpose of this analysis, as we wanted to make sure we were deep into weak or even
what may be characterized as “failed” territory. For the funding ratio in our sample this

applied to only eight of the 109 observations.

135 “The 80% Pension Funding Standard Myth”, Issue Brief, American Academy of Actuaries, July 2012, p. 4.
https://www.actuary.org/files/80_Percent_Funding_IB_071912.pdf

￼
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We then constructed a binomial dependent variable for a probit model based on the

funding ratio. Every variable above 0.50 was assigned a one and anything equal to or below,
a zero. The purpose of the model is to estimate the probability that an observation with
particular characteristics will fall into one of two categories, in this case a plan deemed

effective or ineffective. The value of 0 indicates the plan is underfunded and ineffective, and
the value of 1 indicates the plan is effective. This model allows us to examine the related
conditions that are causally determining absolute ineffectiveness (i.e., poor governance,
underperforming investments, inadequate contributions, etc).

Whereas, the continuous variable of financial performance provides a comparative

snapshot of the pension fund from which we can examine a trend that may improve or

worsen, the failure mode of the absolute condition gives a measure of failure that is both
deeper and more intractable.

The probit model is most often estimated using the standard maximum likelihood

procedure. While a probit binary response model is helpful for probability estimation and
categorization, the coefficients themselves are not related in a linear fashion with the

probabilities. This means coefficient estimates do not give the marginal impact of a change

in the attribute on the probability of the dependent variable, and we cannot easily interpret
the marginal impact of an independent variable on probability. The marginal impact is not

only a function of the coefficient estimates, but of the value or size of independent variable
as well. One final note, we used White’s method for heteroscedasticity correction just as
with the prior models.

With this as background, here is the last and final regression equation using the
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probit method for the model testing absolute effectiveness (using the original selected

variables from 1(a)):136

Eq. 6: Pr(FUNDR(1,0)citi=C + Β1FEQ(X1)citi+ Β2LI(X2)citi+ Β3MVA(X3)citi + Β4Eq(X4)citi +

Where,

Β5Fx(X5)citi + Β6Re(X6)citi + Β7A(X7)citi + Β8CCE(X8)citi + µ

P(FUNDR(1,0): Probability of the funding ratio being above or below 0.50
C:

Constant

FEQ: Fiduciary Effectiveness Index (FEQ) (S_INDEX)

LI: Legal Index (S_LEGIDX)

MVA: Market Asset Value (MKTASS)

Eq: Equity allocation (EQUITIES_TOTSA)

Fx: Fixed income allocation (FIXEDINCOME_TOTSA)
Re: Real estate allocation (REALESTATESA)

A: Alternative investment allocation (ALTERNATIVESSA)

CCE: Cash and cash equivalent allocation (CASHANDSHORTTERMSA)
BN: Total beneficiaries (BENEFICIARIES_TOTSA)

RC: Required contribution rate (REQCONTRATE_TOTSA)
ci: Cross-section (Plan)

ti: Time period (Annual)
µ: Random error term

136 All original variables were used from Model 1(a) except for investment expense, which affected a “complete
separation” of the model in the estimated parameters due to incompatibly of this variable within the probit model.

184

Table 23 (2b.) – Probability Estimate of the Funding Ratio, Cutoff of 0.50, for a Sample
of 31 Plans, 2008-2012
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

Z-Statistic

P-Value

Constant

6.810

3.342

2.038

0.042

FEQ

0.065

0.030

2.172

0.030

Legal Index

-0.042

0.034

-1.239

0.215

-9.19E-08

4.34E-08

-2.116

0.034

Equities

-3.263

2.570

-1.270

0.204

Fixed Income

-1.147

1.727

-0.664

0.507

Real Estate

-2.575

1.344

-1.916

0.055

Alternatives

-2.853

2.458

-1.161

0.246

Cash and
Equivalents

-1.520

0.811

-1.874

0.061

Total Beneficiaries

0.406

1.326

0.306

0.759

Required
Contribution Rate

-0.146

0.071

-2.040

0.041

Market Asset Value

McFadden R-squared 0.519
LR-statistic
29.688
Prob.(LR-statistic)
0.001

Observations with Y=0
Observations with Y=1

Mean dependent var.
8
101

Five periods only

0.927

N=109

Measures are expressed as: Probability (Funding Ratio above or below 0.50) is the dependent variable; FEQ and Legal
Index in scaled index units. The rest are in standardized form: Market Asset Value in thousands of U.S. dollars; Equities,
Fixed Income, Real Estate, Alternatives and Cash and Equivalents as a percent of the total investment allocation; Total
Beneficiaries in number of people; and Required Contribution Rate as a percentage of covered plan compensation.
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In Table 23 (2b) the estimated coefficient on the FEQ is significant below the 1%

level. Market Asset Value, Allocation to Real Estate and Allocation to Cash also have

statistically significant coefficient estimates at the 5% level or below. While the Legal Index
was itself not statistically significant, it did improve the overall fit of the model by

increasing both the pseudo-R squared and reducing the Likelihood Ratio statistic. The

overall model is statistically significant below the 1% level based on the probability of the

Likelihood Ratio test statistic. The McFadden pseudo R-squared is modestly high at 0.51. A
good probit model will have pseudo R-squared measures in the 0.20-0.40 range. 137 To help
us with interpretation of these results, Table 24 (2b.) provides an Expectation-Prediction

Evaluation for Binary Specification using 0.5 as the cutoff. The model demonstrates a 93%

success rate in correctly estimating the binomial measure of effectiveness. It is worth
noting, however, that the model was much more effective in capturing effective plans

(96%), and less so in distinguishing ineffective plans (51%). This may be because there

were such a relatively small number of observations that fell into the “failed” category (only
8 of 109 observations or 7.3% of all cases) during the five year time period.

Table 24 (2b.)– Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification
Estimated Equation
Y=0
Y=1
Total

E(# of Y=0)
E(# of Y=1)
Total
Correct
% Correct
% Incorrect
Total Gain*
Percent Gain**

4.10
3.90
8.00
4.10
51.22
48.78
43.88
47.35

4.09
96.91
101.00
96.91
95.95
4.05
3.29
44.87

8.18
100.82
109.00
101.01
92.67
7.33
6.27
46.11

Constant Probability
Y=0
Y=1
Total
0.59
7.41
8.00
0.59
7.34
92.66

7.41
93.59
101.00
93.59
92.66
7.34

8.00
101.00
109.00
94.17
86.40
13.60

*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation

137

http://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/82105/mcfaddens-pseudo-r2-interpretation/99615

Finally, Appendix C provides a quintile breakdown of the legal factors, factor by
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factor, which generated many of the key findings discussed in the next and final chapter.
The fiduciary effectiveness of boards and committees charged with managing

investment pools can be measured both on a relative and absolute basis as demonstrated by
our review of the U.S. Public Pension Plan system. Our examination of the minutes data of
35 public pension plans generated sufficient information over a five-year period to

ascertain 17 governance factors. When subjected to Principle Components Analysis, a data
reduction technique, we produced a standardized index measure, the Fiduciary

Effectiveness Quotient (FEQ). When combined with other financial and demographic
variables, we were able to construct a model that explained a large percentage of the

variation in investment return performance. As a standalone measure, the explanatory

power of the index was even greater when applied to municipal bond yields and the funding
ratio. We did, however, uncover some sign inconsistency in the latter two measures that
raised some questions.

Turning to a measure of absolute effectiveness, our collection of legal case data over

the study period for 153 plans yielded two variables of interest: case severity and case
frequency. We collected data on 153 plans, and not 163, because not every state is

consistent in making this type of legal data readily available. This was further reduced to
the Case severity is based on a qualitative assessment of each case type across 20

categories. Case frequency is simply a measure of how often the cases occur for each plan.

We found evidence of a statistical relationship between the funding ratio when regressing it
against the Legal Index and the fiduciary effectiveness measure. When applying a probit
model, we were able to identify with 93% accuracy based on a similar grouping of

independent variables found in our first model including both the FEQ and Legal Index,
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whether a plan was likely to be deemed effective or ineffective based on a minimum funding
ratio criterion of 0.50.

The one relationship we anticipated finding was that the FEQ would be a

determinant of the Legal Index, and this was not to be the case. One possible explanation is
that the legal aspects during this period are less directly related to governance, and more
related to the period in time – during and after the GFC – where there was a burst of

security litigation, which produced a certain amount of atypical noise in the data distorting
or at least making the relationship less clear. Table 25 shows the increase and subsequent

decline in class action litigation during the study period as a percentage of overall cases.

Interesting to note the sudden spike in the 2013 filings by private citizens against public

plans. This may become clearer with expansion of the time period under analysis, especially
as the pension crisis has grown in certain geographies following the study period.
Table 25 – Percentage Share of Cases Filed by Year, 2008-2013

Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Class Action
Filed by Plan
Against
Investment
31.91%
24.63%
26.38%
12.36%
23.00%
21.32%

Private
Citizen Filed
Against Plan
42.43%
48.37%
41.45%
41.95%
36.67%
66.91%

CHAPTER VI
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RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of the Study

This study asks a very simple question, “how do I know that my money is being

managed effectively by an organization whose members I do not know and over whom I

have little or no control.” Unlike a company which is subject to the change of control market,
where a buyer (or a creditor) will come in and take over a poorly run company, a poorly run
pension plan has no such corrective mechanism other than bankruptcy, or municipal bond
market pressure as noted throughout this study.

Governance in investment management is a topic that has received much interest as

of last few years, and has many voices. However, most opinion is based on “expert opinion”
or survey data, which is subject to the self-reporting bias of the organizations being

surveyed. The goal in this study was to find out what actually matters based on empirical

measures, without the interference and noise of opinion, self-reported or otherwise. To do

this we turned to the tools of corporate governance, a huge body of work that spans the last
30 years, and applied these methods to our examination of investment organizations to

come up with comparable and comprehensible measures that carry statistical validity in

their assessments. We sought to understand what makes for differences in organizations,
their relative effectiveness, and what makes them effective on an absolute basis.

To do this we gathered data on U.S. Public Pension Plans. Their public policy import

in their role in providing retirement security to millions of Americans notwithstanding, they
produce data, which permitted depth to this investigation. We gathered data on 35 pension
plans representing nearly 15% of U.S. public pension system by assets for this study. We
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came up with results that are compelling not only in terms of demonstrating the critical role
of governance in asset ownership, but produced findings that may ultimately prove useful
to strengthening our systems of pension, foundation, endowment and trust management.
Purpose

The purpose of the research was to identify and measure the key factors that drive

fiduciary effectiveness. With the data we collected on the factors we identified, our models

demonstrated explanatory power on whether an organization is at risk of a significant

fiduciary breach defined as a bankruptcy, litigation case, reorganization, regulatory

violation, crime or other fiduciary problem. Additionally, our composite rating of fiduciary
effectiveness allowed the construction of an index of relative measures, making

organizations comparable side-by-side. This composite rating system, a measure of overall

effectiveness, is the fiduciary effectiveness quotient or FEQ.
Research Questions

The key goals for the research were:
•

To understand the relationship of an organization’s FEQ and the long-term

investment returns (and other financial measures such as funding ratio and
bond interest cost or yield spread) of the organization’s respective

investment pool to link organizational structure and behavior with
performance outcomes.

•
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To assess the model in identifying and correctly categorizing plan fiduciary

problems. This was shown through a binary response (Probit) model to

assess the accuracy of the model in correctly predicting (categorizing) plans

as effective or ineffective.

These were the research questions:

1. What are the attributes of an effective fiduciary, and what particular

attributes drive effectiveness, and are these attributes measurable?

2. If so, can an organization be usefully rated on a composite, index basis for
effectiveness using these measures?

4. Can these measures be explanatory of conditional outcomes and directly

linked to improved investment performance and a better funding status?

To help answer these questions, we tested two hypotheses:

Hypothesis I – Relative Effectiveness: The Effectiveness to Performance Link

H0: An organization’s FEQ has no relationship to the organization’s investment

return over a market cycle (typically defined as a three to five year period).

H1: An organization’s FEQ demonstrates a clear, positive relationship to the

organization’s investment return over a market cycle (typically defined as a three to
five year period).

Hypothesis II – Absolute Effectiveness: The Probability of Being an Effective
Organization
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H0: An organization’s FEQ has no explanatory power over whether an organization

may be designated Fiduciary Effective (absent the following conditions: significant

underfunding, bankruptcy, litigation, reorganization, regulatory violation, crime or
other fiduciary problem).

H1: An organization’s FEQ is explanatory.
Review of the Methodology

Population and Sample For the study period, there were approximately 6,300

public retirement systems in the United States with over $3 trillion in assets. Our study

sample is comprised of 163 of the largest state and municipal pension systems from this

population representing assets of over $1.4 trillion. It is based on the Public Plans Database
provided by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and other data

availability as discussed below.

Data Collection and Procedures Over two years we employed research assistants

in both the Marquette law school and in the business school finance department to gather
data for each separate database. For the Governance database, our research assistants

collected the meeting minutes for every organization available online over the five year

study period. The availability of meeting minutes reduced our sample to 35 plans and 113
observations for this study. A sample of bond yield data consisted of 10 plans and 27

observations. For the legal database, the research assistants collected data from multiple

legal database sources, using Bloomberg, Westlaw and Lexis Legal, to collect observations

for each pension plan in the sample over the five-year period. While we were able to collect

data on 153 plans, we were only able to make use of the data for the 35 plans in our sample.

192

Index Construction We then constructed the FEQ and Legal Indexes, and confirmed

the statistical robustness of the measure. Standardizing the indexes allowed us to measure

public pension plan governance and legal/regulatory characteristics on a scale of 1-100. We

were then able to rank order the plans and organize them into quintile groups. This then

allowed us to go back to each of the 17 governance and 4 legal factors and review each for

major differences between top and bottom quintile groupings.

A quintile is a statistical value of a data set that represents 20% of a given

population, so the fifth quintile represents the lowest fifth of the data (1-20%); the fourth

quintile represents the second fifth (21% - 40%) and so on. Quintiles are often used to

create cut-off points for a given population. This allows the characteristics of each quintile

to be compared to understand where factors may stand out as distinctive to each population
sub-group, which is exactly what we did in this case. Once we rank ordered the panel by

FEQ, and separately for the Legal Index, we could then examine each quintile to understand
the characteristics of each governance factor for the respective quintile group including
similarities and differences across each sub-group. Appendixes B and C provide the
graphical quintile analysis for each governance and legal factor.
Major Findings

There were several major findings in this research summarized first in graphical

form and with further explanation below. Figure 11 shows comparison of the FEQ index

and five-year average investment returns by plan. Figure 12 compares the FEQ index, five-

year average investment returns and interest cost (as measured by bond yield spreads) by
quintile. Figure 13 shows a comparison of the Legal Index and five-year average funding
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ratio, and Figure 14 compares the Legal Index, five-year average funding ratio and interest
cost (as measured by bond yield spreads) by quintile. Major findings include:

1. Top quintile FEQ organizations outperform bottom quintile FEQ organizations

nearly 2 to 1. Average investment returns over a five-year period were 7.22% for

the top quintile versus 3.74%, for the bottom quintile. Compounded over years this

difference could mean billions of dollars in forgone contributions to pension plans
across our nation’s pension system.

2. Higher FEQ organizations have lower interest cost on their municipal bonds than

lower FEQ organization (27% less, comparing second and fourth quintile. Data for
the fifth quintile was not available).

3. Higher Legal Index scoring organizations have lower interest cost on their municipal
bonds than lower scoring organization (over 50% less, comparing first and fifth
quintile).

4. The FEQ and the Legal Index have a direct impact on the funding ratio of pension

plans (explain 89% of the variation in the funding ratio), an important measure of
pension plan financial health.

5. The FEQ, Legal Index and other factors were 93% accurate in distinguishing

effective from ineffective plans as defined as plans having a funding ratio above or
below 0.50.

6. There was no statistical evidence of a relationship between investment expenses

and investment performance in the FEQ model. It was one of only two regressors in
the model not to have any statistical significance. 138 The implication is that other

factors are more important (i.e., fiduciary effectiveness, asset allocation, total assets
138

under governance, etc.).

The other was Required Contribution Rate.

Figure 11 – FEQ Index Compared to Investment Returns for a Sample of 35 Plans

FEQ
Score
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Percent

The FEQ or Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient is measured in scaled units. Investment returns are one year returns shown
averaged over five years in percent. The FEQ is based on seventeen governance factors including 1) Meeting Length is
duration in hours; 2) Page length is the number of minutes pages; 3) Appointee Composition is the percentage of
appointees on the board; 4) Audit Committee is the percentage of board members on the committee; 5) Employee
Composition is the percentage of employees on the board; 6) Investment Committee is the percentage of board members
on the committee; 7) Staff Composition is the percentage of staff attending the meeting; 8) Board Attendance is the
percentage of board members attending the meeting; 9) Retiree Composition is the percentage of retirees on the board;
10) Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of board size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every year and
the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%, every two years 5%, etc; 11) Treasury Composition is the
percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff; 12) Board Turnover is also expressed as a percentage of
board size; 13) Board Size is the number of board members; 14) Investment Discussion is the number of key words
counted in each meeting minutes; 15) Meeting Frequency is the number of board meetings per year; 16) Consultant
Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the consultant; 17) Consultant Turnover is expressed as a ratio of
number of consultants per year. Source: Public pension plan meeting minutes available on plan web sites.
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Figure 12 – FEQ Index Compared to Investment Returns and Municipal Bond Spreads
by Quintile for a Sample of 35 Plans

The FEQ or Fiduciary Effectiveness Quotient is measured in scaled units. Investment returns are one year returns shown
averaged over five years in percent. Bond yield spreads measure the difference in municipal bond yields for a given
municipality or state against a broader municipal bond index and are in basis points (1% = 100 bps). The FEQ is based on
seventeen governance factors including 1) Meeting Length is duration in hours; 2) Page length is the number of minutes
pages; 3) Appointee Composition is the percentage of appointees on the board; 4) Audit Committee is the percentage of
board members on the committee; 5) Employee Composition is the percentage of employees on the board; 6) Investment
Committee is the percentage of board members on the committee; 7) Staff Composition is the percentage of staff
attending the meeting; 8) Board Attendance is the percentage of board members attending the meeting; 9) Retiree
Composition is the percentage of retirees on the board; 10) Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of
board size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every year and the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%,
every two years 5%, etc; 11) Treasury Composition is the percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff;
12) Board Turnover is also expressed as a percentage of board size; 13) Board Size is the number of board members;
14) Investment Discussion is the number of key words counted in each meeting minutes; 15) Meeting Frequency is the
number of board meetings per year; 16) Consultant Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the
consultant; 17) Consultant Turnover is expressed as a ratio of number of consultants per year. Source: Public pension
plan meeting minutes available on plan web sites.
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Figure 13 – Legal Index Compared to Plan Funding Ratios, 5 YR Average, 2008-2012

Five years average of Legal Index shown for 150 pension plans compared to the five-year average funding ratio. The
Legal Index is shown in scaled units. The funding ratio is a ratio of the market value of the assets to projected benefit
obligations. The Legal Index is comprised of: 1) Defendant Case Frequency as measured by number of cases, where the
pension was identified as defendant; 2) Total Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant or
plaintiff; 3) Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as the plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case
was measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 18.
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Figure 14 – Legal Index Compared to Plan Funding Ratios and Bond Yield Spreads, 5
YR Average, By Quintile, 2008-2012

5 YR Legal Index Compared to Funding Ratio
and Bond Yield Spreads
0.82
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60.00
0.72
40.00
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bndylds
Fundr

Legal Index
Q1 – 99.05
Q5 – 72.20
Diff- (26.85)
Bond Yield Spreads
Q1 – 36.97
Q5 – 82.56
Diff- (45.59)
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0.68

20.00
0.66
-

0.64
Q1
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Q3
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Funding Ratio
Q1 – 0.77
Q5 – 0.73
Diff- 0.04

Q5

Five year average of the Legal Index shown for 31 pension plans compared to the five-year average funding ratio and
2012 bond yield spreads, broken down by quintile group. The Legal Index is shown in scaled units. The funding ratio is a
ratio of the market value of the assets to projected benefit obligations. Bond yield spreads are shown in basis points
(1%=100 bps). The Legal Index is comprised of: 1) Defendant Case Frequency as measured by number of cases, where
the pension was identified as defendant; 2) Total Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant
or plaintiff; 3) Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as the plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case
was measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 18.

Key Findings
Governance Factors

Table 26 summarizes the key findings. Boards of top quintile plans when compared to

bottom quintile plans display the following governance characteristics:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Have a higher FEQ Score (87% higher)
Meet more often (42% more)
Meet longer (23% longer)

Turnover their membership less frequently (31% less)

Have more substantive discussions (75% higher)
Have fewer board members (26% fewer)

•

Have greater attendance (8% more)

•

respectively)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Have higher participation on investment and audit committees (61% and 78%,
Have their consultant present (51% more)

Turnover their board leadership less (26% less)

Have more staff participation in meetings (36% more)

Have more appointed than elected members (71% more)
Tend to be larger plans (9% larger)

Have 48% higher returns long-term

Have 27% less interest cost on related municipal bonds
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Table 26: FEQ Key Findings – Top Quintile versus Bottom Quintile, 5YR Average,
2008-2012

FEQ Score*
Investment returns*
Funding ratio
Market asset value
Bond yield spreads (a)
Consultant turnover
Meeting frequency
Board turnover
Investment discussion
Page length
Meeting length*
Board size*
Board attendance*
Retiree composition (a)
Employee composition*
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Top Quartile

Bottom Quartile

Difference

%
Difference

45.99

5.88

40.11

87.2%

7.22

3.74

3.47

48.1%

12,871,838

11,658,134

1,213,704

9.4%

0.26

0.03

0.23

0.74

129.83
12.13

0.79

167.01
7.02

20.60

27.07

21.93

4.46

63.61
3.17

-0.04

-5.9%

-37.2

-28.6%

5.11

42.1%

88.9%

-6.46

-31.4%

17.46

79.6%

16.10

47.51

2.46

0.72

74.7%
22.6%

9.54

11.98

-2.44

-25.6%

6.83

1.72

5.11

74.9%

11.98

71.2%

83.22

76.20

7.03

Appointee composition

15.25

Board members on investment
committee
Board members on audit
committee*

58.29

22.48

35.80

61.4%

9.89

6.35

3.54

35.8%

Staff composition*
Treasury composition*
Consultant attendance* (a)
Board chair turnover

16.83

37.01
1.90
0.72
3.86

1.43

13.81

8.4%

4.85

8.05

28.96

90.6%

78.2%

5.42

-3.52

-184.7%

4.88

0.15

-26.6%

0.35

0.37

51.1%

*Statistically significant at minimum 10% level
(a) Compares first or second and third or fourth quintiles due to outliers, unavailable data
Investment Return is the 1-year return. Bond Yield Spread is the difference in the index yield of the given plan’s
municipality’s general obligation bonds and the referenced broad index yield for similar duration general obligation
municipal bonds. Funding Ratio is the ratio of plan assets to projected liabilities. FEQ is the Fiduciary Effectiveness
Quotient, an index variable composed of 17 governance variables. Meeting Length is duration in hours. Page length is the
number of minutes pages. Appointee Composition is the percentage of appointees on the board. Audit Committee is the
percentage of board members on the committee. Employee Composition is the percentage of employees on the board.
Investment Committee is the percentage of board members on the committee. Staff Composition is the percentage of staff
attending the meeting. Board Attendance is the percentage of board members attending the meeting. Retiree
Composition is the percentage of retirees on the board. Board Chair Turnover is expressed as the percentage of board
size, e.g., if the board chair turned over every year and the board were ten people, the percentage would be 10%, every
two years 5%, etc. Treasury Composition is the percentage of the board represented by the treasurer and staff. Board
Turnover is also expressed as a percentage of board size. Board Size is the number of board members. Investment
Discussion is the number of key words counted in each meeting minutes. Meeting Frequency is the number of board
meetings per year. Consultant Attendance is the percentage of meeting attendance by the consultant. Consultant
Turnover is expressed as a ratio of number of consultants per year. Source: Public pension plan meeting minutes
available on plan web sites.
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The finding related to investment expenses was interesting to note. We found no

statistical significance in relation to investment returns in the first regression model (Model

1(a)) that looked at investment returns in relation to the FEQ and other variables for 35

plans in our sample set. As noted in the last chapter regarding investment expenses, this

finding is of interest because it calls into question the current emphasis in the industry on
reducing investment expenses. In actuality, an over-emphasis on reducing investment

expenses may actually harm pension plan performance. I refer the reader to a recent Wall

Street Journal article on the very low cost approach Nevada’s pension system has taken for a
view into this low-cost obsession, as was the main theme in this story. Nevada is definitely

an extreme example in that to save money the system employs a single person to manage a
collection of passive or indexed investments. Compare that to CalPERs, the largest public

pension fund in the country, which employs nearly 3,000 people. 139 As it turns out, Nevada

fell into our data sample, and did not score particularly well on the FEQ, and has average to

below average returns, and average to below average funding ratios, which places Nevada

at the median among all state pension systems. 140

What about Nevada lead it not to score particularly well in its FEQ measure? Its

average five-year FEQ score was 14.6, which is below the average of 19.7. It had relatively

higher turnover of leadership; average levels of board turnover; no board members serving
on audit; no staff attendance in meetings (for the obvious reason that other than the chief
investment offer, there are no staff members); low levels of diversity among board

representatives; and a lower “investment discussion” measure. This despite areas of

strength including smaller board size, and relatively high attendance of board members and
the consultant.
139

https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/facts-at-a-glance.pdf
Martin, Timothy W. “What Does Nevada’s $35 Billion Fund Manager Do All Day? Nothing Nevada goes passive to
beat peers; BLT or tuna”, Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2016
140
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Legal Factors

Table 27 summarizes the key findings. Top quintile plans when compared to bottom

quintile plans display the following legal characteristics:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Have a higher Legal Index score (27% higher)

Have much fewer legal cases (5x less), and fewer frivolous cases (20x less).
Are named defendants less (96x less)

Are pursuing litigation less as plaintiffs (42x less)
Are 5.7% better funded

Have less than half of the bond interest cost on related municipal bonds.

Table 27: Legal Index Key Findings – Top Quintile versus Bottom Quintile, 5 YR
Average, 2008-2012
Top Quintile

Bottom Quintile

Difference

%
Difference

Legal Index*

99.05

72.20

26.85

27.1%

Funding ratio

0.77

0.73

0.04

5.7%

36.97

82.56

1.00

5.00

Investment return
Bond yield spread
FEQ*
Case frequency
Case severity
Case freq. – plan as defendant
Case freq. – plan as plaintiff

2.83

3.09

(0.26)

4.94

(1.38)

0.52

10.76

(10.25)

0.05

2.10

(2.05)

3.56

0.07

6.75

-9.2%

(46)

-123.3%

(4.00)

-400.0%

(6.69)

-38.8%

-1978.8%

-10030.0%
-3837.5%

*Statistically significant at minimum 10% level
Five year average of the Legal Index shown for 31 pension plans compared to the five-year average funding ratio and
2012 bond yield spreads, broken down by quintile group. The Legal Index is shown in scaled units. The funding ratio is a
ratio of the market value of the assets to projected benefit obligations. Bond yield spreads are shown in basis points
(1%=100 bps). The Legal Index is comprised of: 1) Defendant Case Frequency as measured by number of cases, where
the pension was identified as defendant; 2) Total Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as either defendant
or plaintiff; 3) Plaintiff Case Frequency, where the pension was identified as the plaintiff. 4) Case Severity, where the case
was measured based on the qualitative scale shown in Table 18.

Findings Related to the Literature
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A recent report by J.P. Morgan Fixed Income on pension risk in municipal bonds

represents the growing awareness – yet misguided emphasis on fiscal matters only – of this

risk to municipal bond investors. 141 The authors of the report produced a regression model
using budgetary factors in relation to bond yield spreads, and concluded underfunded
pensions had a relationship to higher bond interest costs, which is consistent with the

conclusions of this study. However, the budgetary factors selected for the model appeared

from the scatter plots in the report to be driven by outliers and showed nominally very little

relationship. In this case the extremes of Chicago and Pennsylvania appeared to strongly

bias the results. The gaps in the report underscored the need for additional factors and
analysis.

What is interesting is that in that report they estimated that poor pension funding

on average would drive bond yield spreads up 39 bps, and in our study we found consistent

results: the difference between first and fifth quintile plan bond yield spreads were 25 bps
(by FEQ) and 46 bps (by Legal Index), respectively, during the study period.

As we noted earlier, most studies have focused on investment managers, such as the

Morningstar and FI360 rating systems, and others have looked at one or two aspects of the
fiduciary issue. To date, no study has comprehensively examined fiduciary effectiveness of
primary institutional fund organizations as a whole, nor applied it so that it can be used in
comparing multiple organizations. Certainly, none have focused on an overall fiduciary
effectiveness score for the governing fiduciary.

141 DeGroot, Peter, Narayan, Karthik, and Henriques, Drew, “U.S. Fixed Income Markets Weekly: US Pension Plan
Update: Underfunded plans to have a higher spread beta to an economic downturn necessitating increased due
diligence”, J.P. Morgan, June 10, 2016, pp. 11-15

Matkin et al (2016) call for a more comprehensive, data-driven approach to
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understanding public pension finance. This call to action demands two things: 1) more

complete datasets are needed to analyze this complex topic; and 2) better ways of analyzing
the data to improve both public policy and private sector activity.

The corporate governance methods of analysis and data collection methods of

organizational behavior addressed in this paper may hold the keys to answering this call.

With this empirical review now completed across a foundational and influential set of asset
owners in the U.S., we have the basis for evaluating these organizations and additionally
creating new survey methods that may help organizations undertake meaningful selfassessments. Most importantly, we can through these methods equip investors,

beneficiaries, donor and taxpayers with the tools to understand, assess and compare these
organizations.

Recommended Best Practices

Finally, and in summary, several things stand out from the data regarding top FEQ

organizations. Here is what the data tell us regarding best practices:

1. Top FEQ organizations document and disclose their activities more

comprehensively, and hit on more key points. Average meeting minutes

are 21 pages in length. Key word measures on average for top organizations
were 63 words per meeting, which were several times the sample average.

2. Top FEQ organizations meet longer, more frequently and have higher
attendance rates, both from board members and the consultant: On

average duration of meetings is around three hours and boards meet

monthly. On average board attendance is 83%, and in five out of seven cases
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nearly 90% or better. In the case of the consultant, on average better than
3.

70%, but in five out of seven cases, greater than 90%.

Top FEQ organizations have consistently lower board turnover, lower

leadership turnover and lower consultant turnover: On average the

boards’ turnover is no more frequent than every five years, and in three out

of seven cases, there was no turnover during the study period. Average

turnover of the consultant was no more than once every four years, and

average turnover of the board chair was no more than once every two years.
Again here, in three out of seven cases there was no turnover of the board

chair.

4. Top FEQ organizations have smaller boards. On average boards tend to
be smaller. The average of the top quintile was nine, but four out of seven
had less than 9 members.

5. Top FEQ organizations have much greater participation on the

investment and audit committees: On average nearly 60% of the board

serves on the investment committee, and nearly 40% on audit. Again, these
were both markedly higher than the overall sample.

6. Top FEQ organizations have more diverse boards, and consistently
greater attendance by professional staff: Top organizations see higher

percentage composition and participation of appointees, retirees and staff,
and lower percentage representation of the treasury department.

Interesting to note that plans that outperform tend to have more appointed
than elected members.

Conclusions
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This is a critical period of transition for our world. The next century will likely be

very different from the last. Transitioning from an industrial-based society to a society

based on informatics and computer processing, so-called Big Data, while maintaining our

standard of living, promoting our non-profit and cultural institutions and ensuring the

retirement security of our aging citizens will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.
This comes at a time when global finance is under heightened scrutiny and income yield is

at a low point, which means greater urgency for finding new ways of maintaining oversight
and control of institutions that significantly influence general social welfare.

Addressing our global retirement savings crisis requires a fresh approach.

Contending with the existing state capitalist welfare system of public and private pensions

in a world of lower potential future returns demands better and more accountable forms of
governance for organizations to become more efficient and effective. Maintaining better
oversight and control of our endowed and foundational institutions is also increasingly
crucial in a world competing for limited resources and donor support.

Endeavoring to understand governance-linked performance outcomes requires the

“heavy lifting” of gathering new forms of data for analysis. Supposition and assumptions

heretofore have been the main approach to this topic. We aim to change that with the new
empirical approach of this research.

Implications
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What I proposed through this study is a shift in paradigm in the way we, as a society,

think about and address the role of the governance fiduciary, which has significant public
policy implications. If such a scoring system or index becomes accessible to the general

public, organizations would have an incentive to adopt and promulgate a positive rating

through investor, donor or beneficiary communications such as annual reports; and avoid a
negative rating, such as in the media, to attract future contributions from donors and
investors in a highly competitive marketplace. Donors and investors would have an

incentive to know in advance of making a contribution to an organization, how effectively
that contribution will be managed. Taxpayers would equally benefit from a system of

accountability for funds being managed by the public sector. Organizations that engage in
meaningful self-assessment could benefit.

The statistical robustness of the research, properly implemented, could lead to the

creation of a system that would “raise all boats” through providing institutions, their donors
and investors, the tools by which they can measure, improve and communicate the
effectiveness of their own organizational management.

Recommendations for Future Research

More data over time is needed. The changes in our political economy that have

taken place, especially in the last two years, are significant. Pension and fiscal crises in

Chicago, Stockton, and Puerto Rico and other places all occurred after the study period.

Municipal bond yield spreads have exploded since Chicago was downgraded by Moody’s in
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May 2015. GASB changes in 2015 along with how ratings agencies like Moody’s report have

also occurred, creating more transparency in the market. This is a sea change in our

country. I believe the strong relationship of the factors identified within the study during
the study period, would only appear even more dramatic in light of the events of the
growing crisis following since the study period ended.

Additional work on variables that fell outside the scope of this study - or were

simply not available – is also recommended. Compensation as a factor alone could be fodder

for another dissertation. What the impacts from differences in compensation in the public

pension and asset owner world are little understood. Some industry observers believe that

one of the reasons the Canadian pension system is so professional and well-managed is that
its people are very well compensated. 142 Diversity within boards, a hot topic in the world of

corporate governance, should also be looked at for the same reasons in the area of fiduciary
effectiveness. Additional research is also needed on gathering the data on professional
backgrounds of the individuals serving on boards. It is well understood that having a

background in finance, accounting and investments is an important component of overall
effectiveness, but to what degree? Survey data in this area could be useful.

Globally change is also afoot. Recently, the Bundesbank in Germany publicly aired

its thoughts about extending the retirement age in by two years to begin addressing the

looming demographic time bomb of their pension system. 143 Extending this research to look
at country-by-country comparisons would be an important undertaking that should be

considered as this is not only a U.S. problem, but a developed world problem, and may also
eventually impact the emerging market countries, such as China.

142

Marriage, Madison, “Pension pay dilemma becomes acute-Retirement schemes torn between attracting talent and
budget restraints”, Financial Times, February 7, 2015
143 Look, Carolyn, “Bundesbank floats higher retirement age in German pension debate”, Bloomberg, August 15, 2016
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Gathering data not just on public pensions, but also private pensions, foundations

and endowments and trusts is also another area for further research. As discussed

throughout, fiduciaries and beneficiaries of all colors and stripes could benefit from better
knowledge and transparency over managed fund programs.

Finally, some investigation into what the implications of a protracted period of low

interest rates are, and how it is changing the complexion of investment funds around the

world, should be examined. Recent research by the investment consulting firm, Callan, has

pointed to how public pension funds have pivoted away from safe, higher yielding bonds to
other, more risky, asset classes just to earn the target rate of return. 144 This aspect alone

may prove to give greater urgency to better forms of fiduciary effectiveness in the future.
Concluding Remarks

While this topic has increasingly gathered attention over the last 20 years, industry

and academia have either focused piecemeal on one or two aspects of asset owner

governance (Ambachtsheer), focused on decision-making in relation to investment

managers (Morningstar, Goyal & Wahal ), or have limited their investigation to a single plan
over an extended period of time (Matkin, et al). Many have overly relied on survey

responses to discern conclusions around best practices (Spence Johnson, State Street),

which firmly lack an empirical basis. The new empirical approach of this research revealed
that the structure, process and engagement of boards is critical to sustaining effective

performance on both a relative and absolute basis, and applies both cross-sectionally and
longitudinally. Best practices on this basis were reviewed and recommended.

144 Martin, Timothy W., “Pension Funds Pile on Risk Just to Get a Reasonable Return
An investor used to get a 7.5% return by holding safe bonds: To earn that now, research finds, takes a more volatile mix”,
Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2016
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In closing, a quote from a 2014 Harvard Business Review article by the authors of

the Focusing Capital on the Long Term (FCLT) initiative: 145

If asset owners and managers are to do a better job of investing for the long-term, they

need to run their organizations in a way that supports and reinforces this.

145

http://www.cembenchmarking.com/Files/Documents/Research/Pension_Governance_and_LT_Investing.pdf
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Definitions of Key Terms 146

Asset Allocation - Asset allocation is the implementation of an investment strategy

that attempts to balance risk versus reward by adjusting the percentage of each asset in an
investment portfolio according to the investor's risk tolerance, goals and investment time

horizon.

Asset Owner – An asset owner is any organization that has a pool of funds for

investment including pension funds, foundations and endowments. Also known as an
institutional investor.

Board of Trustees / Directors - An appointed or elected board that supervises the

affairs of a public or private organization, i.e. the board of trustees of the university, the

board of a public company. The board sets the policies of the organization, and appoints
(and terminates) senior management personnel.

Endowment – A gift of money or income producing property to a public

organization (such as a hospital or university) for a specific purpose (such as research or

scholarships). Generally, the endowed asset is kept intact and only the income generated by
it is consumed.

Foundation – An organization established from donated funds, for the purpose of

donating funds (grants) to others.

Fiduciary – One that holds a fiduciary relation or acts in a fiduciary capacity

(Merriam-Webster).

Fiduciary Duty - Fiduciary duty represents a “cluster of obligations” owed by one

person, the “trustee” or “fiduciary” toward another, the “cestui” or “beneficiary”, regarding
146

Unless otherwise noted, Investopedia.com and Businessdictionary.com.

an identified subject matter, which is referred to as the “res” or “subject of the trust”

220

(Chodos, 2000).

Governance - Establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper

implementation, by the members of the governing body of an organization. It includes the
mechanisms required to balance the powers of the members (with the associated

accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the prosperity and viability of the
organization. See also corporate governance.

Group (Organizational) Dynamics – is defined in the Blackwell Dictionary of

Social Psychology as what happens when people interact with one another, noting that

there are differences between what occurs and what is expected to occur given groups’
cultures and structures.

Investment Committee – The governing body that is charged with overseeing

institutional investments, monitoring staff and the investment consultant and developing

investment policies for board approval.

Investment Consultant - An individual or business that provides institutional or

high-net-worth investors with long-term investment planning in exchange for a fee. An

investment consultant monitors a client’s investments and makes recommendations to help
them achieve their long-term goals (Financial Times Lexicon).

Investment Manager – A person or organization that makes investments in

portfolios of securities on behalf of clients, in accordance with the investment objectives

and parameters defined by these clients. Also, known as a money manager. This includes a
variety of investment vehicles such as hedge funds, separate accounts, mutual funds and
index products.

Pension Fund - A common asset pool meant to generate stable growth over the
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long term, and provide retirement income (annuity or lump sum payments) for employees

when they reach the end of their working years and commence retirement.

Portfolio - Pool of different investments by which an investor seeks to make a profit

(or income) while aiming to preserve the invested (principal) amount. These investments

are chosen generally on the basis of different risk-reward combinations: from low risk, low
yield (e.g. investment grade bonds) to high risk, high yield (e.g. junk bonds) ones; or

different types of income streams: steady but fixed, or variable but with a potential for
growth.

Risk-adjusted return - A concept that refines an investment's return by measuring

how much risk is involved in producing that return, which is generally expressed as a

number or rating. Risk-adjusted returns are applied to individual securities and investment

funds and portfolios. There are five principal risk measures: alpha, beta, r-squared, standard
deviation and the Sharpe ratio. Each risk measure is unique in how it measures risk. When

comparing two or more potential investments, an investor should always compare the same
risk measures to each different investment in order to get a relative performance
perspective.

Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) - A theory on how risk-averse investors can construct

portfolios to optimize or maximize expected return based on a given level of market risk,

emphasizing that risk is an inherent part of higher reward. Also called "portfolio theory" or
"portfolio management theory." According to the theory, it's possible to construct an

"efficient frontier" of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible expected return for
a given level of risk. This theory was pioneered by Harry Markowitz in his paper "Portfolio
Selection," published in 1952 by the Journal of Finance.
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There are four basic steps involved in portfolio construction: 1) Security valuation,

2) asset allocation, 3) portfolio optimization, and 4) performance measurement.

Discount Rate - The discount rate reflects what the plan's assets can reasonably be

expected to earn over the long term.

Funding Ratio - The ratio of an annuity or pension's assets to it liabilities. Funding

ratios above a one will indicate the pension or annuity can cover all obligated payments.

Ratios below a one will reflect it is unable to make payments or may be in jeopardy of not
being about to make payments at a later time.
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Question 1 - What would you identify as three key characteristics that make corporate
boards different than pension boards? How do these three characteristics improve or detract
from pension board functioning, i.e., trustees from fulfilling their fiduciary duty? (Sarah Peck)
While I believe there are many similarities between the two types of organizations

(for one that they are both charged with “earning and returning”), there are indeed some
material differences; material in the sense that they directly impact the fiduciary

effectiveness of boards. They are: 1) key differences in compensation structures; 2) key

differences in external forces for governance discipline (i.e., a lack of a change of control

market for public pensions); and 3) key differences in the nomination or appointment
process (i.e., a political process of appointment for public pensions).

Turning to compensation, let us first acknowledge there has been no academic

work done in this area for public pensions, so anything I share here is strictly anecdotal in

nature. There, of course, is plenty of research on corporate boards, and especially due to the
human resource/compensation/benefit consulting industry served by organizations like

Hewitt and tracked and reported by proxy advisory firms such as ISS, board remuneration
is essentially standardized today and relatively consistent.

Public pensions, however, are inconsistent at best; some board members are paid,

and many are volunteers, and this inconsistency exists not just across organizations but also
within the organizations themselves. Let us look at CalPERS for example. In recent times,
five of the 13 board members receive extraordinary compensation relative to the others.

This subgroup within the board’s distinguishing characteristic? They are public employees
being compensated for taking time away from their jobs. 147 Some board members receive

only a few hundred dollars a month, while others are paid tens of thousands of dollars per

year. Among the five in the ’11-‘12 period the top earner took home $369K and the bottom,

147

Ortiz, Jon, “Pay for CalPERS board members varies widely”, Sacramento Bee, November 22,
2014 http://www.sacbee.com/news/investigations/the-public-eye/article4071012.html

$62K. Other members earned only $100 per meeting, and a final category of members,
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earned nothing; they were strictly volunteers.

Compensation for paid staff is also an issue, and it is widely known that public

pensions struggle to attract talent away from the private sector, as salaries are dictated by
law, with little to no flexibility to award bonus or additional compensation based on
performance.

Compensation that is too low or inconsistent, of course, can impede the

effectiveness of fiduciaries. Inconsistent incentive structures can mean less engagement and
higher turnover, aside from the issue of the quality of recruitment for these positions in the
first place. Corporate board members generally do not suffer from being underpaid or paid
inconsistently. Moreover, many corporate board members are compensated with some
form of equity, which serves to better align their interests with shareholders.

The next key difference between corporate boards and pension boards (specifically

public pension boards), is that there is a significant difference in external forces for

governance discipline. What I mean by this is that if governance meanders or fails in a

corporation, “bad stuff” starts to happen, and not necessarily in this order: First, the stock

price begins to fall, which impacts any shareholder including board members. Then external
sources of funding may dry up as bondholders and lenders withdraw support. Shareholders
will also begin to litigate. Next, as the stock becomes cheap, an activist investor or strategic
competitor may seek to take control of the company by making a tender offer to

shareholders or undertaking a proxy fight. Ultimately, in the case of bankruptcy, the court
may order liquidation of the assets, or award creditors with control of the company. The
main point is that there are several external mechanisms to enforce disciplined
performance from a governance standpoint at virtually every step.
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In the case of a public pension, there is really only one source of external pressure

on fiduciaries. A pension can become insolvent, although even here it is likely to be

backstopped by the state government. Short of a true “bankruptcy”, the only form of

external pressure is the municipal bond market, although individuals can also pursue
litigation. If municipal bond market investors perceive financial risk to the overall

municipality or state due to its pension funding obligations, they will “walk with their feet”

and sell or not purchase the bonds of the municipality, and thereby drive up the bond yields

or interest costs, which in turn will drive up the financing costs to the municipality. This has
the effect of not just enforcing discipline on the pension board, but the entire municipal

government. The drawback of having only one primary form of external pressure is that it

can come late in game, as we have witnessed in the city of Chicago, long after that pressure
was needed for corrections to be made.

Finally, the process of board appointment is very different for public pension and

corporations. Board members in companies are typically recruited by the CEO and

nominating committee and then elected by shareholders, but this can be contested by
outside entities in the form of a proxy fight, as mentioned earlier. Not only are people

recruited for their knowledge, abilities and connections, but they are also appointed for
control. For public pensions, board members are either appointed by the government
(typically the governor in the case of state pensions), elected by the unions or end up

serving as part of their staff appointment (i.e. the state treasurer). We have found in our
research that organizations tend to have better governance with appointed rather than

elected members, and I suspect this is because the governor in such cases acts more like a

CEO, appointing individuals to serve based on similar criteria (i.e., knowledge, abilities and
connections), rather than through the other process of union appointment, where the

candidate may not have any specific credentials for the position other than seeking out
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appointment.

Question 2 - What are potential reporting bias that are created when your sample drops
from163/ 161 to 35 pension funds? How could you test for these biases? (Sarah Peck)
In statistics the absolute accuracy of any study is only possible when one examines

the entire population by conducting a census. However, accuracy is not linear. The accuracy
of a sample comprised of half the population is not 50%, but very nearly 100%. Good
accuracy levels may be achieved with small sample sizes, so long as the sample is

representative. If the sample is not representative, then there will be error in the results,

which means that the average values obtained through the study are different than the true
average values of the population we targeted.

So, how do we test for this, especially in the case of this study, where the sample was 35 out
of an original study group of 163 from an overall population of 6,300?

One method is to test whether several statistics that are descriptive of a distribution are

the same in the sub-sample as the original sample. For example, we could conduct tests for:
•
•
•
•

mean difference

median difference

stochastic dominance

difference in variance

We could also explore tests for equivalence of all such measures by combining

inferences from difference and equivalence tests. TOST, an acronym for “two one-sided
tests”, is a straightforward way of constructing a test of the null hypothesis that two
population statistics differ by no more than a small equivalence threshold.

Another method is to conduct a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (KS test). This is a
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nonparametric test of the equality of continuous, one-dimensional probability distributions

that can be used to compare two samples (two-sample KS test). The KS statistic quantifies a
distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples. The distribution of
this statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the
same distribution.

Question 3 - As you are aware, the use of principal components analysis (PCA) as a datareduction technique can generate bias in estimation results. (Farrohk Nourzad)
a. In those cases, where the use of principal components as a data-reduction technique
does generate bias is the results, exactly what will be biased, the point estimate or the
standard error associated with the principal component regressor?
The point estimate of the regression coefficient associated with the principal

component regressor.

b. Under what conditions would the use of principal components not bias the estimation
results?
While according to Enns (1979) there are no conditions under which PCA

will not bias estimation results, bias will decrease as more components are
added to the principal components regression.

Question 4 - There are three approaches to estimating linear regression models with binary
dependent variable: the linear probability model, the probit model, and the logit model.
(Farrohk Nourzad)
a. Briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods.
The main advantage of the linear probability model is that it is simple to use.

The main disadvantage is that the model doesn’t work well if probability estimated
values are not within the (0,1) range. A better approach is using the logit or probit
model.
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Generally, the setup and use of the logit and probit approaches are the same.

The coefficients from a probit model will be somewhat different to those from a logit
model since the transformation from the coefficient to a probability in probit is

different from the equivalent transformation in logit. However, logit and probit will
produce similar predicted probabilities because maximum likelihood estimators

choose the parameters so that πi is as close to 1 when yi=1 and πi is as close to 0

when yi=0.

The advantage of the logit and probit approaches is that the coefficients will

tell you the direction and statistical significance associated with the effect of

increasing an independent variable just like OLS coefficients. The main disadvantage
is that you cannot assess marginal impacts of the coefficient, as in the “amount of

change” in x will impact a certain “amount of change” in the probability of y. In other
words, the coefficients tell you nothing about the magnitude of the effect of a
change. However, these can be transformed to provide an estimate.

b. Under what condition(s) should one use the probit model instead of the logit model?
Both methods will yield similar - though not identical - inferences. Logit is

more popular in health sciences like epidemiology partly because coefficients can be
interpreted in terms of odds ratios. Probit models can be generalized to account for
non-constant error variances in more advanced econometric settings (known as

heteroskedastic probit models) and for this reason are used in some contexts by

economists and political scientists.

c. As you are aware, the estimated coefficients of probit and logit models cannot be
interpreted as marginal effects. However, one can transform them to represent
marginal effect. Please transform the estimated coefficients of your probit model
(Model 6 on page 169 of your dissertation) that appear in Table 21 (2b.) on page 171
and interpret the results.

There are two methods of transforming the data in the model into estimates that
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allow measurement of marginal impacts. I am applying the first method as taught by Dr.
James McGibany. This method involves using “fact regression” of the mean values of the
variables.

The first step involves calculation of a “Z-score” by taking a weighted average of the

product of the coefficient estimates of each regressor times the average right-hand side

variable mean. In this case, I calculated a Z-score of 2.94625. Then using a density function, I
converted the Z-score into a scale factor, for which I calculated a scale factor of 0.0052.

The final step involves multiplying each estimated coefficient by the scale factor. I

was thereby able to convert the estimated coefficient into a marginal impact estimate on the
probability that event “1” occurs. In this model, an event “1” is the condition of effectiveness
as defined by a funding ratio greater than 0.50 for a given public pension plan. Here is the

table of marginal impact estimates with interpretations, along with the original estimate of
coefficients from the model:

Regressor
FEQ

Legal Index

Market Asset Value

Equities

Fixed Income

Real Estate

Alternatives

Coefficient

0.064624

-0.041900
-9.19E-08

-3.263310

-1.146770

-2.575224

-2.853072

Marginal Impact
Estimate

0.0003

-0.0002

0.0000

-0.0170

-0.0006

-0.0134

-0.0148

Interpretation
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A one-unit increase in
the FEQ, is a 0.03%
increase in the
probability of
effectiveness.

A one-unit increase in
the Legal Index, is a
0.02% decrease in the
probability of
effectiveness.

Size of the plan has no
impact on the
probability of
effectiveness.

A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
equity allocation is
a1.7% decrease in the
probability of
effectiveness.
A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
fixed income allocation
is a 0.06% decrease in
the probability of
effectiveness.

A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
real estate allocation is a
1.3% decrease in the
probability of
effectiveness.
A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
alternatives allocation is
a 1.5% decrease in the
probability of
effectiveness.

Cash and Equivalents

Total Beneficiaries

Required

Contribution Rate
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-1.520448

0.406256

-0.146158

-0.0079

0.0021

-0.0008

A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
cash allocation is a
0.79% decrease in the
probability of
effectiveness.
A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
total beneficiaries is a
0.21% increase in the
probability of
effectiveness.

A one percent increase
(standard deviation) in
required contribution
rate is a 0.08% decrease
in the probability of
effectiveness.

Question 5 - You talk about fiduciaries duties generally under trust law and then you discuss
more specifically fiduciary duties of public pension trustees. Are general fiduciaries duties
under trust law the same or different than duties that apply under state law to public pension
trustees? If different, in what material respects do they differ? (Paul Secunda)
General fiduciary duties under trust law are similar but not the same under state

law as compared to the state law governing public pensions. Both find the same root in

common law, and many of the same tenets found in the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(UPIA). However, state public pension systems are governed by a series of legislative acts

and state laws, whereas the Uniform Trust Code governs trusts, which has been adopted in
a majority of states including Wisconsin.

So, the first major difference is legal inconsistency. Because there is a patchwork of

legislation that governs state pensions across the country and no set of uniform laws, it is
impossible to say that every state follows the same set of rules as the Uniform Trust Code

because virtually every state is different. An effort to harmonize these different sets of rules

fell to naught in the early 2000’s with the Uniform Management of Public Employee
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Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA), which was only adopted in two states.

Out of this come two main critical differences specific to general fiduciary rules. One

criticism is that conflicts of interest are not adequately addressed by states for public
pensions, and this has been one of the main issues on the agenda of those calling for

harmonization. In particular, rules for who serves and in what capacity are widely varying.

Additionally, many have voiced criticism over the amount of “social activism” being engaged
by public pensions that puts retirement beneficiaries secondary to plan objectives, which, of
course, potentially violates the duty of loyalty. 148

Question 6 - One of the more difficult areas of pension investing for public entities is “social
investing.” To what extent should public pension trustees be able to take environmental,
social, or governance (ESG) issues into account when making investment decisions, while still
acting in the best interest of pension plan beneficiaries? When calPERs decided not to invest in
tobacco companies for ESG reasons a number of years ago, were such actions consistent with
their fiduciary duties to their pension beneficiaries? (Paul Secunda)
I think, as a practical matter, the ESG movement is here to stay regardless of one’s

position or viewpoint on ESG. For those who believe in the double (or triple bottom) line,
they would say that there is no conflict and that both objectives, of acting socially

responsibly and supporting beneficiary objectives, are not mutually exclusive, but are

actually mutually reinforcing. There is a large body of academic research over the last 30
years that provides evidence of this. A recent study by Friede, Busch and Bassen (2015)

conducted a meta-analysis of 2,000 ESG studies since 1979 and concluded that 90% of the

studies had statistical evidence of a relationship between ESG factors and positive financial
results. 149

148
149

http://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-JCSM-0316.pdf
https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/ESG_study_Jan16.pdf

I would put myself into that camp with some caveats. The explosion in asset
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managers over the last couple of years that describe themselves as “ESG-integrated” seems

to me in general to lack any qualification whatsoever, and comes to the market with a

distinct standards issue analogous to the “organic” farming movement of 30 years ago (In

the beginning there was a definite lack of standards for those claiming their products were
“organic”. See Ellsworth (2001), for a discussion on the history of the development of

standards and regulation for the organic food industry). 150 And so I think the problem for

asset owners going forward will be first to define their specific ESG objectives, and then

audit or enforce those objectives under their given mandate. Eliminating tobacco stocks

from a portfolio is very straightforward and simple to process. Having a manager control
the carbon footprint of their portfolio is a different matter altogether. Holding asset
managers accountable to a given set of objectives is key.

I also believe there is room for debate over what our governments say qualifies as

ESG. Certain values that are controversial in the domain of politics or public policy should

not be immune when it comes to small groups of people making investment decisions with
public funds on behalf of millions of beneficiaries. Providing capital to certain social

objectives is more than just moral support, it is promoting growth to industries that have
material impacts on society. If a government wishes to remain agnostic and invest in

general without any set of ESG criteria, that is one thing, but when opening the door to ESG,
the expression of a certain set of values now subjects itself to a certain level of public
scrutiny that may not have existed prior to that governance decision.

Question 7 – What is fraud, how does an investment manager usually commit fraud, and why
does fraud so significantly impact a firm’s FEQ? (Nadelle Grossman)

150

I find the online Free Legal Dictionary definition of fraud a good one:

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8889458/Ellsworth.pdf?sequence=1
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“A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have

been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the
individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury. Fraud is commonly
understood as dishonesty calculated for advantage. A person who is

dishonest may be called a fraud. In the U.S. legal system, fraud is a specific

offense with certain features. Fraud is most common in the buying or selling
of property, including real estate, Personal Property, and intangible
property, such as stocks, bonds, and copyrights.” 151

An investment manager can commit fraud in a number of ways. One of the better-

known - if not most common - forms of fraud is the so-called Ponzi scheme. This simple

scheme involves making “earnings payments” to investors from funds raised from new

investors. The secret to keeping a Ponzi scheme going is to continue finding new investors.
Typically, the jig is up when the Ponzi scheme perpetrator fails to find new sources of

funding and can no longer keep up with the payments to its existing base of “investors”, as
was the case with Bernie Madoff, who perpetrated the largest Ponzi scheme in history,
which impacted thousands of individual and institutional investors to the tune of $50

billion. He had kept his Ponzi scheme going for a very long time, over 20 years, and the

scheme only became apparent (despite some earlier warnings from whistleblowers who
were ignored by authorities) during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. A wave of

redemptions by investors hit hedge funds, who in an act of general panic, attempted to turn
their investments to cash. When Madoff was unable to keep up with redemptions because
there were in fact no underlying assets, the scheme revealed itself as fraud.
151

http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fraud

The SEC has a comprehensive list on its web site of common forms of fraud
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involving investments that range from “pump and dump” schemes to “internet and social
media” fraud. 152

Fraud can, of course, impact an organization’s Legal Index, as we identified in the

study. Case severity was one of the two factors we identified as a key component of the

Legal Index. Fraud ranked number one in the case severity scale. More specifically, as it

relates to the FEQ, one of the six “super factors” of Fiduciary Effectiveness identified in the

study has to do with process diligence, under which fraud can be one manifestation of poor
diligence (and poor investment performance, of course, another). Based on our analysis,

this accounts for approximately 10% of the FEQ measure. The other five factors relate to
Board Composition, Engagement, Professionalism, Staff and Institutional Knowledge.

Question 8 – Are fiduciary duties an effective way to hold investment managers accountable
for their myopia? Why or why not? (Nadelle Grossman)
If what is meant by myopia here is what is also known as the problem of “short-

termism”, then the question is asking about an issue that is, as many have argued, largely
systemic, rather than unique to asset owners and their investment managers.

The definition of myopia or “short-termism” is, simply put, a focus and emphasis on

short-term performance versus long-term performance. By performance, I mean the

financial performance of companies, and the investment performance of investments in

those companies or other investments. The quarterly schedule public companies are on to

report earnings and provide guidance is an example of a culture that reinforces a short-term
view. How many managers are compensated through stock and stock options reinforces a

focus on short-term performance. One example of short-termist behavior is the preference
152

https://www.investor.gov/protect-your-investments/fraud/types-fraud

for companies to buy back stock rather than make new investments in their businesses,
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which often requires a long-term commitment. Buying back stock has the immediate and

gratifying effect of boosting one’s earnings per share by shrinking the denominator, number
of shares. I think, by the way, the diminishing number of new public offerings and

companies converting from public to private companies are a reaction to short-termism.

The other related issue feeding into this is the separation of ownership from control.

Whether its millions of individual stockholders invested through their IRA accounts or

millions of beneficiaries that are or (hopefully) will receive benefits from their pension plan,
the disaggregation of owners from direct control over the investment itself has fed into this
“short-termist” culture. Investment managers report and are also reviewed on a quarterly
basis, just as their underlying investments are. The shifts they make in a portfolio most
often are not taken within the context of a long time-horizon.

With this as background, let us turn to the question of whether fiduciary duties can

keep anyone within this cycle accountable for myopia or “short-termism”. I would say first,

this depends in part on the time horizon of the investment vehicle. Pension plans can take a
long-term view typically, as the average duration of funds tends to be around 13 years

based on the projected liabilities; college endowments even longer in perpetuity; and bank
overnight funding operations, of course, much less so.

I would also say that some fiduciaries use this position of long-term investment

horizons to take a longer-term view. The extent of investor activism among some of the

larger pension funds such as calPERS is an example of a longer-term orientation. The Yale
endowment seems to take a longer-term view especially in the way it has promoted-ESG

forms of investing, and expressed a preference for alternative investments, such as private
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equity to invest for the long-term. It’s predilection for hedge fund investing, however, does
not support a long-term view. Hedge funds are notoriously short-termist.

On balance, though, I would say most fiduciaries fall into the short-termist trap,

which is why we generally see lackluster governance and returns at least from the group we
studied, public pensions, and it should not be surprising. The behavioral biases of human
beings are well-documented, and investor myopia is high on the list. Under the aegis of

fiduciary duty, it is quite easy for any investor or group of investors to justify a short-term
approach to investing, as all they need to do is to document a process. Under the business
judgment rule, a court will look the other way regardless of the approach, so long as the

group had a quorum, everyone voted, and the meeting minutes were taken. So, the short
answer is no, fiduciary duties are no defense against investor myopia. Education is.

Professionalism is. Transparency is. These practices can make fiduciaries better, and
persuade them to take a longer-term approach.

Question 9 - What are the known relationships between group size, problem solving
processes, and outcomes under general circumstances? Based on this information and the type
of task involved, what would be the optimal configuration of a fiduciary board (or team)?
(Stephen Guastello)
This question essentially asks: Based on what we know about humans and group

dynamics, how would I go about developing the perfect board for governing a dedicated
investment fund? Because, under the theory, Fiduciary Effectiveness is a function of

Structure, Process/Engagement and People, we would need to address each element
accordingly.

Let us turn to the first part of the question about the known relationships between

group size, problem solving and outcomes. The first thing we know is that smaller is better
when it comes to board/committee size. The Ringelmann Effect, also known as “social
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loafing”, is at play according to social psychology research (Latané & Harkins, 1979). The

idea is that as people are added to a work group, one may believe they are adding more

talent and hands to handle a task, when instead they are getting the opposite. People have a
tendency to hide within a larger group, and not be accountable for tasks, as they operate

under the assumption that someone else will do the work. In addition to finding evidence of
this in psychological experiments, corporate governance research substantiates this as well.
Empirical studies have shown that smaller corporate boards are more effective, and that
relationship declines as board size increases from four to ten members (John & Senbet,
1998).

We also know that boards are challenged in two primary ways, by the time they

have available to commit to the board, and the extent of their individual competence and

experience. As the 2001 Myners’ Report found, “many trustees are not especially expert in
investment”. They also have a range of biases that impact their ability to make good

investment decisions. Layer on top of that, beyond the “bounded rationality” of each board

member, the issue of differences in group dynamics. Some groups work very well together,
while others do not. Some groups fall into being dominated by one or two group members,

who are status-seeking, a common problem in my experience, but not necessarily any better
informed in their discernments or judgments. One inherent challenge to boards is that

unlike operational work groups that work day-to-day, as in an office or industrial setting,

boards only get together every so often, maybe 12 times a year on the very high end; more
often an average of 5 or 6 times. This makes it inherently difficult for people to form

relationships and build trust. All of these factors combine to make effective group decision-

making and problem solving a major hurdle.
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So, what would I do in my organizational design to minimize these issues? Looking

at Structure first. My board would be no more than five people. The entire board would be

the investment committee, and at least two-thirds of the members would also serve on the
audit committee. My board would turnover no more than every five years, and to

accomplish this everyone would sign on for at least a three-year term, and terms would be
staggered. I realized staggered boards are discouraged in corporate governance for the

reason that they can be used as a takeover defense, but in this context I think it does serve

to enhance organizational continuity. The board chair would serve at least a two-year term.
Turnover can be a real problem for organizational continuity, and this was evident in the
research. We address this, as identified in my research, as the Super Factor, Institutional
Knowledge.

My board would also have no more than one elected representative if this is a public

pension board, and the rest would be appointed or professional (i.e. staff leadership). Again,
we found that appointed members versus elected members tended to improve the

effectiveness measure, and I believe this is because those who were hand-picked for their

talents and abilities versus found through a political process by an uninformed electorate of
beneficiary retirees, tend to offer more. The board would also be compensated, and would
be compensated fairly based on market rates as compared to corporate boards. My board
members would also be limited in not serving on more than three other outside boards.
There would be only one investment consultant because in my experience multiple

consultants can confuse matters, although there, of course, may be other advisors, such as
actuaries or accountants.

Then turning to process, my board would meet monthly. They would also meet for

at least two hours, and for possibly up to a quarter of the meetings in the year for at least a
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half day, maybe a full day, with breaks and activities in-between, that may be unrelated to
the work at hand to foster relationships and build trust. They would be presented with

meeting packets in advance that would tend to be more graphical in nature. As I learned in
my research (and my Human Factors course), the way information is summarized, framed

and presented is also important, especially in dealing with people and their cognitive biases.
A good portion of the agenda, if not every meeting, would be focused on education and

fiduciary training. I would have my board members attend conferences and workshops

possibly in between or in lieu of the monthly meeting. The consultant and staff would be a

key part of the agenda, and would drive much of the agenda. Having the consultant and staff
participate in the meetings was also evident from the research.

Finally, on the people factor, at least half the board must have a background in

investments. It would be great if the other half had a background in accounting, actuarial
science or math, but I would settle for a business background of some sort. They should

have some board experience, and having someone from a related field in academia would be
a plus, as well. They should have some fiduciary training, which the organization will

provide if they don’t. They should have the ability to commit a certain amount of time to the
job, plan on attending most meetings, and preferably in person. Also, the choice of the

consultant and senior staff person are among the most important decisions of the group,

and these people should turnover infrequently, but occasionally, to enhance continuity and
institutional knowledge, and to also add a fresh perspective now and then.

Question 10 - What are the principles behind program trading? What is known about their
effectiveness as a decision-making tool? Do they present any new risks, and if so, how would
those risks be managed by fiduciary boards (teams)? (Stephen Guastello)
Program trading is known by many names including algorithmic trading, high

frequency trading (HFT), arbitrage trading, etc. This is a highly controversial area of
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investing, and the media has made much out of some of the perceived unfair trade practices
and risks of this method in its application of computer science to financial markets. These
methods are typically employed by hedge funds or proprietary trading firms, which trade
on their own accounts.

Investopedia has a good definition of program trading: 153

“More broadly, program trading can be defined as all aspects of

computerized trading, including algorithmic trading, high-frequency trading
(HFT) and quantitative trading. Program trading is generally undertaken by
institutional traders at hedge funds, brokerages, and HFT firms, as well as
institutions like mutual funds and pension funds. It typically involves the
purchase or sale of various shares in very large quantities.”

In the world of institutional investing, as it relates to asset owners such as pension

plans, if an organization would like to make use of a program trading strategy typically it is
but one of many strategies included in the portfolio, and to that end a pension would
typically hire a hedge fund to run such a strategy.

In today’s world, hedge funds in general are falling out of favor for several reasons

including their high fees and expenses, lack of transparency around underlying positions

and trading activity and most of all, lackluster performance. When looking at broad hedge
fund indexes relative to traditional markets including public equities and fixed income,
hedge funds as a group have underperformed over the last ten years.

There are a number of possible explanations for that underperformance: 1) the

number of hedge funds have proliferated over the last 20 years, at one point with over
153

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/050214/perils-program-trading.asp

8,000 funds (that is more than the number of listed public companies in the U.S. as a

255

measure of comparison), and as more have come into the market, exploiting market

inefficiencies has become more difficult with the increased competition; 2) the high “2 and

20” or “3 and 30” fee structures have sucked out most of the return (e.g., the case of the NY
City Pension Plan, which had a large percentage of its portfolio in such strategies suffered

public embarrassment recently for having made no earnings over the last ten years, while

still paying out $2 billion in management fees over that period of time to hedge funds); and
3) the high risk, unregulated and capricious nature of the asset class has meant high

turnover in the space with the average life of hedge funds not much more than three years;
and 4) strategies that purport to earn excess alpha, or even “risk-free” returns, are fleeting
and in the long-run unreliable. As a result, there has been a recent backlash against hedge

funds with a number of high profile asset owners quite publicly shutting down their hedge
fund strategies, starting with calPERS two years ago.

This is not to say the top hedge funds are hurting; quite the opposite. The

individuals running and working for these funds are among the wealthiest and most well-

compensated people working in finance, or in business overall, for that matter, with many

receiving many times the pay packet of the average CEO. These funds do well because they
have done well for their investors, and some have been around a long time like Baupost,
based in Boston, which started in the late 70’s, or ASQ out of Connecticut.

Now, at it relates to risk in the financial markets, there have been some “events”

over the past few years that have been triggered by program trading. The 2010 “Flash

Crash” was first in a series of such events, which saw over the brief span of 25 minutes a

huge decline in U.S. stock market indexes with some companies like Procter & Gamble, that
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was trading in the $40 range at the time, suddenly trading around $1 per share. There was
just another event last month in the currency markets involving the British pound.

While these make for big news events, from the perspective of an asset owner that is

running a long-term portfolio, and carefully managing its liquidity needs, these have little to
no impact on what these organizations are doing. First, they tend to be diversified across
asset classes and investment managers. Secondly, they tend not to be raising cash from a
portfolio at sudden points in time from highly volatile asset classes. These tend to be

carefully planned and staged out from low volatile assets like short-term bonds. For an

individual, who may be reacting to a news event, or is applying stop losses to positions, it
can be, however, quite costly.

Question 11 - You say (p. 4) that since 1985 the American percentage share of DB versus DC
plans has shifted significantly to the latter. You also say (p. 15) that workers with access to DC
plans represent over 80% of full-time working Americans. Your FEQ is intended to apply to U.S.
public pension plans. How would your FEQ address the country’s shift to DC plans? (John
Davis)
My FEQ is intended to address any type of institutional fund governance context.

Public pensions just happen to be our sample study group. As I explain from p. 182 of the

dissertation:

“The goal in this study was to find out what actually matters based on

empirical measures, without the interference and noise of opinion. To do
this we turned to the tools of corporate governance, a huge body of work

that spans the last 30 years, and applied these methods to our examination
of investment organizations to come up with comparable and

comprehensible measures that carry statistical validity in their assessments.
We sought to understand what makes for differences in organizations, their
relative effectiveness, and what makes them effective on an absolute basis.
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To do this we gathered data on U.S. Public Pension Plans. Their public policy
import in their role in providing retirement security to millions of

Americans notwithstanding, they produce data, which permitted depth to
this investigation.”

This methodology theoretically may be applied to any organization that has a

governance structure (i.e., a board or committee, staff and external service providers)

including foundations, endowments, trusts and also, DC Plans i.e., 401(k) and 403(b) plans.
Typically, the only difference between a DC and DB plan is that instead of the board and

managers making investment decisions on behalf of beneficiaries, the plan participant is

making the investment choice. Although, even there with improvements in plan design and
technology, many DC plans now “channel” participants into a portfolio selection, so that
many participants no longer even need to make decisions on allocation and manager

selection from options within the plan beyond responding to a brief questionnaire. The
oversight and operation of a DC plan still requires a governance structure.

Additionally, as noted in my literature review, there have been studies that have

focused on DC plans alone. I give the example of Saeli’s work on p. 109:

“Other related work includes Saeli (2011), who suggests a methodology for
quantitatively evaluating the effectiveness of defined contribution plans in
the public sector by looking at a number of factors including employee

participation rates, average contributions, periodic review of managers and
service quality and fees.”

Here some of the metrics to include in a DC-specific governance study could be

expanded to cover some of the unique qualities of DC plans, such as opt-in rates given the
voluntary nature of DC plans, but the essential governance framework we lay out is
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universal. After all, the methods we applied here to public pension plans were not invented
in this study, but were cross-applied from the corporate governance world.

Question 12 - You argue (pp. 13-14) that most corporate plans have shifted funding and
investment burdens to workers because of increased foreign competition. Thomas Piketty and
others have argued that the capital share of income has risen (and the labor share has fallen)
significantly since 1980. In addition, many have shown that the income distribution has
become significantly more unequal since the 1980s, while executive compensation has also
sky-rocketed. Why should we think that increased foreign competition should be seen as the
explanation for the decreasingly generous in corporate plans? (John Davis)
It is true that capital share of income has risen and labor’s has fallen. It is also true

that income distribution is less equal today than it was forty years ago, but there is some

further context around these statistics, which I will cover below. The main factor for the U.S.
economy has been the deindustrialization that occurred over this time, and the

transformation of the U.S. economy to a service and information-based economy. That

process of deindustrialization has come about as industrial production has moved beyond
U.S. borders to places in the world with lower labor costs. The upside of these shifts in the

global economy is that global wealth has expanded at an unbelievable pace, and now many

more people around the world are becoming ever closer (if not already there) to sharing the
same standard of living we have enjoyed in this country for decades.

A former professor of mine at Iowa (now at Illinois), Deirdre McCloskey, just

published a book entitled, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions,

Enriched the World. In a recent essay that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, here is what
she had to say about income inequality:

“Today’s concerns over the stagnation of real wages in the U.S. and other

developed economies are overblown if put in historical perspective. As the

economists Donald Boudreaux and Mark Perry have argued in these pages,
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the official figures don’t take account of the real benefits of our astonishing
material progress.” 154

A recent Op/Ed that also appeared in the Wall Street Journal, “Congrat’s, You’re a

Billionaire.” (Nov. 8, 2016) by Andy Kessler, underscored this point well in talking about
smart phone technology, a device now in the hands of more than 2 billion people. 155

“It’s a lesson easily forgotten because progress is a creeping thing. Society
doesn’t get wealthy overnight. But it does get wealthy. Three years ago, in
his speech calling income inequality “the defining challenge of our time,”

President Obama lamented people’s frustrations. “It’s rooted in the nagging
sense that no matter how hard they work, the deck is stacked against them.

And it’s rooted in the fear that their kids won’t be better off than they were.”

To coin a phrase, the only thing we have to fear are those peddling fear itself.
Won’t be better off? Our kids are billionaires compared with us.”

He argues that innovation has put into the hands of everyday people technology that

couldn’t have been acquired by those with endless financial resources even just a few years
ago. How do we put a value on that, and still talk about income today? This question has

some similarity to the usefulness of GDP as a measure of a country’s wealth. Is it the dollar
value of goods and services each nation produces, or should it be the utility of that

production in promoting the quality of human life on which we should place a value?

Indeed, we have externalized the benefits of human innovation, without properly

measuring them, just as we have externalized the costs of using certain scarce resources

like water. Externalization to my mind is one of the biggest problems in economics today.
154
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How can we, as a civilization, not properly value a scarce commodity like water, when two-

thirds of the human population is living under significant water scarcity or drought, and the
World Economic Forum has placed water security as one of the top three global challenges
next to terrorism and climate change? 156

So, back to the original question: how did foreign competition effectively end the

defined benefit plan (DB Plan) in the U.S.? It wasn’t just deindustrialization that ended the

DB plan, it was a host of factors, according to a 2014 report by the Bipartisan Policy Center:
“Employers with DB plans, however, face significant financial burdens. If
contributions and investment returns are not enough to pay promised

benefits, the employer is responsible for making up the difference. While DB

plans are still the most common type of retirement plan among public-sector
employees, these burdens help explain why DB pensions have become
increasingly rare among private-sector employers over the past 30
years…This trend reflects a number of factors, including increased

regulatory requirements aimed at ensuring that plans are adequately

funded; employer attempts to reduce the volatility and cost of providing

retirement benefits – employer contributions to DC plans are typically much
lower; and the perspective that DC plans may be better suited for a modern,
mobile workforce.” 157

Added to that list is the significant increase in human longevity and changing

demographics, points I make in the dissertation, which have added incalculable costs to

these plans. Many of these original plans were conceived when people only lived a few years
156
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261

into retirement, and there were many more workers to retirees. Now people can expect to
live 20 to 30 years into retirement, and this has actuarially expanded the cost to sustain

these programs in a way I am not sure anyone has precisely measured other than on a case-

by-case basis. In addition, the worker-to-retiree ratio is plummeting across the developed
world, which makes many pay-as-you-go plans, like Social Security, untenable at current
benefit payment rates.

The chronic underfunding and widely unrealistic target returns (discount rates) on

which public plans are valuing their liabilities (which grotesquely understates the current

extent of their underfunding) today is further evidence that these forms of pension systems
are most likely unsustainable in today’s world at least under current approaches to their
governance, management and funding.

